

MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1

The Red Cell



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FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE. MSTP Pamphlet 2-0.1, *The Red Cell*, is designed to assist the staff officer in establishing and running a Red Cell as part of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

2. SCOPE. This pamphlet provides an overview of a Red Cell, actions of the Red Cell during mission analysis, course of action development, and course of action wargaming, as well as appropriate post-war game action. While the pamphlet is primarily focused at the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level, this information is applicable to the Marine Corps component and major subordinate commands.

3. SUPERSESSION. None.

4. CHANGES. Recommendations for improvements to this pamphlet are encouraged from commands as well as from individuals. The attached User Suggestion Form can be reproduced and forwarded to:

Commanding General (C 54)
3300 Russell Road
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Quantico, Virginia 22134-5001

Recommendations may also be submitted electronically to:
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5. CERTIFICATION. Reviewed and approved this date.

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Throughout this pamphlet, masculine nouns and pronouns are used for the sake of simplicity. Except where otherwise noted, these nouns and pronouns apply to either sex.

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Part I

The Red Cell

1001. Red Cell Fundamentals

The Red Cell is the commander's tool. Its proper use ensures that enemy capabilities and courses of action (COAs) are thoroughly considered during the development of friendly courses of action. During the COA war game the Red Cell models the likely reactions of a thinking enemy, and consequently strengthens the operational planning team's (OPT's) COAs.

a. What is a Red Cell?

Ideally, the Red Cell consists of individuals of varied operational backgrounds and specialties. Combining their own operational experience with enemy tactics, weapons, and doctrine, the Red Cell provides enemy reactions to the friendly COAs during the COA war game. The Red Cell is like a G-2/S-2 plans section; to be successful it must function as an extension of the G-2/S-2.

b. Purpose of the Red Cell

The primary purpose of the Red Cell is to provide the OPT with additional operational analysis of the enemy, tailored to the planning needs of the OPT. During the COA war game step of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) the Red Cell employs enemy COAs against the OPT's COAs. Although the Red Cell is used principally at the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), division, aircraft wing, and force service support group, it can also be scaled for use by smaller units. The objective of the Red Cell is not to defeat friendly COAs during the war game, but to assist the development and testing of friendly COAs. The Red Cell makes friendly COAs stronger and more viable for execution in battle.

c. Role of the Red Cell within the Marine Corps Planning Process

The MCP provides the commander and his staff with the means to organize their planning activities and transmit the plan to subordinate

commanders. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing COAs, and then analyzing COAs against the threat. The Red Cell is vital to this process; it ensures a rigorous and unbiased analysis of the friendly COA.

The Red Cell should be formed when the OPT is established. While the OPT conducts mission analysis and COA development, the Red Cell conducts a detailed analysis of the enemy in preparation for the war game. The Red Cell supports the planning efforts of the commander, the staff, and the OPT. It ensures the enemy's capabilities/limitations are realistically considered with respect to proposed friendly COAs. Properly used, the Red Cell will help the commander and staff—

- Visualize the flow of operations.
- Plan against the full range of enemy capabilities.
- Provide a thinking and unbiased enemy during the war game.

The Red Cell must be aggressive in the war game. It must be prepared to explain specific decisions and action in terms of enemy doctrine and operating patterns. For this reason, the entire Red Cell should participate in the war game. The enemy game plan (the enemy synchronization matrix) should be posted in the war game room for all participants to view. The use of this matrix will be addressed later in this pamphlet.

As the unit prepares for combat, it must focus on the enemy. In order to ensure that commanders and staffs do not overlook the enemy's capabilities, the Red Cell examines in detail the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs that capture these capabilities.

1002. Red Cell Relationships

a. Relationship with the G-2/S-2

The G-2, in coordination with the G-3, determines the composition of the Red Cell and often provides a number of its analysts. The G-2 oversees the functioning of the Red Cell, as their analysis of the enemy must be coordinated with the G-2. As stated in MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, the Red Cell operates under the staff cognizance of the G-2.

The G-2 provides the Red Cell with the initial detailed information on enemy location, weapons, tactics, doctrine, order of battle, and assessed COAs. Differences in analysis between the Red Cell and the G-2 must be identified and resolved. To be effective, the OPT and the Red Cell must exchange information and analysis continuously throughout the planning process.

As the Red Cell conducts its own analysis, it should inform the G-2 of its findings regarding the enemy. For example, the Red Cell, through its own research and analysis may determine that the enemy will employ armor and artillery in a unique way. Or the Red Cell may determine that a completely new COA is feasible for the enemy and more likely to be executed than the COA initially provided by the G-2. The Red Cell must immediately discuss this type of information with the G-2. The G-2 should then quickly evaluate the Red Cell position and determine if the new analysis represents an update of the G-2's threat analysis. Together, the Red Cell and the G-2 must hold a free and open discussion of the Red Cell's new analytical conclusions regarding the enemy COA. The G-2 must approve or modify this analysis. Only then should the Red Cell analysis be provided to the OPT for further planning. This ensures that the information the G-2 briefs to the OPT and the commander is consistent with what the Red Cell is refining and preparing for the COA war game.

b. Relationship with Other Planners

While the OPT conducts mission analysis and COA development, the Red Cell is under the staff cognizance of the G-2. The Red Cell moves to the staff cognizance of the G-3 during the COA war game. It reverts to the control of the G-2 immediately upon conclusion of the COA war game phase.

The OPT must keep the Red Cell informed about changes in planning guidance and criteria, as well as the planning schedule. This includes:

- New or changed commander's war game guidance and commander's evaluation criteria.
- Changes in the rules of engagement (expected use of weapons of mass destruction, counter-terrorist activity, or attempts to enforce extended territorial waters, no fly zones, maritime exclusion zones).
- When the war game will start.

During the war game, the OPT facilitator sets the war game rules and coordinates with the Red Cell. He determines what events will be war-gamed and what stage or phase will or will not be war-gamed.

