

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Marine Corps University
User's Guide to Marine Corps Values

COMBAT LEADERSHIP

1. Introduction. Combat leadership is the application of leadership traits and principles under conditions of extreme stress caused by enemy fire or the high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy. It is not necessary to have experienced combat to understand the essential requirements for leading men under stress. However, it is a fundamental responsibility of the leader to be mentally prepared for the experience of battle, and to adequately prepare one's Marines for this event.

2. Overview. The purpose of this period of instruction is to stimulate dialogue relating to the role of the leader in a combat environment. This discussion is intended to enhance the understanding and appreciation Marines have for developing leadership standards within their unit that will contribute to combat readiness. This will help to instill an understanding of the leader's role in combat and to enhance your ability to apply requisite leadership skills to be successful in a hostile environment.

3. References. Include the following:

Determination in Battle by MajGen T.S. Hart
Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders for 3d Marine Division
Combat Leadership by S.L.A. Marshall
Americans in Combat excerpt from The Armed Forces Officer
Legacy of Esprit and Leadership by MajGen John A. Lejeune
Peleliu - Recollections of a PFC by E.B. Sledge
Combat Service Support Case Study
Combat Leadership Problems
Men Against Fire by S.L.A. Marshall
Battle Leadership by Adolf Von Schell

4. Discussion Leader Notes

a. Effective combat leadership is the knowledge and application of the unchanging concepts of human behavior in battle, and a mastery of the ever-changing tactics, doctrine, equipment and weapons necessary for combat. Preparation for combat leadership is accomplished through study and training. The appendices are provided to assist in this effort.

b. All appendices could be distributed prior to the discussion so that all participants will have had an opportunity to read these introductory articles. The discussion should stimulate an interest in additional professional readings to enhance your Marines' understanding of combat leadership.

c. Men Against Fire by S.L.A. Marshall and Battle Leadership by Adolf Von Schell are highly recommended readings for the discussion leader. Additionally, if all participants are also provided an opportunity to read one or both of these books prior to the discussion, the effectiveness of instruction will be enhanced. However, this is not a requirement for conducting the discussion.

d. Four hours should be scheduled for the discussion. If films are available, consider utilization of a scene showing intense combat from one of the recommended films prior to the discussion's introduction. Another opportunity for utilizing a film is after completing the first hour of discussion or after the second hour.

e. This discussion guide is just that, a guide, and is not meant to be the "end-all" of leadership instruction on the subject. However, it does provide the basic points for discussion. Only you, the leader, know what your unit needs most, and therefore, you must evaluate what needs to be emphasized, modified, or expanded.

f. When leading this discussion, remember that the effectiveness of the group learning experience is primarily dependent upon your preparation and your ability to fulfill your duties as discussion leader.

5. Discussion. Today we will discuss combat leadership, a subject vital to our existence. But first, let's find out:

a. WHO IS A COMBAT LEADER?

Let's read from a Marine's diary. "Briefly, the First Battalion did not fare too well before they departed from Guadalcanal. 'A' Co. left San Diego with a total of 196, including corpsmen, in the company; when relieved from Guadalcanal there were about 47 of the original company still remaining. In three attacks to the west of Matanikan, between Point Cruz and Kohumbona, 'A' Co. was assigned as lead Company in the Battalion attack on November 2, 10 & 11, and took a large number of casualties.

By the time 'A' Company was relieved, all the officers had been killed or wounded; the First Sergeant was killed and the Gunnery Sergeant wounded; two of the four platoon sergeants had been wounded and more than half of the corporals and sergeants in the company had been killed or wounded. For a time, the CO of 'A' Company was Sergeant Burgess."

