

**MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY**

**COUNTERINSURGENCY LEADERSHIP  
IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND BEYOND**

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS: LEADERSHIP IN COUNTERINSURGENCY  
A CONVERSATION WITH GEN. PETRAEUS**

**INTRODUCTION:**

**MAJ. GEN. ROBERT NELLER,  
PRESIDENT,  
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**MODERATOR:**

**LT. GEN. BERNARD TRAINOR,  
AUTHOR,  
“THE GENERALS’ WAR”**

**SPEAKER:**

**GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS,  
COMMANDER,  
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

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MAJ. GEN. ROBERT NELLER: Good afternoon. My name is Bob Neller and since the 4<sup>th</sup> of September I've been the president of the Marine Corps University. And when most of the Marines in here say that, they will probably have a hard time keeping a straight face, but I am the president of the Marine Corps University. And it's our pleasure – my pleasure to be with you here today.

Before we get to our last panel and our keynote speaker, I'd like to take an opportunity to thank all the people that made this event possible. First, the Marine Corps University Foundation: to acknowledge Gen. Tom Draude, retired, Lt. Col. John Hales. The foundation provides the university a wide range of support for educational purposes, for events like this, for academic chairs, for student trips. And we wouldn't be able to do what we do without them so I'd ask you to join me in a round of applause for the foundation. (Applause.)

I'd also like to acknowledge those at the university who worked very hard to make this event happen: Dr. Jerre Wilson, Maj. Andy Hamilton, Mary Lanzillotta, Gretchen Campbell, and Dr. Mark Moyar, and Mr. Paul Trapp and his folks from National Conferencing for running the events – the event today. (Applause.)

The university is committed to engaging in joint interagency and multinational communities and intellectual dialogue and scholarly debate to address problems we're likely to face in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We regularly host conferences at our Gray Research Center in Quantico that most recently hosted Emerald Express event this spring addressing issues in Afghanistan. We hope to do another one this following spring.

For those of you who have not participated in those activities, we'd ask you to visit our Web site and learn more about us and possibly join us again in the future.

Now, let me get right to the panel. I remind everybody that the topic for today is leadership in a COIN environment. During the past eight years, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines have fought side by side in both Afghanistan and Iraq sharing the same hardships and achieving, in many cases, the same accomplishments. They've served effectually under commanders from different services.

We are, I believe, truly a joint force, so it makes eminent sense that we spend some time talking to each other about leadership in all types of war. Especially in counterinsurgency, the human element is critical in mission success. We have to give equal and comparable time to the people aspect of war fighting who will lead the employment of the instruments of war.

We know the leadership capabilities, if they didn't differ from individual to individual could not be developed or enhanced appreciably; those who possess national leadership could not get better. We all learn every day and get better, I think all of us, particularly those of us a little long in the tooth, would say we're certainly better leaders from what we've learned from others than we were in the past.

The histories of nations show the leaders vary widely in talent and that success often depends on which side is better at developing leaders and putting the right person in the right place at the right time.

Our panel today will be able to talk – Gen. Petraeus will be able to talk today about how we’re able to – at least in Iraq and we’re working that in Afghanistan as you heard from Col. Haynes – to find the best Iraqi leaders to lead those units. I think the improvement in the quality of the Iraqi leadership was a critical factor in the transition of so many security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government.

Our panel today is going to be moderated by Lt. Gen. Trainor and obviously a man – I have an introduction here, but I’m not going to do it because it’s in your – if you don’t know who Gen. Petraeus is, see me outside. (Laughter.)

Gen. Trainor is a Marine, joined the Marine Corps after War World Two, served in Korea in combat, was a battalion commander in Vietnam, served in other capacities in Vietnam. He ended up making the rank of three-star and retiring. He’s been a successful writer. He’s been an educator at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and he and Michael Gordon have written a couple of books on Iraq, “The Generals’ War” and “Cobra II.”

Gen. Petraeus is the commander of CENTCOM. And we all know – and for those who have to serve, when we were there together, he was the commander of multinational forces in Iraq from February 2007 to when he assumed command of Central Command.

So with that, sir, thank you very much for coming today. I appreciate you taking the time, and the floor is yours.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Well, thanks a lot, Bob. Good afternoon everybody. Thanks for being here and thanks for that mercifully brief introduction. I’ve had this conference on the calendar for a number of months actually and it’s one I think – a topic that’s very good, very timely, and very important.

And I applaud, Bob, what you and your team have done in pulling it together. I feel privileged to be a panel of one here today. I’ve been an Army of one a few times, it felt like, and it’s great to be a panel of one with my Marine on my flank here.

Congratulations as well, Bob. You know you’ve just taken over command of the intellectual center of the universe there, the Marine Corps University. And I commend you for that and commend the Marine Corps for that with a very straight face having seen you in action and knowing what you’ve done over the years. And I can assure the audience that that is a very, very good selection and we’re delighted to see you where you are.

It’s also wonderful to see so many familiar faces, so many important members of what’s come to be known as counterinsurgency nation here today. But looking at a lot of those who are out in this audience and knowing that I’ve PowerPointed many of you within an inch of your intellectual lives on various occasions, I concluded that the most productive approach this

afternoon might be indeed a conversation facilitated by a great Marine leader and a great military historian. That's, of course, Gen. Trainor.

Well, that was my thinking, but then, being a U.S. Army general officer, the idea of a presentation without PowerPoint prompted me to reconsider. (Laughter.) It's genetic.

And so, what I thought I'd do is set the scene with four or five slides that provide context for the challenges that our leaders are facing in the overall central command area of responsibility and then have our conversation and Q&A with, of course, a full deck of slides available on call as required.

Finally, up front as well, my apologies to those who showed up hoping to see this session be all Afghanistan all the time and to hear me divulge pre-decisional details on force recommendations or my advice to the secretary of defense and the president. As we were reminded, the conference focus is leadership in counterinsurgency. I know you've had some great sessions on that subject already today, and, with respect, that should be the focus of the questions this afternoon. I can assure you it will be the focus of my answers. (Laughter.)

Actually, it reminds me: I worked for a wonderful – in fact, we were doing counterinsurgency at the time. I was privileged to serve one summer under the great Gen. Jack Galvin when he was the commander-in-chief of U.S. Southern Command and we were engaged in El Salvador, and Columbia, and Peru, and a variety of other places. And I remember watching him with the press today and he was done, and I was a special assistant so, you know, he asked afterwards: well, what did you think? And I said, well, gosh, sir, it seemed super. You got all your points across, but it struck me that you didn't answer any of their questions. He said, well, they didn't ask any of mine. (Laughter.)

So a couple of slides, again, just to set the stage here if I could. Next slide. This is Central Command now. Now, some of you will remember Central Command and will remember a world prior to 1 October last year where there was one less geographic combatant commander and when Central Command still had the Horn of Africa. But, of course, with the standup of African Command last 1 October, the start of the fiscal year, there are now six geographic combatant commands to go along with, of course, the four other combatant commands that have specified functions. Central Command is, therefore, the smallest of the geographic combatant commands, but regrettably, it seems to have the lion's share of the problems. Next slide.

Now, just focusing a little more just to remind you where we are, of course, it starts with Egypt in the West, Pakistan in the East, Kazakhstan and the other central Asian states in the North, and down through, of course, the Yemen and the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula, the waters off Somalia – so we get to do piracy – and everything in between. All told, 20 countries. We have ambassadors in 18 of them.

And you can see the various challenges that exist there. It's a region – I don't need to tell this audience – of haves and have-nots, the richest per capita country in the world and also among the poorest countries in the world, extraordinarily blessed in oil and natural gas, but often poor in fresh water. Some countries, again, with spectacular construction activities ongoing, and

others that have very substandard services, inadequate governance and a host of other challenges to confront, and therefore, are, in many cases, fertile ground for planting the seeds of extremism.