1003. Composition of the Red Cell

Ideally, the Red Cell is task organized to mirror the strengths and capabilities of the enemy force. Potential enemy COAs and pertinent mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T) factors will also influence who will serve in the Red Cell. The G-1, G-2 and G-3 should coordinate personnel requirements accordingly. The core membership should include maneuver, intelligence, fires, and aviation representatives. Other skills that have proved useful in the Red Cell include combat engineering; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC); and command and control. Whenever possible, the Red Cell should include a representative with regional political and cultural expertise, perhaps a foreign area officer if available. The Red Cell is task organized based on the enemy's capabilities.

The Red Cell requires a high level of experience and knowledge. Typically, the most effective Red Cells are composed of experienced field-grade officers representing the various warfighting functions. Individuals who have been commanders and have served on higher level staffs (or are weapons and tactics instructors) can provide useful insight during the Red Cell's analysis and the COA war game.

Stability in the assignment of Red Cell members is crucial to the success of the Red Cell's efforts. Warfighting function representatives who rotate in and out of the Red Cell will likely contribute very little to its effort. The Red Cell functions as a team and relies on its members having a thorough knowledge of the mission and the current situation. Replacing Red Cell members who have already taken the time to assimilate the enemy's doctrine, weapons, order of battle, and capabilities, even for the best of intentions, will undermine the Red Cell's purpose. However, for special requirements, the G-2 might identify a need for representatives with unique skills or knowledge to temporarily augment the Red Cell during certain phases.

The commanding general/commanding officer designates the Red Cell officer in charge (OIC). The Red Cell OIC is not required to have a specific MOS.

Ideally, the Red Cell OIC should represent the warfighting function that is a strength of the enemy or represents his center of gravity (COG). For example, if the enemy is an artillery, vice maneuver-based force, the commander should consider choosing an artillery officer as the Red Cell OIC.

1004. Red Cell Support Requirements

The G-2 provides guidance and intelligence support to the Red Cell. This includes current enemy situation, enemy doctrine, order of battle, capabilities, limitations, assumptions, and maps. The Red Cell must receive updated copies of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products from the G-2, to include a modified combined obstacle overlay, doctrinal templates, and various situation templates. The G-2 must also provide COA sketches and narratives detailing its assessment of the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs to both the Red Cell and the OPT. Publications used by the Red Cell might include Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency geographic, political, and military assessments. As appropriate, intelligence studies from the National Air Intelligence Center, the National Ground Intelligence Center, the National Maritime Intel Center, the Air Force Information Warfare Center, and the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center will be required to aid the Red Cell in developing the requisite level of knowledge. These studies could include assessments of enemy command and control nodes, equipment capabilities, and operating procedures.

Although the Red Cell does not have a table of equipment, it does need some support equipment to operate. It will require a computer, a printer, and access to a copier. An overhead projector is also useful to facilitate briefings. Additional support equipment (e.g., Command and Control Personal Computer [C2PC], intelligence operations workstation) will be required to prepare products for the war game if it is going to be conducted using an application such as C2PC.

The Red Cell should be located in close proximity to the OPT in order to better integrate its findings into the planning process, but it should be in a separate room or area for efficiency and to minimize interference between the Red Cell and the OPT. Security arrangements for the work area must be appropriate for the classification level of the intelligence materials that are provided by the G-2.

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Part II

Mission Analysis

During mission analysis, the Red Cell collects and analyzes information on the enemy.

2001. Initial Actions

a. Form and Organize

Forming the Red Cell begins with the G-2/S-2 assessing its mission and initial personnel requirements. The commander designates the OIC. Personnel playing the role of subordinate enemy commanders or staff officers may, in turn, be designated by the OIC. Because few staffs are capable of creating a Red Cell composed entirely of its own officers and staff noncommissioned officers, members of the Red Cell may come from a wide variety of sources and organizations. The Red Cell OIC must then determine if there are any additional personnel, equipment, or information requirements that must be resolved in order to continue planning.

b. Coordinate With the G-2/S-2

During mission analysis, the first priority of the Red Cell is to gain and develop situation awareness. It accomplishes this through close coordination with its primary source of information—the unit intelligence section. The G-2/S-2 briefs the Red Cell on the current enemy situation and provides it with the latest IPB products. This flow of information from the G-2/S-2, started during mission analysis, will continue throughout the planning process until the Red Cell is disestablished. As the Red Cell analyzes the enemy, its assessment of the enemy and analytic products might differ from those provided by the G-2/S-2. These products should be coordinated with the G-2/S-2, before release to the staff and OPT, to ensure a coherent intelligence picture is portrayed throughout the command.

2002. Analyze the Enemy

a. Analyze the Centers of Gravity

Using the initial guidance from the commander and OPT, the Red Cell reviews and analyzes enemy doctrine as modified by the current intelligence picture provided by the G-2/S-2. This information is used to focus the Red Cell's efforts on identifying the enemy COG(s) and associated critical vulnerabilities (CVs) for each enemy COA. The purpose is to validate or revise the G-2/S-2's analysis of the enemy COG(s) and CVs. Any differences are immediately shared with the G-2/S-2.

In addition to reviewing the enemy COGs, the Red Cell must determine which aspects of the friendly forces are perceived by the enemy as COGs. Once that step is completed, the Red Cell should carry the analysis further and determine what the enemy will perceive as friendly CVs. These may differ from the U.S. perspective. The results are key, because they indicate what the enemy will focus on. This analysis will guide OPT development, and force protection actions. The results will also assist the Red Cell once it begins analysis of the enemy COA.

b. Develop Enemy Planning Tools

The Red Cell must begin work on developing planning tools as they would likely be perceived and used by the enemy. These are the same basic tools used by U.S. military organizations to conduct planning. Even though the concepts used here may not be in vogue with the enemy, definition of these tools as the enemy would use them will clarify the enemy thought processes and likely actions for US planners.