(Extract from a Marine's Diary, Sgt. James Sorensen, Rifle Squad Leader, Company A, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines.)

b. Everyone is a potential combat leader regardless of rank or MOS and should be prepared for that eventuality. Combat may be just around the corner, and tomorrow each of us could find ourselves in a combat leadership position.

c. Regardless of how well a unit or air crew is trained, leaders must "steel" themselves for the first action. The first time a unit comes under fire or meets the enemy is a very crucial time. A unit hit by enemy fire for the first time tends to become disorganized, and consequently less effective. The men hit the deck, take cover, and wait for somebody to do something. Generally, everyone, including fire team leaders, squad leaders, and platoon leaders, react in this manner. This is the baptism of fire, what may be the most important moments in the life of the individual Marine and the unit.

d. If the unit or air crew fails to react properly and overcome its initial fears, its failure will be reflected for a long time in future actions. Confidence at this point is essential, for it becomes contagious. The Marines in the unit must have confidence in themselves, their comrades, and their leaders.

e. At this crucial moment, if all leaders at all levels supply the drive and enthusiasm needed to weld the unit together as a team again, the Marines under their command will react accordingly. If Marines are well disciplined and have been trained for this moment, all that is necessary is the igniting spark of leadership that will get the team moving again quickly. Each leader must commence carrying out the troop leading steps.

6. Troop leading steps

a. Although this discussion is not about troop leading steps, they must know the basics; review quickly as appropriate.

If they don't know them, this will indicate where additional work is required.

b. Your Marines' leadership and aggressive action will provide contagious confidence that reassures every individual during combat. Once aggressive action begins, the unit will function as it has been trained to function. During this discussion we will accomplish the following:

- (1) Discuss the nature of combat.
- (2) Discuss the leadership challenges faced in combat.
- (3) Discuss how to develop combat readiness.

7. The nature of combat

a. During this period we will discuss the nature of combat. We will first define what we mean by combat, then identify the various stresses that are characteristic of the combat environment. Having identified the stresses, we will then determine what effect they have on the individual Marine and the leader. Our focus will be on the basic factors that are essential for unit survival and accomplishment of the mission in combat.

(1) WHAT IS COMBAT?

(a) For our purposes, combat will be defined as engaging the enemy with individual or crew served weapons; being exposed to direct or indirect enemy fire; and otherwise undergoing a high probability of direct contact with enemy personnel and firepower, to include the risk of capture.

(b) All Marines, regardless of MOS, must be prepared to succeed in combat. The fluid nature of modern combat operations demands that everyone on the battlefield be ready to fight and provide the necessary leadership.

(2) WHAT ARE COMMON ELEMENTS FOUND IN THE COMBAT ENVIRONMENT?

(a) The combat environment varies for Marines depending upon MOS, duties, tactics, type of conflict, etc. (Discuss this for awhile and allow various group members to describe what they have experienced or expect to experience in combat. It would be useful to write down these inputs to assist in defining the nature of the combat environment. It should become clear that the real challenges facing Marines are

generally the same even though the experiences and situations vary.) Some common elements found in the combat environment are:

- [1] Confusion and lack of information.
- [2] Casualties.
- [3] Violent, unnerving sights and sounds.
- [4] Feelings of isolation.
- [5] Communication breakdowns.
- [6] Individual discomfort and fatigue.
- [7] Fear, stress, and mental fatigue.
- [8] Continuous operations.
- [9] Homesickness.

(b) In Appendix F, E. B. Sledge describes his experiences as a PFC on Peleliu:

"For us, combat was a series of changing events characterized by confusion, awesome violence, gripping fear, physical stress and fatigue, fierce hatred of the enemy, and overwhelming grief over the loss of friends. We endured vile personal filth in a repulsive environment, saturated with the stench of death and decay...

...In combat I saw little, knew little, and understood still less about anything that occurred outside K3/5. We had our hands full fighting and trying to survive moment to moment."

(c) In the January 1983 Marine Corps Gazette article entitled "Understanding Limited War," the author provides some thoughts on what combat may mean to an individual.

"Nations may pursue war on a limited basis to ensure survival, yet combatants pursue it in all its totality for the same reason. To the individual engaged in isolated combat, there is no big or small battle, only the fight for survival. If he fails to survive, that nondescript battle suddenly became the ultimate conflict. An isolated confrontation on a lonely jungle trail becomes World War III to the participant."

(d) Some additional questions to consider:

[1] How does the combat environment change depending upon one's rank and billet?

[2] How can these differences present different leadership challenges?

[3] How did/do the leadership challenges differ between operations/missions in Desert Storm and Somalia?