So these are the challenges that are out there and you know about them, the al-Qaida and a handful of other transnational terrorist and extremist organizations. Of course, we have the activities of countries like Iran which continue to arm, train, fund, and equip Shia extremist elements in Iraq to a modest degree; Afghanistan; of course, Hamas and Gaza and Lebanese Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

There's the piracy issue. I'd be happy to talk about that. Touch wood, but we've actually made a bit of progress against that with the Zone Defense against the mother ships. They're parked off the coast of Somalia. The challenge there, of course, being a failed state. And, of course, we still do support operations that are conducted in this area by AFRICOM with assets that come out of the Central Command region or from the naval component commander, Special Operations Command in particular.

Obviously, we still have the operations in Iraq, needless to say, in Afghanistan and the major effort ongoing in Pakistan as well, among others. In fact, if you go to the next slide, there's always a money slide in the deck. I'm sorry. Go to the next slide beyond this. Flip through this quickly. There we go. Back up one please.

This shows the elements that are in the Central Command. There we go. This is the money slide, if you will, as it's called. And it shows in a snapshot what it is that we're trying to do across the AOR in terms of – in the stands to replace the traditional great game, the competition for power and influence among the powers of the world with a broad partnership against extremism in the illegal narcotics trafficking industry that comes out of Afghanistan. Obviously, a major effort supporting our partners in Pakistan where we've seen heartening developments over the course of the last five months, in particular, against those elements seen by the Pakistanis as threatening their writ of government and their very existence. But also, of course, in some of the operations and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas that have resulted in the death of some of the key leaders, among them Baitullah Mehsud.

Afghanistan, needless to say – I know that you spent a good bit of time on it already during the course of the day and we've got a bunch of backup slides that can show trends and so forth if you want to get into that.

The concerns about Iran and the actions that I mentioned recently and also, of course, its continued efforts in the nuclear arena which many analysts would assess as the components of an effort to achieve a nuclear weapons capability and the means to deliver it with their missile efforts.

Happy to show you the latest statistics on Iraq where there continues to be very substantial progress still down somewhere around to 20 attacks per day ranged even with Iraqi data used, which we've now put in retroactively. And that's down, of course, from over 160 attacks per day back in the June 2007 timeframe. And although we have seen horrific bombings back in the 19<sup>th</sup> of August and it was Black Wednesday, it's termed, by and large, significant

damage done still to al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni extremists still present, still Shia extremists present, again, unquestionably, but such vastly reduced levels of violence that the reconstruction, all the bridges just about have been rebuilt that were blown up by the extremists back in the 2006-2007 timeframe.

Pipelines are all flowing – highest oil exports in their history, back in August highest electricity production I think in their history as well. The number of the major hospitals that finally now opened Fallujah Basra Children's Hospital coming online and so forth.

So quite a bit of progress there – all be it, many, many challenges: Sunni-Shia, the political speed dating that's going on as they prepare for the January 2010 elections, intra-Shia, intra-Sunni, Sunni-Kurd, or Arab-Kurd internal boundary disputes, you name it – plenty of challenges there and no shortage of issues that have to be resolved.

We continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces; heartening development in the elections, not so heartening yet in the formation of a government by Saad Hariri. But coming along, working hard to continue the partnership, longstanding partnership with Egypt. By the way, we're going to do the first big Bright Star exercise this year that we've done in a number of years, I think probably since 2002 or so.

The overall effort – if you're going to characterize the overall effort against al-Qaida and other transnational extremists in the region, I think you would say that it is mildly positive actually that the development is all the way from the FATA over into Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, the Gulf States, certainly Saudi Arabia, which has had a very impressive whole of governments effort to counter terrorism there – and there's something I'll highlight at the bottom here in a moment as the way of going after this – with the exception of Yemen, and that's where al-Qaida and the Arabian Peninsula has established its headquarters.

This is a concern. It's a country that faces al-Houthi threat in the north, southern secessionists in the south and they're located down that, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and some of the southern tribal areas. So again, that is a concern and they do tie into al-Qaida, East Africa, which of course, lost its leader here recently according to news accounts.

I mentioned the piracy effort here, and then, finally, this very substantial series of partnerships that we have undertaken with countries along the western side of the Gulf there many of them in a sense motivated because of concern over Iran's rhetoric and Iran's actions.

And interestingly, Iran has been the best recruiter for Central Command when it comes to a variety of these activities. Just an example. There are eight Patriot missile batteries now up and radiating in the west side of the gulf in four different – two each in four countries where some time ago there were none of those. So a lot of other activities, as you would imagine in the ballistic missile defense arena, assured early warning and air defense. And countries are very substantially embracing bilateral arrangements that we can then turn into multilateral effects, we believe – a lot of maritime activity as well.

Next, if you can go and just show who it is that's out there doing all this. Next slide. I'm sorry. I want to talk briefly about this. This was an insight out of the strategic assessment. This is not something related to Afghanistan.

Now, let me very clear about this. This is something I've been briefing for about eight months since we had this strategic assessment – great Col. H.R. McMasters who honchoed that as he did three of those for us in Iraq during the surge period, during the 2007-2008 timeframe.

The point here though is that to counter terrorism – and I'm talking terrorism writ large, extremism – requires more than just your special mission unit forces. It really requires a whole of governments' counterinsurgency approach. That does not mean that we have to be the ones providing the forces or all the resources or anything else. It does mean that many different governmental agencies, civil military partnerships and again, a comprehensive approach to these problems is the answer.

And I would hold out, frankly, as an example what the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has done, because they have had a superb program. Yes, their deputy minister of interior was nearly blown up the other day, Mohammed bin Naif, Prince Mohammed bin Naif, who has been a very important part in their effort. But by and large, the progress there has been very impressive given where they were four and a half, five years ago when the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah was overrun, when their Ministry of Interior headquarters was blown up when the oil complex was threatened and when thousands of Western workers were leaving because of concerns about the extremist threat.

The response that they had is actually quite similar to the Anaconda slide that I have in reserve – anyone wants to call on that, it is always there – to remind you what a whole of government approach looked like when we did in the case of al-Qaida in Iraq. And so would be happy to point to discuss that further as well. Next.

Now, just a reminder, of course, as well of the components and the elements that are out there: obviously, we've got the typical Army, Marine, Navy, and Air Force components, two of these fulltime out in the Gulf, two that split their time between headquarters, although there are 70, 80 percent out there – that's a little bit less – then, of course, the four-star commands in Iraq and in Afghanistan; we show the U.S. forces-Afghanistan is obviously dual-hatted as COMISAF; then, two-star SOCCENT commander, and just a sense of where all these different headquarters are.

And, in addition to that, the two-star in Pakistan. Two star, one star, one star in Saudi Arabia and a number of other flag officers in other organizations that are out there because of the enormous security assistance efforts that are we have ongoing that are of considerable importance and I think actually looming larger and larger as we try to build a network of networks as the regional security architecture again helped to some degree by the concerns about the activities of Iran. So that's sort of, again, just to set a stage for all that. Next slide, please.

And so you have a sense of what is out there. Oh, and then we had the old Mesopotamian stampede. Before we start the conversation, since it's about leadership, we often

used to use this because this was a metaphor for what it was that we were trying to do in Iraq and the idea was that the cattle in this picture are the tasks or the missions, and what you're trying to do is get the cattle to Cheyenne, that completes that particular task or mission.

But, boy, it's tough, and it's raining sideways. This might be an IED going off right here, this thunderbolt. We're riding flat-out for glory right here, the handful of us are outriders. We're all trying to keep it going. Some tasks get out ahead of you and you'll catch up with those. Some will fall behind. If they're important, you go back and get them. The point was always with this slide to illustrate the idea that leaders in counterinsurgency have to be comfortable with a slight degree of discomfort, of chaos almost, of, again, the Mesopotamian stampede.

It's a very complex endeavor often involving non-standard tasks that many of us, for the first 25 years of our careers, spent relatively little time on – it's been an enormous adjustment. I know that you've heard a great deal about that from other speakers during the course of today.

And again, we'll leave that up because I think it's a great reminder of the kind of challenges that leaders face in what was initially, in particular, a fairly uncomfortable endeavor.