The Red Cell must draft an enemy mission statement that captures what the enemy has probably been instructed to do by its higher headquarters (essential tasks) and the five elements of a mission statement—

- Forces to conduct the operation.
- Type of operation.
- Time the operation will start and end.
- Location of the area of operation.
- Purpose of the operation.

The Red Cell must draft a probable commander's intent for the enemy. This should be based on enemy doctrine, recent operational patterns, and available biographic information about the enemy commander. The Red Cell should try to discern how the enemy commander envisions achieving his goals, as well as his intended endstate or conditions.

The Red Cell should review the relative strengths and weaknesses of the enemy forces as developed by the G-2 and attempt to determine whether the enemy shares their conclusions. For example, in Somalia, conventional wisdom indicated that the lack of sophisticated communications was a weakness of the Somali warlords. Yet the Somalis saw their use of cell phones and civilian runners as a strength that reduced their support structure and minimized the chance of intercept by US forces.

The Red Cell examines the weaknesses and strengths of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and confirms potential high value targets (HVTs), or those assets and things the enemy considers essential for the MAGTF to carry out its mission. Remember that the Red Cell is tasked to think from the perspective of the enemy forces. At the MEF level, HVTs may not be maneuver units or fires units; instead the enemy may focus on more vulnerable targets associated with command and control nodes, logistics nodes, airfields, port facilities, or lines of communication.

Often there is a link between critical vulnerabilities and high value targets. By identifying those MEF facilities, installations, or nodes that the enemy would most likely target, the Red Cell can help the MAGTF force protection planners.

If the G-2 has been unable to provide them, the Red Cell should attempt to determine current and projected unit boundaries based on the current force disposition. Together with the mission and intent, this should then reveal the area of operations and probable geographic objectives for the enemy force.

c. Advise the Operational Planning Team

The Red Cell must be available to the OPT during mission analysis. Although the G-2 will have a representative in the OPT whose role is to provide intelligence to the OPT, the OPT will frequently need an assessment and interpretation of enemy intent and probable COA. The Red

Cell should provide that information. Additionally, at the conclusion of mission analysis, the Red Cell should, following coordination with the G-2, present a briefing of its analysis to the OPT.

Part III

Course of Action Development

During COA development, the Red Cell refines enemy COAs specified by the G-2.

3001. Develop/Refine the Enemy Course of Action

a. Detailed Enemy Course of Action Development

The G-2 will have provided the Red Cell with (at a minimum) the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. Additional COAs may also include other less likely COAs as specified by the commander in his planning guidance. The Red Cell now begins the process of assessing the COAs in detail. The Red Cell may also determine potential enemy branches and sequels, or if warranted, develop and present new COAs that become apparent during analysis. The specified COAs are developed and refined based on the priority established by the G-2. Each COA is developed using operational capabilities of the enemy and validated enemy doctrine. The Red Cell determines realistic time/distance factors for enemy movement and maneuver for each enemy COA based on enemy doctrine and tactics. Each warfighting function of the enemy force is considered and its role in the enemy COA is identified and defined.

The Red Cell must remember to not “mirror image”—they must think like the enemy and not like Marines. As it refines the enemy COAs, the Red Cell should also be able to identify and refine the—

- Enemy COG and critical vulnerabilities.
- Likely enemy movement rates and associated time phase lines.
- Enemy responses during the war game.
- Enemy branches and sequels to their COAs (as developed by the G-2). These branches and sequels must be coordinated with the G-2’s analysis.

- G-2's analysis of potential HVTs.
- Friendly critical vulnerabilities.
- Enemy targeting plan.
- Enemy threat to the MAGTF rear area.
- Enemy intelligence collection and counterreconnaissance capabilities.
- Enemy engineering and NBC capabilities.

b. Enemy Capabilities

The Red Cell focuses on analyzing the enemy's capabilities. If possible, the cell will also attempt to articulate what it believes are the enemy's intentions. The following are some questions about the enemy that help focus the OPT and the Red Cell:

- "How can he hurt me?" (Capabilities.)
- "What scares me the most?" (Center of gravity.)
- "When will he reach a certain point in the battlespace?" (Doctrinal rates of movement.)
- "Who among the enemy forces is most capable of hurting me in the near future?" (Committed forces and reserves available.)
- "How fast and by what means can he reach me?" (Avenues of approach.)
- "How and when did he get to his present location?" (Situational awareness.)
- "What has he done recently?" (Pattern analysis of current operations.)

c. Predictive Analysis

The Red Cell should use predictive analysis to depict future enemy activity. Predictive analysis is the use of intelligence analysis to examine past and present enemy actions to "paint a picture" of future enemy activities. Based on our integration of enemy doctrine and capabilities with environmental effects, we develop a list of enemy options or COAs. These things prepare the commander and the staff for a variety of potential enemy actions (most likely, most dangerous, and any branches from those baseline COAs). The Red Cell must prepare branches to the basic enemy COAs for the war game. These branches must be reviewed and coordinated with the G-2 before presentation to the staff.

d. Comparison of Enemy and Friendly Forces

The friendly COAs developed by the OPT are now provided to the Red Cell for integration into its analysis. Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities, and enemy and friendly CVs and COGs (identified during mission analysis) are evaluated for each enemy and friendly COA. This is a critical element of the ongoing dialogue between the OPT and the Red Cell—without this information the Red Cell cannot effectively prepare for the COA war game, and the friendly COAs will consequently suffer.