(3) WHAT STRESSES DO YOU EXPECT TO EXPERIENCE IN COMBAT?

(a) List responses on a chalkboard. The following should be discussed in detail:

[1] Extreme risk and fear.

[2] The "fog of war."

[3] Discomfort and fatigue.

[4] Casualties.

[5] Boredom.

(b) The combat environment is characterized by long periods of routine activity that tend to create a false feeling of security. When combat actually occurs, it is frequently sudden, unexpected, and characterized by extremely violent action, savage behavior and intense danger. Everyone on the battlefield, including headquarters and service support personnel, must be prepared for combat at any time.

Now let's examine these stresses in greater detail to determine their effect upon the individual Marine and you, the leader.

(4) WHAT ARE SPECIFIC SOURCES OF FEAR IN COMBAT?

(a) The possibility of being killed, wounded, or captured is always present.

(b) The noise and sights of combat have a traumatic, shocking impact upon the senses, causing confusion, and a sense of chaos that may become particularly unnerving.

(c) The apprehension that you might not "measure up" as a Marine under fire or let your buddies down.

(d) Anticipation of the unexpected; constant anxiety about the enemy's location, strength, or intentions. Knowledge that if the enemy succeeds in creating a situation which was

totally unexpected, he may have a decisive advantage. This is the element of "surprise" in reverse.

(e) Fatigue itself is a source of fear. As individuals become physically exhausted, they may begin to perceive themselves to be helpless or unable to continue to fight. Air crews experiencing fatigue may begin to make critical mistakes in maintenance procedures or may begin overextending their own capabilities and that of their aircraft.

(5) WHAT EFFECT DOES THE STRESS OF FEAR HAVE?

(a) Extreme fear brings out our instinct for self-preservation. Survival is clearly a very strong motivation and will generally be a priority concern. In combat, killing the enemy helps remove that threat to your life. The alternative of not killing the enemy increases the likelihood that he will kill you.

(b) Physically, the body reacts when threatened or there is anticipation of danger. During World War II, General George S. Patton, USA, wrote a friend:

"It is rather interesting how you get used to death. I have had to go inspect the troops everyday, in which case you run a good chance...of being shot. I had the same experience everyday, which is for the first half hour, the palms of my hands sweat and I feel very depressed. Then, if one hits near you, it seems to break the spell and you don't notice them anymore."

(c) Some other physiological reactions are:

- [1] Trembling.
- [2] Pounding heart.
- [3] Irrational laughter.
- [4] Sweating.

(d) Psychological reactions might include:

- [1] Inability to make decisions.
- [2] Over-fixation with minor details.
- [3] Displaying lack of confidence.

(6) WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO KNOW AND BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE THESE REACTIONS?

(a) The leader may not normally see these manifestations/reactions in peacetime. Fear must be recognized and dealt with promptly. Fear is infectious and can destroy the effectiveness of a unit.

(b) Extreme reaction to fear occurs when the individual confronts a situation where death appears to be imminent. During such instances two basic forms of behavior have been observed.

[1] "We fought like rats, which do not hesitate to spring with all their teeth bared when they are cornered by a man infinitely larger than they are."

(Statement of German soldier on Eastern Front during World War II describing how they reacted when overrun by Russian hordes. From Combat Motivation by Anthony Kelleet.)

[2] "They sat there dumbly in the line of fire, their minds blanked out, their fingers too nerveless to hold a weapon." This has been termed "freezing under fire." From Men Against Fire by S.L.A. Marshall, writing about soldiers on Omaha Beach in World War II.

(7) WHAT IS IT THAT ENABLES MARINES TO OVERCOME FEAR?

(a) (Allow some discussion). Many experts have tried to answer this question, however, center attention on the following areas:

[1] Identity. Our identity as Marines conveys a special meaning to our fellow Marines; one Marine will not let another Marine down. The "felt" presence of another Marine who is counting on you to do a particular job is usually sufficient to overcome most fears.