And with that, I will handoff to my Marine wingman here, begin the conversation and then we can go ahead and have the question and answer.

LT. GEN. BERNARD TRAINOR: When I go up there and start to get the vision of the group out here, I'll ask you a question.

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'll come up and go with you in a second.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Well, fair enough. Fair enough.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Very good. We'll make it hard on the TV cameras here.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Before I make my preliminary announcements, I'll give you something to ponder.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: We went into Afghanistan to go after the al-Qaida. And we went into Iraq and AQI gave us fits for quite some time. And you alluded to the fact that al-Qaida is down in Somalia and Yemen remains part of their nest also. My question is – you know, things move over time. So my question is: how would you define al-Qaida today and how would you describe its state of health?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, that is a great question. And as I mentioned a moment earlier, I think that al-Qaida is diminished over where it was, say, certainly several years ago. It

is certainly diminished from where it was when we launched the surge in early 2007, again, without question.

And again, I think that if you look at what's been done to al-Qaida in the FATA – and now I'm talking about al-Qaida and transnational extremists in particular – that there's been a diminution of their capabilities, of their assets and so forth.

That doesn't mean that we're not tracking actually various threats. I mean, you saw that there were some arrests made, I think, in the United States; was reported here recently. It doesn't mean there are not alerts in some Western European countries and careful tracking of individuals in various locations in that area as well. It doesn't mean there's not a link, again, from al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula over al-Qaida in East Africa and then over to al-Qaida in the Maghreb.

In fact, we have PowerPoint slides, of course, that can build and it builds each and every little link that can track these, and the folks that are in that business for us out here – there's one – I don't think we had one command on there that works for us as well in that particular arena. And in fact we can show that pretty well, now showing and being able to target or disrupt or ultimately defeat some of those elements is another case. And often, again, that requires a bit more than just, of course, kinetic activity; it also requires as in the case of Iraq where you have to actually clear, hold, and build certain areas that were sanctuaries in that case for al-Qaida, Iraq, and some of the Sunni extremist allies.

So again, I would assess – and I think that is an assessment that has been shared by heads of certainly the CIA. The past CIA director gave a little reported, but major speech back in, I think, November, December last year that had a similar assessment and I think the community's assessment is the same as that as well.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Thank you. All right. Let me remind you all of the rules of engagement. Raise your hand if you want to be recognized, wait for the mike so that everybody can hear you, identify yourself and your affiliation, and ask a question, but only one question – no follow-up questions – and make it succinct. And if you're going to make a statement, please do not make it a Fidel Castro two-hour speech. Stick to what you want to say and say it precisely. And if you go on too long, I'll cut you off.

GEN. PETRAEUS: This is why we had a Marine, by the way. (Laughter.)

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Now, the other thing I want to mention is to stay on topic. The topic of the conference has been leadership in counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. And Gen. Petraeus has already indicated he's not going to address any speculation about the current situation which has been dominating at least the Washington newspapers. So stay on topic. It's a business of counterinsurgency leadership. And with that, we'll get it underway. So who's the first? In the back. That's you.

Q: (Off mike.)

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Stand up. State your name, affiliation, once you get the microphone. (Laughter.) And I would ask the attendants with the microphones to be on their toes if they are even in here.

GEN. PETRAEUS: There is a microphone right there, I think. That's not it. I see.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Do we have any –

GEN. PETRAEUS: My apologies. We can talk loud.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: We're flexible and adaptable. So just speak up.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Go ahead.

Q: (Off mike) – original Afghanistan-Pakistan review. I'd like to ask you when the Obama administration did its Afghanistan-Pakistan review, did you and the military provide the leadership and guidance of: if you have the strategy, these are the resources you're going to need to fully implement it? As you know, Gen. Krulak says, if you want to have a fully resourced COIN strategy in Afghanistan, you're going to need hundreds of thousands of troops.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, they don't all have to be our troops and there's a whole variety of ways that you can come at those. And by the way, you know, those who say and quote "the good old FM 3-24" – and we'll be doing book signings after the session out here.

You know, everyone talks about 20 counterinsurgents per thousand and so forth. Those are in areas where you obviously have a serious insurgency problem. In fact, if you all can pull up the slide for Afghanistan that shows the density of attacks, and I can show you, for example, that it's in just about 10 percent of the districts that you find over two-thirds of the attacks.

So obviously, one of the approaches has to be to concentrate your effort in those areas where indeed the insurgency is most threatening the population and where, of course, also you have the most people and where they most matter.

Back in the process that was carried out, the so-called Riedel report because it was led by Bruce Riedel, 30-year CIA veteran, author of the great book on al-Qaida, among other things. In fact, I did participate. So did the Joint Staff, so did a host of other folks. It also drew, as I can show in a moment after this – first let me just show you just a reminder.

This is where the insurgency is. These hotspots right here, and for what it's worth, when we did our operations in Iraq in 2007, we actually did similar density plots and we focused on where the insurgency was. And as folks like Tom Ricks and Linda Robinson – if she's in here – remember, the first joint security stations that we established to live with the people, which was one of the big ideas, secure the people, which you can only do by living with them. The first JSSs went into Amiriya and Dora, I think it was, and then Ghazalia quickly thereafter. And they were the hottest of the hotspots in Baghdad at that time.

In fact, were we to lay on this, where it is that our forces have been going, I can do that in a moment if you'd like. We can show, you know, how the focus has been on these areas, Helmand Province, Kandahar, actually, of course, the original wellspring of the Taliban; you can see some emergence of problems out in Farah province and Herat and then, a handful of other places in and around Regional Command East with a bit up there in the Kunduz area as well.

So again, that's where you've got to focus. Again, when we have the – did the strategy at that time, if you can show the process, the strategy process slide – this is a good training device here for – got a new team. We did through summer rotation with the speech writing here – there they go. See? Now, this is what happened.

This was the Riedel report. Of course, the president announced the strategy on the 27<sup>th</sup> of March. There are a number of documents that fed into that, actually, in addition to the group that assembled to help craft the Riedel report, as I mentioned, I was one of those, Ambassador Holbrooke, Michèle Flournoy, and then a whole team from the interagency and joint staff and a whole host of folks, many of whom I think are actually in this room.

But they also could draw on the so-called Lute Report that was done at the end of last year. There was a joint staff assessment in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And then in the study that was overseen by HR there was a component of the CENTCOM strategic assessment that also covered Afghanistan and Pakistan – fed into that – was announced.

And I think you recall at the time, actually, that we said that we expected that there would be some form of assessment that would take place sometime in the fall. And this may be a bit earlier perhaps than we expected to do that, but you know, we've had some events like an election which, so far, does not appear that it is going to produce a government with greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people – though it's not done yet and we need to give the Election Complaints Commission, the IEC there, and others an opportunity to work their way through that.

And so, again, there's an assessment that has now come in as well. Gen. McChrystal submitted that right here. I think the resource options piece will be in, in a few days as well.

But before that, we also had a civil-military planning conference. Ambassador Holbrooke and I chaired that here in Washington, brought all the players in from Afghanistan and Washington and those who were going to go out, Ambassador Eikenberry, for example; in fact, actually Gen. McChrystal was there as well.

And they have now produced a civil-military campaign plan that was one of the achievements of the month of July, the tactical directive that Gen. McChrystal refined. It was originally done by Gen. McKiernan to reduce the level of civilian casualties – hugely important effort.

I mean, you cannot have what seemed to be tactical successes actually be strategic setbacks because of the numbers of civilians that are killed. In fact, the numbers of civilian killed has been dramatically reduced by the very rigorous implementation of that particular tactical

directive which governs, provides guidance on the use of close air support, and other indirect fires, and so on.

He's also published a counterinsurgency guidance that is again, superb, something similar frankly that we did in Iraq – and we can give you copies of that at the door as well, if you want them. There's still come in a couple of rucksacks out there.