3002. Course of Action Development Products

a. Mini-War Game

The Red Cell should conduct an internal war game their COAs against OPT-developed friendly COAs in order to ensure that the enemy COA is fully prepared for presentation during the war game so that it will provide adequate “stress” for the friendly COAs. The mini-war game is an informal thought process conducted by the Red Cell that examines the execution of the enemy COA. The standard action, reaction, counteraction gaming sequence works well for this process.

b. Develop Synchronization Matrix

During the internal war game, the Red Cell begins to develop the enemy synchronization matrix. This matrix will help determine if the enemy COAs are feasible and realistic. The matrix can also provide a detailed “script” for the Red Cell during the war game with the OPT. The matrix can be posted on a wall for the OPT and the Red Cell to refer to during the war game. It ensures units and assets are allocated in a reasonable way to support the enemy COAs within the given time and space. Most importantly, it captures in a written form the details of the enemy COA for reference during the COA war game. As the matrix is filled in, the Red Cell members should discuss each warfighting function’s activities during certain events.

The OPT facilitator and the Red Cell OIC may coordinate details and requirements of the synchronization matrix prior to the war game. If the COAs are segmented into phases or stages, both the OPT and the Red Cell may want to design their respective synchronization matrices to correspond to the COA war game phases and stages. This coordination will facilitate

comparing and contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COAs versus the enemy COAs.

c. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The COA graphic and narrative are critical tools used by the Red Cell to record planned enemy actions in the correct sequence. The graphic overlay clearly portrays where and how the enemy intends to accomplish its mission, guided by appropriate maneuver control measures such as boundaries. The narrative includes the purpose and tasks of the main effort, support efforts, reserve, and the sequencing and timing of the operation from the enemy perspective.

d. Advise the Operational Planning Team

The close communication between the OPT and the Red Cell must continue throughout COA development. The OPT will increasingly rely upon the Red Cell for information about the enemy COA as it develops the friendly COA, and the Red Cell must be prepared to respond to OPT questions with additional details and analysis. Additionally, at the conclusion of COA development, the Red Cell should coordinate its analysis with the G-2 before briefing the OPT on the elements discussed above.

Part IV

Course of Action War Game

During the COA war game, the Red Cell presents doctrine-based enemy reactions to friendly actions.

4001. Preliminary Actions

This step in the MCPP pits friendly COAs against enemy COAs in a war game. The war game is controlled and run by the OPT with the Red Cell role-playing the enemy. The OPT establishes the rules of engagement and appoints the war game facilitator to control the functioning of the war game. The commander issues guidance on the conduct of the war game, which may include:

- Friendly COAs to be wargamed against specific threat COAs.
- The timeline for the phase or stage of the operation.
- Critical events to be wargamed.
- Level of detail of the war game.

War game is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as:

A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.

a. Select War Game Technique

Based on the commander's guidance, the OPT will employ one of the following wargaming techniques—

- **Sequence of Essential Tasks.** The sequence of essential tasks highlights the initial shaping actions necessary to establish a sustainment capability and to engage enemy units in the deep battle

area. At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the Red Cell commander executes a reaction that necessitates the reordering of the essential tasks. This technique also allows wargamers to concurrently analyze the essential tasks required to execute the concept of operations.

- **Avenue in Depth.** Avenue in depth focuses on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This technique is good for offensive COAs or for defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.
- **Belts.** Belts divide the terrain into belts that span the width of the sector (defense), zone (offense), or area of operation. This technique is most effective when the terrain is divided into well-defined cross-compartments during phased operations (e.g., a river crossing or helicopterborne assault), or when the enemy is deployed in clearly defined echelons. This technique is based on the sequential analysis of events in each belt; that is, events are expected to occur more or less simultaneously. This type of analysis is preferred because it focuses on essentially all forces affecting particular events in one timeframe.
- **Box.** The box technique is a detailed analysis of a critical area, (e.g., colored landing beach, infiltration route, raid objective). It is most useful when time is limited. This technique applies to all types of units. The OPT isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area. The assumption is that the friendly units not engaged in the action can handle the situations in their region of the battlespace and the essential tasks assigned to them.

Each technique is suited to a particular situation or type of command. The commander's wargaming guidance should be provided simultaneously to the OPT and the Red Cell.

b. Pre-Start Presentations

Prior to execution of the first moves and countermoves, the Red Cell should brief the OPT on the results of its analysis of the enemy COA. Much of the information should have been informally presented to the OPT prior to this point: neither the Red Cell nor the OPT should ever surprise one another with new information at the war game. However, it is useful to formally present once again a synopsis of the enemy force posture, mission, intent, and a brief description of the enemy COA.

The event template can be used to graphically depict enemy COAs. It is developed by the Red Cell using the MOS skills of its members. For example, the engineer representative in the Red Cell would ensure the event template includes likely enemy minefield and obstacle locations, while the artillery representative would indicate potential enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket firing sites.

Additionally, the Red Cell should describe those actions that the enemy would take prior to the commencement of operations. These actions could include such issues as establishment of logistics sites, reconnaissance screen, assembly areas, and obstacle belts. The enemy synchronization matrix can be reproduced as a handout and disseminated to the OPT and the Red Cell for the war game. It can serve as a readily available source on the enemy's capabilities and the enemy's thought process.

4002. Conduct of the War Game

During the war game, the role of the Red Cell is to accurately portray the enemy while the friendly commander executes his various COAs. The ultimate goal is to produce a concept of operations that will allow the friendly commander to accomplish his mission, not for the Red Cell to win (or to roll over). The Red Cell can be of best help if it tells the friendly commander—

- What capabilities the Red Cell needs to succeed.
- What friendly capabilities are the most disturbing to the Red Cell.
- What friendly actions have an effect on the Red Cell and which don't have an effect.

The Red Cell should ensure that enemy actions are realistic, operationally sound, and indicative of the enemy's perceived thought process. It should address all functional areas and highlight its capabilities and limitations. If any issues or disputes are encountered during the war game, the facilitator should intervene, make a decision, note the issue, and continue the process.

a. Game Move Sequence

A game turn covers all friendly and enemy actions that are planned to occur during a specified time interval and are focused on a specific task or event.

Each game turn usually consists of three moves—two by the friendly force, one by the enemy force. The friendly force has two moves because the activity is intended to validate and refine the friendly forces' COA, not the enemy's. If necessary, additional moves may be required to achieve desired effects.