[2] Discipline. Everyone is afraid in combat, but this fear has to be controlled so that the job can get done. All Marines must have the will power to force fear out of their minds or to overcome it and replace it with action. Concentrate on your job and actively support your fellow Marines. Everything we do as Marines reflects on the quality of our discipline, something we recognize as essential to success in combat.

[3] Esprit de corps. We are a Brotherhood of Marines. Fierce pride in our Corps and our unit is a source of

enduring strength. "The Few, The Proud, The Marines" is more than a recruiting slogan; it's a way of life.

[4] Tradition. We fight and win. Every Marine must have knowledge of and pride in our history and traditional values. We will do no less than the Marines who have come before us.

[5] Training. Training develops confidence in our leadership, our fellow Marines, and ourselves. It builds morale, discipline, esprit, pride, and develops physical stamina and teamwork.

(8) WHAT SIGNIFICANCE DOES FEAR HAVE TO YOU, THE LEADER?

(a) Though leaders share the same risks and fears, they must be able to overcome their own fears, and provide the leadership necessary to achieve success in combat. They must understand the conditions that stimulate fear, and be able to inspire confidence and courageous actions by their Marines.

(9) WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS THAT STIMULATE FEAR?

(a) The unexpected. Whenever the enemy actions appear as a surprise it will have a powerful impact upon your Marines. Being surprised by the enemy has been described as causing the "will that controls fear to sag and crumble." At such moments leaders must exert a strong influence upon their Marines to maintain control over the unit's actions.

(b) The unknown.

[1] There is a tendency to think that the enemy is much greater in strength or ability than he really may be. Do not allow yourself to be deceived as to enemy strength or capabilities through exaggerated impressions.

[2] Regardless of how well you or your Marines are trained for combat, the first shock of realizing that the enemy actually intends to kill you is a powerful factor everyone will have to face. Until this threshold is crossed and your Marines become accustomed to functioning under fire, the leader must act decisively to ignite the confidence and individual actions that will transform fear into an aggressive unit response.

[3] The presence of a leader has tremendous value in overcoming fear, particularly at night, in adverse weather, or during lulls in the action when everyone's

imagination runs wild and Marines think they may be alone or isolated.

[4] A feeling of helplessness. It is the leader who must prevent this from taking hold. The leader must act to direct and inspire the response against the enemy. Everyone has a job that must be accomplished and it is the leader who must see that everyone is doing what must be done. Action is a key to preventing this feeling of helplessness from taking hold. Keep your Marines engaged. Read or tell the story of the following excerpt from Guadalcanal Diary to make the point that the timely, reassuring presence of a leader is of immeasurable value to combatants.

"He was firing from behind a log. His face was gray, his eyes were dull and without hope. He stopped firing and looked around.

'It didn't do any good,' he said. His voice was flat, and he was speaking to no one in particular.

'I got three of 'em, but it don't do any good, they just keep coming.'

Platoon Sergeant Casimir Polakowski, known as Ski, said, 'What the hell are you beefing about? You get paid for it don't you?'

The kid managed a grin. As Ski crawled on down the line, the boy, now a man, was once more squeezing 'em off."

This excerpt identified another important factor that helps the individual "bear up" under stressful combat circumstances. The importance of humor.

(10) WHAT ACTIONS CAN THE LEADER (YOU) TAKE TO HELP OVERCOME FEAR?

(a) S.L.A. Marshall stated, "...even if they (the troops) have previously looked on him (the leader) as a father and believed absolutely that being with him was their best assurance of successful survival, should he then develop a dugout habit, show himself as fearful and too careful of his own safety, he will lose his hold on them no less absolutely." Actions the leader can take include:

[1] Be fearless, confident, and decisive. Don't let fear be reflected in your looks or actions.

[2] Ensure your Marines are able to recognize the causes and reactions of fear. It is important knowledge that will enable Marines to help their buddy.

[3] Instill a sense of unit cohesion, a belief in the band of brothers concept, and develop esprit.

[4] Do not tolerate self-pity.

[5] Talk to your Marines and encourage them, particularly just before a battle.

[6] Do not tolerate rearward movement especially when under fire without your order.

[7] Take physical corrective action as necessary.

[8] If a subordinate appears to be losing control, help him regain a positive control through direct personal leadership and then let him continue to march.