And even, believe it or not, a tactical driving directive. Believe it or not, we were so antagonizing the public with how we drove in Afghanistan that just the act of driving down the streets in some of the areas over there – so this is what Gen. McChrystal has talked about when he's highlighted the need to change the culture, in fact, of how we operate so that it is one that does not thrust the friendlies, the civilians, the neutrals into the arms of the Taliban by the actions that we take.

He then did his review. Initial assessments come in, of course. And he – as you well know now – laid out his assessment of the situation. The military implementation plan required to, in their view, achieve the objectives laid out in the late March strategy. And of course, now it's coming in as I mentioned here fairly shortly will be the resource piece of that.

If I can just show where we put our forces as well because I think it's instructive, having shown you the density plots earlier, what it is that we're doing. As you know – and these are all forces the very first batch of which were ordered by the Bush administration and then the latter, 21,000 or so, by President Obama. And of course, overall, taking us from somewhere around 31,000, 30,000 at the beginning of the year to about 68,000 here when this is said and done, and the additional enablers that were recently sent over there will take us up to about that number with boots on the ground.

The first element that went in, a brigade from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division in Wardak Logar area right there, again, if you go back, you'll go back, you'll see that that was one of the hotspots that we had to contend with. We desperately needed helicopters so a Combat Aviation Brigade went in and it, together with a Marine Expeditionary Brigade, more than doubled the number of helicopters that are on the ground in Afghanistan, and some of the enablers using the authorities of a combatant commander that were just shifted and been in the process of shifting from Iraq to Afghanistan will take that even a little bit higher.

The Marine Expeditionary Brigade – Gen. Trainor should be very proud of this. I think it's the largest brigade in our history. It's got every enabler and everything else you could ever want. It's over 10,000 strong. That went into Kandahar – or to Helmand – I'm sorry – and has been working with the U.K. Task Force Helmand there, and as you know, there have been a number of operations there pretty highly reported on that have in fact, been some tactical gains in the activities there also some of them operating in that Farah district of Herat province.

Next element, Stryker Brigade Combat Team, very effective forces over in Iraq, as you will recall. In fact, it's so effective that we sought to keep two of them there at all times and generally we were successful in doing that. That element has gone into Kandahar and areas around it working very closely in that case with Task Force Kandahar from Canada.

And then – this is going to be very interesting to watch right here. This is a significant endeavor, but putting in a brigade of – it's going to be an advise and assist brigade similar to the concept that we've developed for Iraq and are just starting to implement there, but it's essentially a 4<sup>th</sup> brigade of the great 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division augmented by a substantial number of commissioned and noncommissioned officer leaders above and beyond their authorization to enable them to do this advise and assist mission, and overlay, generally, probably about platoon sized elements on the army and police elements in Regional Command South.

That will substantially increase and deal with the deficit in advisors that had existed across Regional Command South. It will give a coherence to that effort, some sinews in terms of command and control, logistics, and the various access to enablers. Issues that sometimes have plagued some of those elements. And it will be very important to watch that.

And then of course, you have a number of efforts that we have undertaken, have been designed to help achieve greater unity of effort. That's been another key theme of Gen. McChrystal's but, frankly, but even before that you'll recall that dual-headed the COM ISAF actually not long after I took over in Central Command. We had to do that. There's a number of other issues that we have done.

We took the headquarters in Afghanistan and looked at it and compared the headquarters that we had developed in Iraq overtime, the headquarters that was truly optimized overtime for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and it really was not much of a comparison.

And one of the major elements here, although there are many other smaller elements as well, but one of the major elements is the creation of the so-called Intermediate Joint Headquarters. This is the headquarters that Gen. Rodriguez will command, the core element, C-O-R-E, of it is the Corps of the U.S. Army, but it is a NATO headquarters and it will be augmented very substantially by officers from all the different NATO nations.

So again, that sort of lays down what are known as a host of enablers that have been sent in and then others that are still on the way and that we still need, frankly, to see the effect that they'll achieve overtime even as there's this, I think, quite healthy discussion that is ongoing with a considerable degree of intensity, I might add. And I know that there are several meetings, for example, some multi-hour meetings planned for over the next two weeks and quite a significant commitment of time by our most senior leadership to this during that time. Next question please.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Right here.

Q: Thank you very much, General. It's John Terrett from Al Jazeera English Television. We met outside.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes. That was a great, great attempt at an ambush out there.

Q: I'm sorry.

GEN. PETRAEUS: I've been through a few of those before.

Q: That was the least risky of all of them, I'm sure.

GEN. PETRAEUS: It was actually. You might say that. I couldn't possibly. (Laughter.) It was from the "House of Cards," you may recall. It was a BBC program some years ago.

Q: Absolutely. (Laughter.) Could you very kindly speak to the process of thinking through a change in strategy in Afghanistan from the counterinsurgency measures that we're taking now to the protecting of the Afghan people to one which is more slanted towards a more distant approach, a more high-tech approach, and also brings in Afghanistan? I can't image who might ask you for your thoughts on that, but if they were ask you, what was the thinking of the strategy that one would have to go through to get there?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I mean, that's another great attempt at an ambush, but with respect – to be truthful, that is something that gets into the very pre-decisional nature of what it is that we're doing right now. And obviously I endorsed – the chairman endorsed those who have been linked I don't think Gen. McChrystal's assessment and description but, to be candid, that's not something that I feel that we could share here today. My apologies.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Next question? Yes, ma'am. That's you. Shape up. (Laughter.)

Q: Marisa Porges, Council on Foreign Relations.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: (Inaudible) – bad shape as it is.

Q: We've been speaking all day today about how to shift the focus so it's the training, leadership and everything that's primarily oriented to be effective at COIN. But when you bring up the slide for the region there's obviously a lot of other issues at play that aren't necessarily on the front page every day, but require attention. How does this wholesale shift in the focus of the Army, Marine Corps, and military affect our engagement strategies on these other issues and our ability to make headway on those problems?

GEN. PETRAEUS: We see them as very related. We tend to see – whatever the threat or challenge is, we tend to see enormous connections throughout the entire area of responsibility. And we even, obviously, work across combatant command boundaries.

To give you an example, I mean, we run secure video teleconferences that may be co-hosted by SOCOM commander and myself, JSOC command, maybe Gen. Lute or someone in the White House, or John Brennan. But they will consist of the entire arena that is out there. And again, that is just one example, and we sort of see layers of layers of different tasks out there and all the way from security assistance, but they all tend to reinforce one another.

So the regional security architecture, which may include substantial activities to develop centers of excellence, for example, with the United Arab Emirates Gulf Air Warfare Center – for what it's worth, they're 70 blocks, 60 F-16s are the most potent air force in the region including that one to the east, I might add.

And what they have done and the way that pulls together other countries and everyone is engaged, again, that keeps everyone in that. I think that we have developed leaders as well who are capable of full spectrum operations. And we opened up the aperture. In fact, if you can bring up the FM 3.0 slide and then be ready to bring up the engine of change slide, I can also talk about the process that we went through in the army in particular to try to come to grips with this and the other services did something that was very similar as well.

But there was a huge idea. You know, we had the big ideas, and a lot of you have seen me brief, again, the counterinsurgency big ideas and so forth about securing and serving the population, learn and adapt, foster initiatives, support reconciliation, and all the rest of that.

But we've also had the really, really big idea and that was the idea that all operations are some mix of offense, defense, and underlying stability and support operations. And frankly, that was a pretty substantial idea and we had not fully embraced that at all when we went into Iraq.

In fact, the truth is that when we asked for some of those stability and support enablers and some of the other elements that were presumably available to help the certain tasks, when the brigade commanders and I turned to each other and said, you know, the good news is we own Najaf, the bad news is we own Najaf, we frankly, did not have them readily available and nor did we probably have the kind of mindset that we pretty rapidly had to develop and, in fact, were able to develop overtime.

If you can back up and go to the engine of change slide please – but this FM 3.0 was huge. That was the really big idea. And then from that cascaded all of the others, counterinsurgency being just one campaign, or type of operation, along a spectrum of conflict typically.