- **Friendly Actions.** After the various pre-war game friendly and enemy briefs are given, the war game begins with the first friendly action. The war game then proceeds through each warfighting function representative to give the details of the friendly COA. Representatives explain how they would predict, preclude, and counter the enemy's action.
- **Enemy Reactions.** Normally the Red Cell OIC will speak for the Red Cell and respond to friendly actions. He will use an enemy synchronization matrix and event template to describe the enemy's activities. The event template will be updated as new intelligence is received and as a result of the war game. These products will depict where (named areas of interest [NAIs]) and when to collect information that will confirm or deny the adoption of a particular COA by the enemy and will serve as a guide for collection planning. The Red Cell OIC will describe enemy actions by warfighting function. He should present the enemy's concept of operations, and concept of reconnaissance and surveillance. What intelligence collection assets does the enemy have? How and when will he employ them? Also, the Red Cell OIC should describe how the enemy will organize its battlespace: rear area, main battle area, and security area. Are there potential engagement areas, fire sacks, etc.? He should identify the location, composition, and expected strength of the enemy reserve, as well as the anticipated decision point (DP) and criteria that the enemy commander might use in committing his reserve. Other enemy DPs that he might identify include likely times, conditions, and areas for the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and friendly NBC defense requirements, when to the enemy could begin a withdrawal, where and when to the enemy will use unconventional forces, etc. Based on the experience level of the Red Cell OIC, he might also offer insight on the likely effectiveness of friendly actions. For example, the initial most dangerous enemy COA did not take into account the projected friendly force laydown of the friendly COA that is to be wargamed. This may permit the enemy to adopt a different COA that could become the most

dangerous COA in this particular context. The friendly commander will want to know what decisions the enemy commander will have to make and when those decisions will be made (“Are they event driven?”). When a deception is plan is being wargamed, the Red Cell should outline target biases and predispositions, how and when the enemy would receive the desired misleading indicators and enemy actions that will indicate the deception has been successful.

- **Counteractions.** After the enemy reaction is executed, friendly forces will provide a counteraction and the various warfighting functions’ activities will be discussed and recorded before advancing to the next series of events. If necessary, the war game facilitator authorizes more “moves” by both sides in order to achieve the desired fidelity. If possible, the staff analyzes each critical event by identifying the tasks the force must accomplish one echelon down using assets two echelons down.

b. Data Collection

The OPT must concentrate on collecting data to support the commander’s evaluation criteria. The evaluation criteria are articulated at the end of COA development prior to entering the war game. These criteria may be concerned with the following examples: the principles of war, assumptions, shortfalls, speed and tempo, and asymmetrical application of combat power. Strengths and weaknesses of each COA are identified, and if required, adjustments can be quickly addressed. As the sequence of events continues, the OPT will identify branches and sequels that may require closer scrutiny. This can be accomplished with a side bar or as an ongoing part of the OPT war game. Each adjustment, branch, and sequel should be recorded with the time/event that initiated it.

When events occur that cause a deadlock, or create unacceptable circumstances, the commander/OPT facilitator decides whether to abandon that COA or revisit previous actions to modify his counteraction to the enemy. During the action-reaction-counteraction process, the friendly force intelligence representative should point out to the OPT the location and the activities of enemy HVTs. Remember, HVTs are those targets or capabilities that are essential for the enemy force to accomplish its mission.

The Red Cell may highlight points during the war game where these assets are important to the enemy COA. This may prompt the OPT to consider

nominations of certain enemy HVTs as high payoff targets (HPTs), making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA under consideration.

As a result of this process, the OPT updates the situation and event templates associated with the enemy COA to reflect NAIs and targeted areas of interest (TAIs) supporting the acquisition and engagement of those HPTs.

The synchronization matrix and decision support template (DST) are particularly valuable tools. Targeting information, such as collection requirements, desired firing systems, target movement rates, and engagement times and locations should be captured in the synchronization matrix. As a result of the war game's action, reaction, and counteraction process, the OPT may identify targets, branches, or sequels that will require a decision to be made. Each time the OPT identifies such a DP, the recorder makes appropriate entries in the DST and synchronization matrix.

4003. Recording the War Game

At selected points, the map picture should be annotated and recorded to provide a time-referenced graphic for each COA to support later comparison and decision. Also, recording the war game results gives the staff a record from which to build task organizations, synchronize activity, develop DSTs, confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and analyze COAs based on identified strengths and weaknesses. The Red Cell should ensure that the maps accurately reflect the enemy disposition at the designated times.

The OPT starts the war game with clear overlays, whether electronic or acetate. The OPT should seek to use any automated tools (e.g., Command and Control Personal Computer) to aid in the conduct of the war game and recording its results. This will become especially important when the war game results are reproduced and disseminated.

It's helpful if the OPT can retain the "start" and the "finish" overlays for each war game. These overlays can be used to graphically show the commander the thought process of the war game. The overlays can also be handed off to the Marines who will develop the order, thus becoming a useful tool in transition. The retention of these war game overlays help add detail to the branches and sequels identified in the war game.

Part V

Post-War Game Role

The Red Cell records its findings for the OPT, and continues to assist future operations as required.

5001. Post-War Game Products

The OPT recorder must capture the significant decisions made during the war game. The strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COAs are recorded. Vulnerabilities and weaknesses in friendly forces or friendly COAs identified by the Red Cell must be captured and recorded. This information may be in the friendly synchronization matrix, the war game worksheet, or it may be recorded separately. Regardless of where or how it is recorded, it must be presented as part of the COA war game back brief to the commander. The friendly and enemy synchronization matrix and the war game worksheet should also be available for the commander to review.

Certain useful products will result from the war game in addition to wargamed friendly COAs. The OPT entered the war game with a “rough” event template and must complete the war game with a “refined”, more accurate event template. The event template—with its NAIs and time phase lines—help the G-2 focus the intelligence collection effort. An event matrix can be used as a “script” for the intelligence representative in the OPT during the war game. It can also indicate if the commander is relying too much on one or two collection platforms and he has overextended these assets.