(11) WHAT DO WE MEAN BY THE "FOG OF WAR?"

This expression describes both the literal fog created by the dust, smoke, and debris of the battlefield, and more importantly the mental fog of confusion and uncertainty created by lack of knowledge of the enemy, the chaotic noise, mental and physical fatigue, and fear.

(12) WHAT SIGNIFICANCE DOES THIS STRESS HAVE TO THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE?

As with the condition of risk and fear, the individual must be able to function in an environment that may appear confusing and chaotic. By focusing his/her attention on the task at hand, on working with fellow Marines, and on the leader's commands, the individual will overcome this stress.

(13) WHAT SIGNIFICANCE DOES THE "FOG OF WAR" HAVE TO YOU, THE LEADER?

The leader must be aware of the problems caused by the confusion of battle. Tired as he or she may be, they must realize that their Marines are equally tired. They must have yet additional strength to see that commands are obeyed and essential tasks accomplished. They must help cut through the fog and confusion of combat by keeping orders clear, simple, audible, and understood, ensuring that the unit continues to function as a team. Most of all, they must make certain that their Marines never become confused about their own unit's ability to fight.

Leader must ensure their units are a cohesive force on the battlefield regardless of the chaos and confusion.

(14) WHAT DOES FATIGUE MEAN TO THE LEADER?

(a) The leader is not immune to fatigue. As he/she becomes increasingly tired, he/she may lose the ability to make decisions rapidly, and may become more easily confused, disoriented, and ultimately ineffective.

(b) Leaders must understand the effects of fatigue on themselves and on their Marines and know when to provide rest. In Appendix C, S.L.A. Marshall states: "Right on the battlefield, with an attack pending they would halt everything to order a rest or a sleep if they felt that the condition of the troops demanded it." The leader must know when to rest, especially amidst the chaos and confusion of battle. Without it, a unit will lose its effectiveness as surely as if by enemy fire. The leader must be able to recognize when fatigue is beginning to adversely affect the unit."

(15) WHAT ARE SOME KEY INDICATORS OF FATIGUE?

(a) Reckless disregard for the safety of the individual or the safety of fellow Marines.

(b) Excessive caution or unwillingness to expose oneself to even the slightest risk.

(c) Failure to fire weapons.

(d) Lack of concern for the cleanliness of weapons, the condition of vehicles, or other essential equipment.

(e) Lack of attention to aircraft maintenance/flight procedures.

(f) Lack of concern for personal cleanliness; refusal to shave, wash, eat, or drink.

(16) WHAT HAPPENS TO MARINES IF FATIGUE IS IGNORED?

As individuals become more fatigued their mental condition can deteriorate from mere weariness to becoming a psychological casualty. Rest is a preventive cure that works to keep psychiatric casualties from occurring. (Appendix A provides further insight on prevention of psychiatric casualties.)

(17) HOW DOES DISCOMFORT AFFECT INDIVIDUALS IN COMBAT?

(a) Admittedly, discomfort is probably the least of a Marine's concerns when actually engaged in combat. However, the degree to which he/she has been adversely affected by being wet, cold, hungry, thirsty, or weary does have an effect on how well he/she can respond to the enemy. Marines tend to develop a high tolerance for enduring the extremes of weather and making do without much support; however, there is a point where morale begins to be affected and a unit's actual ability to fight becomes questionable. It is essential that the leader take care of his/her Marines, and at the first opportunity, provide for dry clothing, protection from the cold, food, or water. The following excerpt from S.L.A. Marshall's book, Battle At Best, describes how taking care of your Marines pays its dividend in combat (The discussion leader can read this or relate the story):

"At dark on 8 December, the snowfall ceased and the cold intensified. Down along the canyon road near the water gate, a brisk wind was piling the drifts as high as a man's head.

At the Battalion CP, which was partly sheltered by the canyon wall, the thermometer read thirty degrees below zero. Up on the wind-swept crags where Able Company was clearing Chinese dead from the bunkers to make room for its own ranks, and at the same time preparing to evacuate its own casualties down the iced slopes of the mountain, it must have been a touch colder than that, though there was no reading of the temperature.