But what we had to do is first get that big idea, codify it in doctrine – and you saw actually there are a whole series of doctrinal manuals that were done during that time including the manual on leadership, by the way, which again encompass the kind of adaptive leaders that we're talking about.

Then you have to educate all of your leaders and we did that throughout every school and center in the entire U.S. Army and we completely overhauled these. I mean, there was one point at which I remember the field artillery school commandant called up and said, hey, sir, just thought you'd like to know we closed down the field artillery officer advance course two weeks ago. I said, well, great. Thanks for telling me. Good to hear it. Did you do it because you realized you needed to make some of those changes that the captains and we all were talking about, those guys that had all been in Iraq? And he said, yes. And in fact, he said, we brought

the captains in and had them help us redesign the course. They know more than in some cases the instructors did about what they actually really needed to focus on.

I remember telling the chief of staff of the Army that afterwards. You know, I sort of broke it to him and I said, hey, sir, probably just so you don't hear it from somewhere else we closed down the advanced course. He said, well, that's great. He said, you, there's a couple of good things here. One is they did. The second is they didn't ask permission so this is good initiative. And the third is they didn't ask for any money or people. (Laughter.)

So you've got to change. We changed everything. We changed the combat training centers and the next piece over here where we do the collective training from the "Clash of the Titans" out in the central quarter of the national training center to complex counterinsurgency operations with hundreds of native speaking Iraqi or Afghan role-players, the Afghan scenarios move up into the mountains of the deserts, the dozen villages or more look like Iraqi villages on the floor of the desert where it used to be just pristine force on force kind of activities; pretty much a thing of the past.

And then you have to have a feedback mechanism, of course, the lessons learned apparatus, in this case, the Service Center for Army Lessons Learned; each service has one and there's a joint one. And those lessons are fed back to every one of these different elements so you can refine the big ideas, adjust the curricula, the seminars and so forth; refine the scenarios that the Combat Training Centers change what you're doing down range is required; and all of it enabled by knowledge-management applications and virtual communities and all of this activity that is enabled by huge pipes that enable us to share stuff now, of course, in real time, big data, and not have to do it in hard copy, the goal being, again, a learning organization, and it is this right here that we're after.

And again, the bottom element in any counterinsurgency guidance that we've ever published has always been "learn and adapt." And right above that, typically, by the way, is exercise initiative.

Coming back to where we started, a huge piece of this is the idea that you're not going to do just conventional military operations as we used to know them were you attack, you seize the high ground, you plant the flag, and you go home to a victory parade. In fact, you're going to engage in something that will go back and forth from offense to defense, will have a component of stability and support.

And I think there's no better example of this, by the way, than the Battle of Sadr City when the great Col. John Hort, after having the biggest armada of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets in all different kinds of a really intense bit of fighting over the course of three or four weeks or so, defeats the militia and they literally collapse and within an eight-hour period, his troops go from literally cheek to charging handle to organizing the reconstruction of the area of Sadr City southwest to phase line gold.

That is an example of troopers who get it, and who can pivot, and can really do whatever it takes, whether it's – again, very high intensity at low level combat or very high intensity stability and support operations.

So that's I think probably getting at what it is that you're talking about, although we obviously specialized to various degrees to ensure that we have people in the right places who understand our very arcane and sometimes difficult – usually difficult foreign military assaults apparatus and security assistance procedures and all the rest of that, and others who are also very much cultural and language experts.

And by the way, there's a huge effort ongoing – one of the other big insights out of the strategic assessment that HR oversaw came out of the intelligence arena. By the way, it was the great Derek Harvey who is now heading our Center for Excellence for Afghanistan and Pakistan at Central Command headquarters in our intelligence center there because what we realized, frankly, is that we did not have the kind of capacity, the density, the sheer numbers of intelligence analysts and experts who could, at local levels, tell us a very important data point: who is reconcilable and who is irreconcilable.

One of the huge components – again, everybody agrees, I think, in the way ahead that you've got to resource more substantially the Afghan National Security forces to a substantially higher number and to push that very hard.

There's another component that has not been pursued significantly or adequately so far and that is the whole area of reintegration irreconcilables. And it's termed reintegration there. In Iraq it was reconciliation. But there's a couple of different ways of doing this there that are being tried out. But, in fact, as some of you may know, Lt. Gen. Graeme Lamb, retired now, but who helped us stand this up in Iraq as the deputy commander of MNF-I – together, by the way, with Gen. McChrystal who was then the JSOC commander. And we did that because Lamb had a line into 22SAS. He was a former director of Special Forces of the U.K. McChrystal obviously had JSOC. We didn't need deployment orders for their forces so they sent us what we needed.

We stood up the first force strategic engagement cell, and then, overtime, got the request for forces process going and actually got the forces that ultimately institutionalized that concept, and then we were able to develop the right and left limits, if you will, intellectually and an azimuth that our leaders could then have something to hang on as we sought to exploit the developments out in Anbar province, in fact, where the university president played such a big role in supporting what came to be known as the Anbar Awakening overtime. It started in Ramada in October or so of '06.

So again, what we have now, I think, are leaders and troopers who do get it, who are capable in a host of different environments and can fight, can do stability and support, and do all of that exceedingly well.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Let's take a question from the right field, way in the back.

GEN. PETRAEUS: He wants to give the microphone operator a little exercise.

Q: Austin Long – Columbia University, sir. We've talked a lot today about building counterinsurgency leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq where we've had a robust presence. Could you talk a little bit about how we do that in parts of CENTCOM where you don't have that robust presence and I'm thinking of Pakistan, but many of the other countries you mentioned?

GEN. PETRAEUS: That is a wonderful question because what I was trying to illustrate earlier is that the idea that countering terrorism requires more than counterterrorist forces – it requires a whole of governments counterinsurgency mindset does not mean that those force have to be yours.

And I think Pakistan is a great example of that. The fact is that in Pakistan the Pakistanis are doing the fighting and we are providing substantial assistance to be sure. I think the numbers this year probably will be somewhere around perhaps \$1.5 or more billion in a variety of forms of support, some equipment, some coalition support funding and the like. We're helping to do some training the trainer with some superb Special Forces, and assisting in a variety of other areas. In addition, obviously, to the efforts on the embassy side in the civil arena supporting a whole host of activities as well.

But it's the Pakistanis that are out there on the front lines. We don't go below brigade level. And again, we are strictly in the mode of just assistance where they want it, and most of that, again, is in the equipment, and again, some training of trainers and some units in some respects some special elements.

So that is a case where, again, we have a relatively small number, but we're able to do that because you have functioning institutions. And the Pakistani military is certainly really a very robust and very fully functioning institution with decades of development under its belt, unlike a situation, say, in Iraq where after the dissolution of the military and so forth and all the other actions that we were taken we obviously, literally, had to start literally from zero. I mean, there was not even a Ministry of Defense building much less a ministry of defense.

And so you were trying to build – you know, we used to use that line that we're building the world's largest aircraft while in flight, while being shot at, and while we're designing it because that was the case. You had to get on with it. You had to start developing infantry battalions, in particular, in substantial numbers, but at the same time you're trying to develop the ministry level and then you're trying to work it out so that the institutional elements of that would eventually mesh with what was coming up from below as you got battalions, and then you get some brigade headquarters, and some division headquarters, and so on, so operational commands.

And you know, I think, arguably, that the Iraqi security forces have very much taken on the security tasks there. We are out of the cities with the exception of a handful of coordination centers in Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Yes, there have been some horrific incidents particularly again on 19 August.

But, by and large, number – if you can pull up security incidents for Iraq just to show you how that is tracking along. Again, they generally have taken that on. So you had a case where we were having to do, obviously, virtually all of it for a while, and now a case where they are in the lead and at most, we are enabling or assisting.

And, by the way, their operational tempo of their Special Operations forces has picked up, something that was hugely important and was a concern in the early days after the 1 July change of us coming out of the cities.