The draft DST and decision support matrix (DSM) also come out of the COA war game. The commander may identify critical events and potential DPs early in the planning process, perhaps as he articulates his commander’s battlespace orientation. Normally, DPs and TAIs should be on the draft DST as developed in the war game. Of course, as more information about friendly and enemy forces becomes available, the DST and DSM may change.

During the war game brief to the commander, the Red Cell should be prepared to brief the enemy COAs and defend the data produced by the Red Cell. Besides enemy reference materials, the Red Cell should have available the enemy mission statement, commander's intent, relative strengths and weaknesses analysis, COG/CV analysis, initial synchronization matrix, order of battle, and IPB products.

After a detailed analysis of the friendly COAs, the commander is now ready to compare those friendly COAs against each other and decide which is the best. The commander identifies that COA which has the highest probability of success against the enemy's most likely/most dangerous COA (as based on the commander's evaluation criteria). This COA is then used to prepare the concept of operations that in turn forms the basis for orders development.

5002. Future Operations

If the commander anticipates further operations in the same theater of operations and the OPT continues to plan for future operations, the Red Cell may be kept intact. This would ensure continuity and reduce time lost reorienting a replacement team of analysts for the new Red Cell. As the OPT continues to plan future operations, the Red Cell should continue to analyze enemy future operations and provide the required support. The G-2 will continue to provide intelligence analysis and products and guide the Red Cell for as long as the Red Cell is in existence.

5003. Disestablishment

Once *orders development* begins and no future operations are anticipated, the role of the Red Cell is normally over. All products should be transferred to the OPT, the G-2, or destroyed in accordance with standard information handling procedures. Support equipment should be conveyed to the appropriate control authority, and the Red Cell members can then return to their original organizations and resume their normal work.

Appendix A

Example Red Cell Products

These products will be drafted by the Red Cell as though the enemy created them. They will duplicate equivalent U.S. doctrinal products but will use the enemy “voice” to demonstrate his perspective.

A-1. Enemy Mission Statement

“The Northern Operational Group (NOG) will conduct defensive operations to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. forces in order to force their withdrawal from Tunisia thereby allowing us to gain joint sovereignty of the offshore oilfields through a negotiated settlement. Be prepared to prevent the U.S. from threatening the homeland.”

A-2. Enemy Commander’s Intent

“I want to force the U.S. to withdraw their forces from Tunisia. Inflicting casualties on the U.S. forces is more important than holding terrain. I view the landing of an amphibious force as an excellent opportunity to inflict maximum casualties on the Americans. I want to make the enemy pay in blood for every inch of Tunisian soil they occupy. The sooner we inflict these casualties the faster we will wear down the American will to fight. I see us attriting the American forces in their rear areas and as they build their combat power in Tunisia. We will accomplish this through unconventional means. Do not risk the destruction of your forces, pull back when necessary, but be prepared to defend in earnest vicinity Gabes. Chemical weapons will not be used unless the Americans attempt to breach the Libyan border.”

A-3. Enemy Center of Gravity Analysis

Orangeland Strategic Center of Gravity. Orangeland’s *de facto* one-man rule and lack of formal governmental structure has focused power in

the hands of Field Marshal Chilmand Sondo, the leader of Orangeland. There are no legal political parties. Opposition groups are for the most part in exile. The Army represents a latent political bloc inside the country, as does the Orangeland religious and tribal order, and other tribal groups. Sondo has encouraged in-fighting among his potential political and military successors to reduce internal threats to his power.

Orangeland Operational Center of Gravity. The NOG is the operational center of gravity of Orangeland forces. It is composed of eight separate brigades and two artillery regiments. The NOG has the personal sponsorship of Sondo and is allowed to recruit personnel from the remainder of the Orangeland armed forces. As a result, the quality of personnel and equipment within this unit is without equal within the Orangeland armed forces.

Orangeland Tactical Center of Gravity. The 102nd and 103rd Armored Brigades are the tactical center of gravity for the NOG. These are the best equipped (only T-72 equipped units), most effectively led units within the NOG. In both exercises and in recent operations, the NOG has used the armored striking force of these brigades as its counterattack/exploitation force.

MEF Center of Gravity. The NOG perceives that the COG for the MEF is its logistics tail. Mechanized operations in the upcoming campaign will test its capability to move, stockpile, and distribute large amounts of fuel and water in a desert environment with few improved roads. There will be several chokepoints that the NOG believes it can attack to prevent the MEF from resupplying its frontline units and will impose an unanticipated operational pause. Irregulars, special operations forces, and surface-to-surface missiles (possibly with chemical munitions) will attack these chokepoints (supply, ammunition, and fuel dumps at forces service support group and division). If successful, the NOG will force the MEF to limit the speed with which its forces move and attack.

A-4. Relative Combat Power

Friendly Forces				Enemy Forces			
Type Unit	Nos.	Value	Weight	Type Unit	Nos.	Value	Weight
Tank Bn	2	10	20	Tank Bn	10	4	40
Atk Helo Sqdn	6	9	54	Atk Helo Sqdn	2	6	12
Arty Bn	6	8	48	Arty Bn	10	6	60
MRL Bn	1	10	10	MRL Bn	3	6	18
FW Sqdn	12	10	120	FW Sqdn	2	5	10
EW BN	2	7	14	EW Bn	2	3	6
R&S Assets	2	9	18	R&S Assets	1	4	4
Total			284	Total			150
NOTES							

Table A-1. Example of relative combat power.