All batteries had frozen. Weapons were stiffening. The camp long since had run out of water because of the freezing of canteens. To ease their thirst, the men ate snow and seemed to thrive on it.

But of the many problems raised by the weather, the most severe one was getting an average good man to observe what the field manuals so easily describe as a 'common sense precaution.'

For example, prior to marching from Chinhungni, Captain Barrow of Able had made certain that each of his men carried two spare pairs of socks. But that safeguard did not of itself ensure his force, though the men, with feet sweating from the rigors of the day, were all at the point of becoming frostbite casualties by the hour of the bivouac.

Let Barrow tell it. 'I learned that night that only leadership will save men under winter conditions. It's easy to say that men should change socks; getting it done is another matter. Boot laces become iced over during prolonged engagements

in snowdrifts. It's a fight to get a boot off the foot. When a man removes his gloves to struggle with the laces, it seems to him that his hands are freezing. His impulse is all against it. So I found it necessary to do this by order, staying with the individuals until they had changed, then making them get up and move about to restore circulation.'

That process, simple in the telling, consumed hours. By the time Barrow was satisfied that his command was relatively snug, it was wearing on toward midnight. Right then, his perimeter was hit by a counterattack, an enemy force in platoon-strength-plus striking along the ridge line from 1081 in approximately the same formation which Barrow had used during the afternoon.

All that needs be told about this small action is summed up in Barrow's brief radio report. 'They hit us. We killed them all - all that we could see. We have counted eighteen fresh bodies just outside our lines!' (Note: Captain Barrow became our 27th Commandant.)

(b) In this case, looking after the men's welfare was translated directly into enabling a company of Marines to succeed in battle. Leaders must continually concern themselves with the needs of their Marines so that they will be ready to accomplish the mission.

(18) WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ENDURANCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL MARINE?

Killing the enemy that is trying to kill you is only half the battle; endurance is the other half. To the individual Marine, enduring discomfort and fatigue and the other hazards and stresses of combat is what must be done so that he can succeed in combat. The individual Marine must be physically strong and capable of perseverance. He/she must know that fatigue causes the behaviors that we have described; the loss of concern for survival, the erosion of will to fight, and a general apathy. These must be resisted with self-discipline and the reservoir of strength that is deep within every Marine. When necessary we can, and will endure as Marines have done before.

(19) WHAT EFFECT DO CASUALTIES HAVE ON INDIVIDUAL MARINES?

Seeing a fellow Marine go down has traumatic impact upon the individual. Combat is a brutal event and casualties are to be expected. The shock of seeing buddies wounded or killed, and the possibility that it may happen to one's self adds to the

fear and apprehension of survivors; it increases the reluctance to take risks and obey the leader. How individuals respond after they take casualties is a key indicator of the effectiveness of their training, self-discipline, and preparation for combat.

(20) HOW SHOULD MARINES RESPOND TO CASUALTIES?

(a) Proper care for your wounded has a great effect upon morale. Every Marine must be assured that if he is hit, his fellow Marines will take care of him. There is an unwritten contract among Marines that if wounded and unable to fend for oneself, another Marine will come to one's aid and do all he/she can to help.

(b) During the assault, Marines cannot stop to aid a fallen buddy, and each Marine must know this. Casualties are the job of the corpsman. This is the reason corpsmen are not armed with rifles or machine guns. It is their job to look after the wounded, not to fight. Most corpsmen are "gung-ho" and many want to employ weapons other than their T/O 9mm pistol; this should not be allowed as they may tend to fire rather than take care of the wounded.

(c) At the very first opportunity, casualties should be looked after by their leaders and comrades. Every Marine must be accounted for. Dead and wounded are removed from the combat area as soon as possible.

(21) WHAT IS THE RESULT WHEN CASUALTIES ARE NOT EXPEDITIOUSLY EVACUATED?

(a) The presence of dead and wounded for a prolonged period of time hurts the morale of survivors. It is important to always care for casualties and impart confidence that whatever the cost, your fellow Marines will do all that can be done under the circumstances. If combat prevents the prompt evacuation of casualties, they should be moved to a position of relative safety and receive care until they can be evacuated.