But here's what you see. Again, you all are familiar with it. It started over in January '04. On this data here is September '09. I should not for those who really watch this closely that we have put in Iraqi data and we put it in starting somewhere around here and we wanted to go back that far because we've had to use more and more Iraqi data particularly as we pulled out of the cities we need to rely on that – the same way, by the way, that we did add Iraqi civilian violent deaths into the metric that you'll recall that we showed to Congress all the way back as early as September '07.

But what this shows again, you all remember, the surge started somewhere in here – horrific levels of loss of life in December: 53 per day, in Baghdad in the month of December just the sectarian violence or was even some more in some other categories, and we wondered why they couldn't get legislation. The level of violence went up when we did the surge of offensives and started launching out. And a lot of you in here who participated in that remember us having to fight to take away those sanctuaries to establish the 77 additional joint security stations just in the multinational division Baghdad area alone.

And then that level of violence started to come down. There was also a militia taking a knee and you can actually track each of this. That's the "March madness," as the troops called it, the March and April battle for Sadr City and Basra.

But now, more recently now, for about – I guess it's going on seven or eight months or more, you see a level of violence – when you talk about attacks –and this also includes attempted attacks, IEDs found and cleared – somewhere around 20 or so a day. This week it's a little bit less – a good bit less actually because probably the – (inaudible) – and so forth, sometimes a little bit more. Obviously, a very substantial reduction from this period back here when it was over 160 attacks per day on average in certain weeks in June of 2007.

Iraqi forces have picked that up. Do we have a number of concerns? Absolutely. I mentioned some of them earlier, still al-Qaida and other Sunni extremists, Shia elements, all of the political challenges and other issues, still a lot of legislation that we'd like to see.

But you know, it more than stumbles forward. I mean, there's, again, progress in variety of areas. There's huge emotion about a lot of them, needless to say. Even the Sons of Iraq, by the way, have all been paid. They took two months back pay before Ramadan and even have now picked up, I think, up to a total of 5,500 or so just in the past month in integrating Sons of Iraq onto payrolls of elements in Baghdad. Never easy. Every payday is emotional. It's all hard all the time. But, again, pretty substantial progress.

Contrast, again, between a situation where you have, ultimately have some forces, have governance, have – in fact, governance that’s seen as reasonably legitimate in the eyes of the bulk of the population. Pakistan – again, another case where we can enable them rather than us having to do it.

And then, on the other hand, you see obviously, in Afghanistan where governmental institutions still very nascent, in some cases, challenged certainly by corruption and a variety of other ills that Prime Minister Karzai and others are the first to recognize and to admit. And we’ll have to see again how this goes forward.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Let’s take the next question from the left. Young lady next to the gentleman with the yellow tie.

Q: Thank you. Ann Marlowe, Wall Street Journal and Weekly Standard. I have a question about an unpopular group, the ANP. I would like to get your response to a radical idea: remove them from the districts. They’re getting killed, I believe, still at about a company rate per month. I’ve heard the argument that they belong in the towns, but where people are part of a homogenous tribe we would do better to rely on a tribal law – tribal collective responsibility.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes. Actually, in fact, one of the things that is being looked at is the structure of the Afghan national security forces. And it is no surprise that when a situation gets difficult in a local area, those who are most vulnerable, right away, are the local police because they live in the neighborhood. They are individuals. They’re not units. They don’t live on a base away from their families, their families are vulnerable. And so again, they are very much in harm’s way and they tend to be the first element that will collapse.

And we saw that repeatedly in Iraq. In fact, there were whole swaths in the country as we launched the surge of offensives. So you recall in the triangle of death south of Baghdad and a number of other areas where there were virtually no Iraqi security forces whatsoever and certainly no functioning police. I think there were 20 in – (inaudible) – or wherever it was when we tried to start recruiting and rebuilding and all the rest of that.

And, in fact, we’ve questioned several times – I personally have questioned and asked – CSTC-A – the training and equip element, and Gen. McChrystal as well – and he’s taking this up – to really look hard at the structure.

You know, everybody is always happy because of the focused district development program, but part of the reason that works is because you put the NCOP in when you take the local police out for retraining.

The NCOP are units, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and they come – essentially paramilitary gendarmerie almost like units, come in battalions and so forth and you plunk them down. They’re not from the neighborhood. They’re not entangled by tribal loyalties and all the rest of that. They have a base and they can operate fairly freely without the kind of

intimidation and vulnerability of local police. And typically, they'll clean the area up for a while.

You put the Afghan National Police back in and if you don't have some elements there to back them up – and ultimately, in Iraq we had to develop, for example, Swat teams, substantial Swat teams, Iraqi national police and federal police in substantial numbers after we reclaimed them, by the way, from the grip of the militia in the spring, summer, and fall of 2007 when the national police commander both division commanders, nine brigade commanders, and 70 percent of the battalion commanders had to be replaced, to give you an idea of how challenging that particular effort was.

So I think we have to take a very hard look at the architecture of the Afghan national security forces. It may be that, again, you have to do the same thing you did in Iraq where the first element that goes in is actually an army unit once it's been cleared. And then perhaps you do work with local tribes in some fashion.

And then, as you know, there are some experiments with that down in the Wardak Logar area, the Afghan Population Protection program. There's another element – initiative that we're experimenting with a civil defense at local levels. But they have to be tied in. Again, they cannot – they can't become just tribal militias. They do have to be tied back into something that has a link ultimately to the district and the province, and ultimately to the national. So that is certainly something that folks are looking at.

And the ANP, as you rightly noted, are being killed in substantial numbers. It's staggering to see the numbers of – by the way, Iraqi security forces, of course, as you recall were typically losing their lives at a rate of at least three times to those of ours and again, many of those police because they are the most vulnerable. So you put your finger on a very good topic and it's one that is being looked at very, very hard, I can tell you.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Thank you. Right here.

Q: Thank you. General, Bob McMahon, Pennsylvania Veterans Museum. Many in the press compare Iraq and Afghanistan with Vietnam. And could you address how the shaping of your strategy and the lessons you learned about Vietnam maybe going back to West Point – not everything since West Point, but just the shaping of it, sir.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, look, first of all, I think people have been right to say that Iraq is not Vietnam. Afghanistan is not Vietnam. I mean, they have their unique challenges, each of them. There's some similarities always that you can point to. I mean, in the case of Afghanistan, you have the sanctuary problem. You had a little bit of that, frankly, in Iraq as well.

So there are some similarities, but I think the biggest lesson of Vietnam is, of course, not to become a prisoner of lessons that you may have learned in a very visceral experience in the past. So in my case, one of the challenges that I have and that many others have who have all now gone to Afghanistan – and we've assembled a real first class team over there we believe – is

to make sure that we're not prisoners of our own experiences in Iraq and that we don't try to solve every problem in Afghanistan with the solution that worked in Iraq.

In fact, I've laid out at various times here are the lessons that we learned, here's the counterinsurgency guidance that we employed and that worked in Iraq, but you have a real buyer beware with that that says, you have to apply this with extraordinary care and with real knowledge of the local circumstances in which you are applying those lessons.

And again, that's something that was lacking at the beginning when we did this strategic assessment. We did not have the depth and breadth and sheer number of experts on local circumstances. And if you cannot, again, determine who the irreconcilables are, if you can't figure out who the reconcilables are, it's awfully hard to foster the concept of reintegration of reconcilables, and it's awfully hard to separate the irreconcilables from the population so that you can indeed secure the population.

So in that sense, I think what you really have to do is try to shed all of the baggage from the past using it where you can, but you know the old saying that lessons of history can illuminate but they can also obfuscate.

For what it's worth, you know, my dissertation was actually on the lessons of history and the lessons of Vietnam, but really, for the military and a lot having to do actually with the use of force and advice and the character of that. But obviously, you can't do something like that without also looking at the kinds of lessons that we learned about trying to get the big ideas right for the time. I think that occasionally we shot behind the target. There's some real experts in counterinsurgency application actually in this room. And, arguably, the Marines and a number of other elements at various times got it right, but then there would be other units that were still doing a big war or we might be doing counterinsurgency and they're coming at you with the big war.