A-5. Most Likely Course of Action

Phase I—Delay/Withdraw

a. The 202nd and 203rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades will initially occupy prepared positions vicinity Mezzouna Oil Fields and Sfax. Do not take Sfax—this could prevent smooth withdrawal should it become necessary. Once confronted with a major allied ground offensive, these two brigades will begin, during darkness, to displace by echelon south towards Gabes. Make maximum use of minefields and obstacles to slow down the American advance. The 102nd Armored Brigade will conduct limited counterattacks to prevent penetration of our lines and to cover the withdrawal of our slower infantry. The 205th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will occupy positions vicinity Gafsa in order to provide early warning and to delay an envelopment by U.S. forces. Priority of fires from the 401st Artillery Regiment will go to the 202nd and 203rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades. Engineer Battalion will assist the 202nd and 203rd Mechanized Infantry Brigades develop defensive positions vicinity Mezzouna Oil Fields and Sfax. The Engineer Battalion then supports the 204th Mechanized Infantry as it builds the second echelon defenses vicinity Gabes.

b. The 301st Motorized Infantry Brigade will continue to occupy Djerba Island. The 103rd Armored Brigade will be the NOG reserve. Second echelon brigades will continue to secure the coastal road (Route 1) for resupply of the NOG, and will establish an in-depth defense from the Libyan border to Gabes. Operational control of the forward brigades will be delegated to the 102nd Armored Brigade commander. The rear echelon brigades will be under the operational control of 201st Mechanized Infantry Brigade commander.

c. Organic AAA and SA-7s, along with the NOG Air Defense Regiment, will support NOG forces. All fixed-wing aircraft will remain in Libya and will only be used to defend the homeland. Naval forces will primarily lay mines and attempt to hinder any attempt by U.S. forces to conduct an amphibious assault.

Phase II—Defense of Gabes

a. Taking advantage of the constrained terrain, minefields, and obstacles around Gabes, the 202nd, 203rd, and 205th Mechanized Infantry Brigades will occupy and defend the prepared positions at Gabes. The 102nd Armored Brigade will support the defense by sealing off and eliminating local penetrations. The 103rd Armored Brigade will act as reserve. Priority of fires from the 401st Artillery Regiment will go to the defending Mechanized Infantry Brigades. Should the second defensive belt be penetrated, all units are to fall back by echelon behind the third defensive belt at Medenine.

b. Prior to occupation of the second defensive belt, the 204th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will displace south and assist in the establishment of the third defensive belt vicinity Medenine. The remainder of NOG forces will be under the operational control of the 201st Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

c. Fixed wing aircraft and naval forces will have the same concept of operations as in Phase I.

A-6. Most Dangerous Course of Action

Defense of Gabes.

a. Taking advantage of the recent operational pause to resupply and refit, the NOG will establish a defense in depth from Gabes to the Tunisian-

Libyan border. This course of action takes advantage of more defensible terrain. Our analysis of the enemy indicates his objective is to defeat our forces and force us from Tunisia. This forces him to attack into our strength, attempt an envelopment of our western flank over long distances and very inhospitable terrain, or attempt an amphibious landing along our eastern flank. Any one or a combination of these actions are to our advantage and will either drive the enemy to fight through a successive layer of defenses or diminish his combat power by attempting to fix us near Gabes and then proceed with one or more envelopments.

b. The NOG's first echelon maneuver forces, consisting of the 102nd and 103rd Armored Brigade and the 202nd, 203rd, and 205th Mechanized Brigades, will establish defensive positions north and west of Gabes. Their mission is to defeat U.S. forces attacking south along Route 1 and its adjacent corridors and from the west along Route 15. These forces will execute localized counterattacks and exploitation, as opportunities for such are presented. The 401st Artillery Regiment is in general support of the first echelon. First echelon forces are under the tactical control of the 102nd Armor Brigade.

c. The NOG's second echelon force, consisting of the 101st and 104th Armored Brigades, the 201st and 204th Mechanized brigades, and the 301st Motorized Infantry Brigade, will establish a defense in depth from Gabes to the Tunisian-Libyan border. The 402nd Artillery Brigade is in general support of the second echelon. The 204th Mechanized Brigade is the NOG's operational reserve and is to be prepared to counterattack or reinforce penetrations of first echelon forces along either Route 1 or Route 15. The 301st Motorized Infantry Brigade is to pay particular attention to potential amphibious landing sites along Djerba Island and immediately attack to repel an enemy landing. Remaining second echelon forces, while remaining in defensive positions, will be prepared to counter any attempt to envelop our western flank; the 201st Mechanized Brigade will give particular emphasis to identifying likely routes for enemy armor/mechanized units to move through that restricted terrain and effecting those measures and plans to prevent a breakthrough to the coast if an envelopment is attempted. The 101st Armored Brigade will be prepared to reinforce the 201st Mechanized Brigade or counterattack any amphibious landing along the coast south of Djerba Island. The 302nd Motorized Infantry Brigade, 105th and 106th Armored Brigades, and 206th Mechanized Infantry Brigade will stage toward the Tunisian-Libyan border, with the mission of counterattacking any amphibious landing east of the Tunisian-Libyan border.

d. Organic AAA, SA-7s, and the NOG Air Defense Regiment will support NOG forces. All fixed-wing aircraft will remain in Libya and will be used for defense of the homeland. Rotary-wing aircraft will be used to combat U.S. forces. Naval forces will continue mining and harassment operations against enemy shipping.

A-7. Synchronization Matrix

A synchronization matrix indicates when critical functions occur over time and their relationship with other events. It is used during COA development and COA war game and focuses capabilities and asset allocation in relation to the enemy (selected COA), time and space, and events (DPs).