(b) Another important task of the leader occurs after the casualties have been evacuated. At the first opportunity, communicate with the next of kin. It is also reassuring to the surviving members of the unit to know that they will not be forgotten.

(22) IS BOREDOM A FACTOR IN COMBAT?

(a) Boredom is not something one would expect to find during combat. However, the combat environment is often

composed of long periods of inactivity that often lead to careless behavior, thereby reducing everyone's chances of survival when combat next occurs. Leaders must not allow idleness or slovenly and careless behavior to happen. When enemy contact appears remote, every action must be oriented toward improving the unit's readiness to defeat the enemy. Training does not cease in combat, it continues and intensifies.

(b) We have described some of the conditions that we will experience in combat. Combat's nature is violent and brutal, generating chaotic confusion that can destroy the combatant's will to fight. Specific stresses we can expect are:

- [1] Extreme risk and fear
- [2] Confusion, the so called "fog of war"
- [3] Discomfort and fatigue.
- [4] Casualties.
- [5] Boredom.

During the next phase, we will examine how the leader can maintain morale, motivation, discipline, proficiency, and esprit de corps under combat conditions.

8. Leadership challenges faced in combat.

a. During this period we will discuss some psychological leadership challenges; how to maintain morale, motivation, discipline, proficiency, and esprit de corps in the combat environment. While the discussion will focus on the role of the leader, bear in mind that all Marines share in leadership responsibility. Since one objective of the enemy will be to break the individual Marine's will to persevere in battle, overcoming these psychological challenges are crucial to achieving success in combat. Every Marine must develop an instinctive understanding of these factors and devote his efforts to strengthening them in the unit. (If necessary, refer to "Foundations of Leadership" for other ideas in leading this discussion.)

(1) WHAT ARE SOME LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES THE LEADER MUST DEAL WITH IN COMBAT?

(a) There are basically two types of challenges leaders face in combat:

[1] Challenges that you have little or no control over, but must try to understand, to endure, and to explain.

[2] Challenges that you can influence.

(2) WHAT ARE SOME CHALLENGES YOU HAVE LITTLE OR NO CONTROL OVER?

(a) Some challenges you have little or no control over include:

[1] The type of conflict.

[2] The duration.

[3] The political guidelines and rules of engagement.

[4] The enemy's actions.

[5] The public's reaction and support.

[6] The location, weather, and terrain.

[7] The organization's mission.

[8] The organization's history.

[9] The availability and quality of replacements (personnel and equipment).

(3) WHAT IS AN EXAMPLE?

An obvious one from Lebanon is the limitations placed on Marines from entering into full combat with hostiles. This can create stress from frustration and have an adverse effect on individuals and units if we are not careful. This frustration of never "getting at the enemy" was considered an underlying explanation in the breakdown of discipline of the Army unit in the My Lai incident during Vietnam.

(4) WHAT ARE SOME CHALLENGES YOU MAY BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE?

Some challenges you may be able to influence are:

- [1] Morale
- [2] Discipline
- [3] Esprit de corps
- [4] Proficiency

(5) WHAT ARE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FACED BY COMBATANTS THE LEADER MUST BE AWARE OF?

(a) In Annex A, MGen T. S. Hart outlines the following challenges that affect an individual's willingness and ability to fight during combat.

[1] Fear, real or imagined, is the major stress faced by all men in battle. In Battle Leadership, Captain Von Schell states:

"In peace we learn how to lead companies, battalions, regiments, even divisions and armies. We learn in books and by maps how one fights and wins battles, but we are not instructed in the thoughts, the hopes, the fears that run riot in the mind of the front line soldier."

[2] The unexpected presents challenges that they may not have been prepared for. Clausewitz summed it up:

"It is of first importance that the soldier high or low should not have to encounter in war things which, seen for the first time, set him in terror or perplexity."

[3] The unknown is what the Marine has not seen and does not know about, but has yet to be affected by. This worry and apprehension begins to eat at the individual. As the author states, "I would add that this fear of the unknown is most marked when the soldier is isolated, or at night."