So again, you have to assess the character of what it is that you're doing in a very, very brutally forthright manner, a very rigorous manner and so that you have – the good, old Joint Staff term – a “granular” understanding of the situation at hand and that's hugely important. And I think that's probably the big lesson.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Next question. The gentleman here.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Make it an easy one now, Pete.

Q: Dr. Pete Mansoor, the Ohio State University. Gen., the one area of counterinsurgency leadership we've only touched on here today is civilian leadership. And I won't ask you about any one currently serving in government, but I'm wondering if you could touch on your relationship with Ambassador Crocker and with President Bush, and let us know what made them such effective leaders in a counterinsurgency environment during the surge period in 2007 and 2008.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, I mean Ryan Crocker was sent from central casting to be the ambassador of Iraq. I forget how many embassies he'd been the chief of mission for before, but I think it was six or so and they were never the garden spots. It was always Syria when they overran his residence. It was Pakistan right before – his reward for Pakistan was to come to Iraq. He was in Lebanon I think in some pretty tough moments. He did have Kuwait at a reasonably decent time. He was the first, in a sense, envoy, our ambassador chief of mission in Afghanistan even in 2001, as I recall – hoisted the flag up, I think.

So he really was an expert in the culture. He'd actually served in Baghdad before. By the way, you know, there are very, very few folks who actually knew Iraq. You'll recall that we turned around and we got these folks that would come in to help us and would ask, have you ever been in Iraq before and they'd say, oh, yes. And say, great. Where? And it always above the former green line. They'd made a lot of trips to Arbil but that wasn't of enormous assistance in dealing with Sunni Arabs down below the green line in the areas that we had, for example.

Beyond that, I mean, he truly was a student of what it was that we were doing, had been through this kind of stuff before. He was determined, as I was, that we were going to achieve unity of effort. You'll recall the civil military campaign plan that we developed.

And, by the way, the first iteration of that was signed I think two days after he arrived and it established – all we did was just the first 18 pages. That's all you need to do. The leaders out there don't need a huge amount of guidance. If you say, secure the people and do it by living with the population, they got it, and they'll take that and operationalize that.

And then, again, your job is a strategic leader, get the big ideas right, communicate them to the breadth and depth of your organization, oversee their implementation, a lot of that by going out, walking on patrol but also through a whole host of campaign reviews, even the daily battle updates and all the rest of that, and then capture best practices and lessons and ensure that they're learned by institutionalizing them, by refining the big ideas, communicating and overseeing their implementation.

And so, on the second day, we'd already agreed the focus was going to be secure the population, again, live with it and a handful of others. And again, that was enough to really solidify, frankly, what was already happening in terms of establishment of JSSs and some of the other ideas that were being implemented.

And then, cooperation was not optional and we established that to the embassy. He established that to the military. I established it to the military. We built, as you recall, fusion cells. We found – there's limited numbers of experts in civilian agencies and you recall – I mean, we had to take down the deputy minister of health at one point in time and then the – so we're trying now to help the deputy minister of health who's left and we find out, you know, there's one health attaché, one. This is for an entire ministry of health for a huge country.

And so, you know, we looked around and looked at some of the assets we had, and there's a little bit of a reduction in casualties. We had a little bit of excess or exert capacity, and we said, well, how would you like to be helped by several doctors, a handful of supervisory

nurses, some hospital administrators and some medical logisticians and maybe a security force to go with all that and a handful of up-armored Humvees. Needless to say, that augments – but she was the lead and she was terrific.

And we did the same thing, as you recall, with energy fusion cell, the election fusion cell and a number of others. So I think that is a model for what has to be done.

Secretary Gates, the chairman and I and others have all been on the Hill saying, you know, we're the biggest champions in more spending for state, I think, that go up there. But there's a limit to how much you are going to develop and they're not going to come as squads, platoons, and battalions with transportation ability to secure themselves, communication, and all the rest of that.

So I think the partnerships that were developed there, frankly, I think the partnerships they're being strengthened in Afghanistan as there is an increase in the civilian numbers there to go along with the increase, substantial increase in military numbers is also very important as well.

And then obviously there was a real focus on Iraq. There's no question that it was the main effort and we're pretty much able to build a team of, again, first rate folks. That's why I brought you back over there with me to be the exec, and, you know, HR – there's actually a number of other folks in this room and we're able to build – actually build on what was already a very good team, and as folks rotated also to get some terrific people and then to make sure they're all in the right place and to move forward.

I think more importantly actually was building or helping the Iraqis build their team. And I'm not sure how much you talked about that. Someone talked a little bit earlier about replacement of various leaders, but the fact is that that government – you know, you have to recognize that Prime Minister Maliki was selected. His strength was his weakness in the eyes of those who elected him. They did not want to elect a strong leader. They all wanted to elect someone they thought they could have their way with. And the fact of the matter was that he became very strong.

He became so strong, there was a point at which, I came back and told Ambassador Crocker, hey, Ryan, good news is Prime Minister Maliki has just made a really tough decision. The bad news is he's made a really tough decision and forces are starting to move to Basra tomorrow. So again – but, by golly, that actually ended up being a tactical engagement that had a real strategic effect on the situation in Iraq and also solidified his position.

So again, there's just a lot of engagement, as you well recall, and I think that partnership there was something that rippled all the down and to a great and, to a degree, rippled all the way up as well. So I think that is an example in that regard.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Next question. In the back, back wall. The two of you can fight it out. (Laughter.) Go ahead.

Q: Col. Larry Strobel with the Peacekeeping and Stability Ops Institute. We've talked a lot today about being critical on military leadership. We do that very well and we get better because of that. How can our civilian organizations whether they be interagency, national, international improve their leadership to the current COIN operation so we can achieve success?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes. Well, that's another great question. In fact, there was a period where we were – the engine of change actually guided what we did in the army and it just so happened that the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth actually oversaw all the different gears on that particular engine that oversaw the doctrine, oversaw the education of the commissioned, non-commissioned, warrant officer leaders, oversaw the scenarios of the combat training center for lessons learned, and even oversaw the battle command knowledge system which enabled the knowledge management piece of that.

And some of you may have been at it. There was an interagency conference that was talking about how do we develop greater counterinsurgency expertise in the rest of government, and we actually proposed an interagency engine of change. And again, it starts with some big ideas and then you've got to have the education piece – and, by the way, there is in fact now I believe – is anybody here from state who can talk about what is out here in Arlington? There is an actual education center at which they do counterinsurgency. And if someone – yes. Could you – hey. Messer (sp), how are you? Another old wing man right there. Is that not true that they have now instituted essentially counterinsurgency stability and support operations instructions out there?

Q: Yes. It is slow. I mean, we – President Bush authorized this stabilization and reconstruction force. It was essentially on life support until last year's budget. And it is now hiring and moving. There's still a whole lot of pieces that are going to have to – it has a lot more presence to it, but there's a lot of pieces that are going to have to go. And just, as you've had with some of your efforts, the length of time from idea to concept to full up, it is going to take a while. We've got new authorities. They're hiring – these numbers sound laughable to you but they're big to us – I think they're hiring either 1,200 or 1,300 state officers over attrition this year.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes. Big effect. Yes.

Q: Where the last few years we didn't hire any. But of course, we're hiring at the bottom. We're hiring our version of second lieutenants. That doesn't –

GEN. PETRAEUS: They can be strategic lieutenants, though, as you know.

Q: They could be strategic lieutenants, but they're not going to be O3s and O4s for a while. Yes. There's a lot of movement but you won't feel a whole lot of effects still for a while.

GEN. PETRAEUS: That's – in fact, that's another initiative, if I could. And thanks, ambassador, but there's also an initiative at Arlington at your State Department Training Center there which has also established an interagency counterinsurgency center. So again but that's

how you develop it I think. That's how you do it. In addition, obviously, there's experience, but there also has to be education and that's the component of that.

Now, the challenge for the State Department has always been, if your numbers are never adequate to the overall tasks that are out there, how do you break someone out for one of these out of their intellectual comfort zone experiences that we talk about? And I'm sure you've had that discussion here about the importance of those kinds of experiences.