Enemy Most Likely Course of Action			
Time/Event		Phase I (Sousse-Sfax)	Phase II (Sfax-Gabes)
Enemy Action		Delay/Withdraw	Defend
	Deep	SCUD attacks at ports/airfields. Conduct rear area operations	Same with added emphasis on enemy's extended lines of communications
	Security	Covering force engages forward/delays/withdraws. Counterreconnaissance actions. Operations security enforced. Rear area patrols	Reestablish security zone north of Gabes. Engage, disrupt, fallback.
	Close	Civilian shields and refugees to block roads. No decisive engagements. Priority withdrawal: artillery, mechanized, armor.	If second defensive belt is penetrated, fall back. Withdraw flank elements at Gafsa based on enemy maneuver.
Maneuver	Reserve	103 rd Armored Brigade remains in position	Reposition in vicinity of Medenine.
	Mobility	Maintain lines of communication and facilitate rearward movement to Gabes and forward movement of supplies to Gabes.	Maintain lines of communication to border.
	Countermobility	Blow bridges, hasty mine fields. Force refugee movement to block roads. Anti-tank ambushes.	Same.
	Rear Area	Begin to establish third echelon positions in vicinity of Medenine. Active security operations.	Withdraw FARP at Gabes. Position rear elements in vicinity of Libyan border.
Intelligence		Identify main efforts at corps, division, and regimental level. Support friendly rear area operations	Continue to identify main efforts. Watch for indications of amphibious assault.
Fires	Lethal	Focus on attriting enemy and slowing his forward movement.	Same
	Nonlethal	Attack tactical command and fire direction nets.	Same
Logistics	Sustainment	Buildup supply points in the vicinity of Gabes.	Same
	Transport	Emphasis on pushing supplies to Gabes and evacuating casualties.	Same

Table A-2. Example of synchronization matrix.

A-8. Strengths and Weaknesses Matrix

		RED	BLUE
MANEUVER		Lead elements are in defensive positions and hold key terrain.	Superior tracked mobility assets.
	Deep Operations	Aviation forces not well trained; normally operate under ground based control.	Capable of full-spectrum operations throughout the AO.
	Security		
	Close Operations		
	Reserve		Small reserve.
	Rear Operations		
	Mobility		
	Counter-mobility	Mine warfare, mobile coastal missile and cruise missile armed fast attack craft capable of threatening Blue littoral operations.	Limited obstacle and mine-clearing assets.
INTELLIGENCE			UAVs and aerial recce
	NAI		
	TAI		
FIRES	Lethal	Capable of accurately massing artillery fires in support of offensive and defensive operations.	Multiple Launch Rocket System
	Nonlethal		Aerial electronic warfare assets
LOGISTICS	Sustainment	Extended supply lines vulnerable to air interdiction	
	Transport		
COMMAND AND CONTROL		Overall command and control at Brigade and higher level is poor	
	IW		Army Psyop assets
	C2W		
FORCE PROTECTION	NBC	Capable of employing weapons of mass destruction.	
	Air Defense	Integrated Air Defense System unable to expand beyond border.	

Table A-3. Example of strengths and weaknesses matrix.

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Appendix B

Glossary

Section I Acronyms

Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
 2. MCRP 5-12C, *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
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C2PC	Command and Control Personal Computer
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
CV	critical vulnerability
DP	decision point
DSM	decision support matrix
DST	decision support template
HPT	high-payoff target
HVT	high-value target
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MEF	Marine expeditionary force

METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, and time
NAI	named area of interest
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
OIC	officer in charge
OPT	operational planning team
TAI	targeted area of interest

Section II Definitions

Note: Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military definitions of military terms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
 2. MCRP 5-12C, *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
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C

centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (JP 1-02)

course of action—1. A plan that would accomplish, or is related to, the accomplishment of a mission. 2. The scheme adopted to accomplish a task or mission. It is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. The supported commander will include a recommended course of action in the commander's estimate. The recommended course of action will include the concept of operations, evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations, and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment. Refinement of this data base will be contingent on the time available for course of action development. When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan or operation order. Also called **COA**. (JP 1-02)

critical vulnerability—An aspect of a center of gravity that if exploited will do the most significant damage to an adversary's ability to resist. A vulnerability cannot be critical unless it undermines a key strength. Also called **CV**. (MCRP 5-12C)

D

decision point—An event, area, or point in the battlespace where and when the friendly commander will make a critical decision. Also called **DP**. (MCRP 5-12C)

decision support matrix—An aid used by the commander and staff to make battlefield decisions. It is a staff product of the war-gaming process which lists the decision point, location of the decision point, the criteria to be evaluated at the point of the decision, the action or options to occur at the decision point, and the unit or element that is to act and has responsibility to observe and report the information affecting the criteria for the decision. (MCRP 5-12A)

decision support template—A staff product initially used in the war-gaming process which graphically represents the decision points and projected situations and indicates when, where, and under what conditions a decision is most likely to be required to initiate a specific activity (such as a branch or sequel) or event (such as lifting or shifting of fires.) (MCRP 5-12A)

H

high-payoff target—Target whose loss to the threat will contribute to the success of the friendly COA. (MCRP 5-2A)

high-value target—Assets that the threat commander requires for the successful completion of a specific COA. (MCRP 5-2A)

I

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (MCRP 5-12C)

N

named area of interest—A point or area along a particular avenue of approach through which enemy activity is expected to occur. Activity or lack of activity within a named area of interest will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Also called **NAI**. (MCRP 5-12A)

O

operational planning team—A group built around the future operations section which integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the six warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called **OPT**. (MCRP 5-12C)

T

targeted area of interest—The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to either abandon a particular course of action or require him to use specialized engineer support to continue, where he can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Not all targeted areas of interest will form part of the friendly course of action; only targeted areas of interest associated with high-payoff targets are of interest to the staff. These are identified during staff planning and wargaming. Targeted areas of interest differ from engagement areas in degree. Engagement areas plan for the use of all available weapons. Targeted areas of interest might be engaged by a single weapon. Also called **TAI**. (MCRP 5-12C)

W

war game—A simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation. (JP 1-02)

wargaming—A step-by-step process of action, reaction, and counteraction for visualizing the execution of each friendly course of action in relation to enemy courses of action and reactions. It explores the possible branches and sequels to the primary plan resulting in a final plan and decision points for critical actions. (MCRP 5-12A)

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