And it doesn't matter to me what it is. Grad school was it for a lot of us where you go and realize that the huge debates that you thought you were having at the staff college were in a spectrum about like this, and you go to civilian grad school and you realize there's some seriously bright people who are actually all the way out over here or all the way out over there. And by the way, they have some reasonable assumptions that undergird their intellectual positions.

So those intellectual, out-of-your-comfort-zone experiences are of enormous important in development of leaders that can take on these kinds of tasks. That is supposed to be one of them as are a number of other activities for them. When you send a State Department official to one of our staff colleges or war colleges, I think that's probably an out of their intellectual comfort zone experience as well, but trying to break them free to do that and I can affirm that having gone to State and asked if they could send more to some of the courses that we oversaw when I was at Fort Leavenworth. So that's the challenge.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Unfortunately, this will be the last question. The gentleman right in front.

Q: Thank you. Gen. Jerry Lines (sp), Joint Staff J-7. Sir, you know the U.S. government has put out a DOD, State Department, and USAID has now a U.S. government guide for COIN. And I'm told USIP is going to put out doctrinal guidance for stabilization and reconstruction. Yes, sir.

GEN. PETRAEUS: These are the big ideas. And that is hugely important. Now, there were some other ones as well. I don't know if you guys actually can find the interagency engine of change in the slides. If you can, pop it up, but if not – I mean, there were some underpinnings already as well as you know if you go all the way back to PDD 56 and some others.

Q: Not my question. I just figured I'd throw that a tad bit out there because there's a new doctrine.

GEN. PETRAEUS: I appreciate it. That's key. That is key.

Q: Sir, certainly you were one of the drivers of the engine of change for a number of years at CAC and as the principal customer of force development. The institution has come a long way in preparing its individuals and its units for the COIN fight. Okay. Good so far. From your position, as the ultimate customer, as our principal, joint-war fighter right now, what needs

to be done with more urgency? What emphasis needs to be changed? What have we not quite got right? If you would comment on that, sir, I think it would be of value.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Yes. Boy, that's another terrific question. And the fact is that there are a number of still very high-demand, low-density skill areas that we have to fix. So there's a lot of structural pieces still.

In fact, for example, the other day, I sent a memo to the chief of staff of the Army and the Air Force I think were the two, and asked for help with developing more JTACs, Joint Tactical Area Controllers – big shortage of those out there especially as we now proliferate these security teams out there in platoon sizes, special forces teams that need the JTACs from the conventional side of the house and all the rest of that. There's a host of other examples of that in the electronic warfare field, in the information operations field.

So first of all, there are some real structural gaps that still exist in areas that didn't used to be all that mainstream or all that important or even if you had them on your books, you never filled the electronics warfare officer. That was sort of the last person that ever shows up if you really have 100 percent more then maybe you fill that particular billet. All of a sudden, when you're doing serious various forms of electronic warfare, that's very important.

There are big capabilities that are lacking. I mean, as you look at the whole cyber command issue, as you look at the issue of cyber space as, again – it's a battleground. It cannot be uncontested. The enemy cannot have free reign out in cyberspace any more than they can have free reign or a sanctuary in some kind of physical geographic location.

Then, I think there are skill sets that we want to see more of in various of our individuals, and that would include languages and obviously the kind of cultural expertise. There's a piece of that that can come. Arguably, I think we built this in Iraq, but we built it the old fashioned way just by sending people back again and again and again in substantial numbers and, you know, when you're in your fourth tour or third tour over there, you start to sort of understand the nuances of it even if you haven't really picked up the language yet. But you have a real sense of how things operate, how systems are supposed to work, how they really work and all the rest of that. And we have to gain that in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan in much, much greater numbers.

So building that expertise, that's really about also the road to deployment, and we didn't show that particular piece. You can flip that up, guys. There's one last slide if you can find it.

But we also overhauled the road to deployment. And believe it or not, well into – we were into – I think it was late 2005. I just asked, hey, how have we updated the seminar that we conduct at the beginning of the road to deployment? And it turns out that we're still teaching combat in cities that late in this exercise. And so we said, stop. You're going to do a counterinsurgency seminar. We're going to start it next month. I don't care what shape it's in. It will be better than doing combat in cities. Said, great. Hooah. We got after it and started that.

But that kind of overhaul – but you’re constantly adjusting it, and that’s the real key especially as the Army now becomes a lot more like the Marine Corps, like the Navy, and like the Air Force where you have the brigade combat team as the centerpiece and you are almost treating those the way you treat aircraft battle groups or say MEUs or something like that as they’re generated. So I think that’s another area that we have to look very hard at.

I do think that we have leaders that have now demonstrated the kind of flexibility, and adaptability, and so forth. There are concerns at various times, some of which are valid, I think, that some of the technical expertise of some of our war fighting functions isn’t what it used to be. You know, we haven’t massed battalions of artillery lately and that kind of thing. And you know, you need to do some of that.

And I think as we get the dwell time, for example, in the Army and in the Marine Corps, in particular, that some of these skills can be brought back as well. And then you focus during the final say nine, 12 months of preparation on those skills that you actually need for the area to which you’re going to go. And as we’ve expanded in-strength and recruiting is going real well and retention’s quite good, we’ve been able to build that up and start to implement that kind of program, I think.

I was just talking to a brigade commander, for example, that the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division is not going – not on the patch chart, as they say, actually for quite a while, and yet he’s got a very substantial amount of strength of his forces and so forth. So he can really do that kind of stuff as was envisioned as the Army developed the force generation model.

So again, I come at it both terms of functions, tasks, and some expertise that we need to refine for the kinds of environments that we’re going to. And I think the key is this road to deployment, this preparation of forces as we line them up against various locations and making sure – I mean, we made a change recently where 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade is now on the patch chart for Afghanistan which is where it was last time instead of Iraq which is where it was going to go and then there’s another unit that was in Iraq that was going to Afghanistan so it’s actually going back to Iraq.

So that kind of thing as well that we’ve done, to try to facilitate this process as well as the Afghanistan, Pakistan hands program where we’ve identified a substantial number of slots in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in the headquarters and elements that support them and said, these are slots that we want to keep experts in and we want to keep rotating them through that. The Center of Excellence at CENTCOM will be one of those as we go forward.

Well, this has really been a privilege. I thank you all. I appreciate, again, folks talking on the subject. That was listed for this particular conference despite all the issues that are topical right now in Washington. I can assure you that those are getting enormous attention. As I mentioned, there are multiple-hour meetings scheduled for the weeks that lie ahead. And there is – folks are seized with those and working them very hard. As I said, the final piece of Gen. McChrystal’s responsibility recommendations will be with us here in a couple of days as well. Thank you very much, sir.

LT. GEN. TRAINOR: Thank you, General. (Applause.) Gen. Neller, Gen. Draude, you certainly gave us a full plate today. And I'm happy to draw from the Bible, and say, you saved the best wine for last. And Gen. Petraeus, I want to thank you. It's been an honor to moderate for you. And for an Army officer, you did very, very well. (Laughter.)

GEN. PETRAEUS: High praise. Thank you. (Applause.) Thanks a lot. That was great. Thank you very much.

MAJ. GEN. NELLER: Sir, on behalf of all the participants today, thank you for coming. It's a cliché to say, thanks for taking time out of your schedule, but in this case, I think it's an accurate statement. Thanks for sharing the time with us. If I could ask Gen. Draude to come up here. He has a small presentation.

GEN. THOMAS DRAUDE: General, time is precious, especially yours, and we deeply appreciate your time with us. I give you two books from the Marine Corps University Press. One is on irregular warfare and the other is on civilians. And I think that both of those are captured so very well in your remarks and the – (inaudible) – we had today.

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm going to show this one here. I'm going to show this one. It's titled "Among the People" and that obviously captures it extraordinarily well, and few did it as well as some of those who are in this room, in fact, led by the president of the Marine Corps University, thanks you all very much. Thank you, sir. (Applause.)

(END)