[4] Fear of failure may be common among Marines, particularly those who have yet to "prove" themselves in combat. This is a real stress and many times plays an important role in tight cohesive organizations during combat. S.L.A. Marshall states:

"When fire sweeps the field, nothing keeps a man from running except a sense of honor, if bound by obligation to the people right around him, of fear of failure in their sight, which might eternally disgrace him."

[5] The noise and sights of the battle can be particularly unnerving. No peacetime training can completely prepare an individual for the carnage or emotional impact of combat.

[6] Fear of killing is not uncommon. Peace time training may not prepare all individuals for the reality that it is often simply a matter of kill or be killed.

[7] Exhaustion is a reality and a constant danger during combat operations. When confronted daily and constantly with the stress of combat, men can come apart at the seams. In Annex A, the author writes:

"There is no doubt that troops, however well led, can only take the stress of battle for so long then they break. Any commander, at any level, who tries to overdraw the account is courting disaster."

"...the mental and the physical constantly interact. Therefore, physical fatigue, hunger, disease, thirst, and, above all, the stress of adverse climatic conditions, can reduce the physical state of the soldier to such an extent that his will to fight is broken."

(6) WHAT TYPES OF REACTIONS CAN THESE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGES CREATE?

(a) Units are made up of individuals, an obvious statement, but often it only takes one to inspire a unit to victory or lead it to defeat. Therefore, we must prepare each link in the chain sufficiently to ensure success. To do this we must understand how these challenges can affect individual performance. There are common factors that challenge all combatants.

[1] Stress As previously discussed, individual stress can have a devastating effect on individual performance. In combat it is ever present and even more important that individuals be able to cope with it. If not, then as the author in Annex A offers:

"Despite all our efforts, when stress becomes too much, or the soldier has been under stress for too long, the will breaks and the soldier suffers psychiatric breakdown. This breakdown can be present in many forms:

[a] Panic states which result in headlong flight.

[b] Acute depression where the patient sits mute and motionless.

[c] Acute anxiety with extreme restlessness and agitation.

[d] Exhaustion states where troops show abnormal feelings.

[f] Hysterical reactions including hysterical blindness, paralysis, etc.

(b) It is to our credit that Marines have not been overcome by these problems to any great extent in the past.

(c) Some additional reactions include:

[1] Freezing under fire.

[2] Inability to make decisions.

[3] Over-fixation with minor details.

[4] Lack of confidence.

[5] Breakdown of discipline

(7) WHAT ABOUT INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT CONSTANTLY EXPOSED TO THE RIGORS AND DEMANDS OF THE FRONTLINE, WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGES DO THEY FACE?

(a) These units whose situations/missions may or may not bring them in direct confrontation with the enemy often present the greatest leadership challenge. They often are affected by:

[1] The stress of going back and forth from a high risk environment to a relatively safe one (e.g., air crews, pilots, motor transport personnel, etc.).

[2] Boredom brought on by a "business as usual" routine day today (e.g., rear area headquarters personnel, supply personnel, rear security area personnel, etc.).

[3] Frustration from wanting to be at the front, but being in the rear.

(8) WHAT IMPACT DO THESE CHALLENGES HAVE ON ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS?

(a) Discuss the effects of these factors on units. Try and focus on how, if ignored or not noticed, they can erode the basic fiber of an organization. Again, it might be useful to look at how the factors affect various units (ground, support, and air). Consider using the following indicators to assist this part of the discussion:

[1] Morale.

[2] Discipline.

[3] Esprit de corps.

[4] Proficiency.

(9) MARINES FREQUENTLY CONFUSE MORALE WITH MOTIVATION. WHAT DO THESE TWO TERMS REALLY MEAN?

(a) Allow some discussion to define the two terms. Both terms are used to describe the willingness of individuals to fight and their readiness to die for something more important than themselves; their fellow Marines, their unit, their Corps, their country, or all of these combined.

[1] Good morale is the confident, resolute, willing, often self-sacrificing, and courageous attitude of an individual to do the tasks expected of him /her by a group of which he/she is a part. It is based upon pride in the achievements and aims of the group, faith in its leadership and ultimate success, a sense of participation in its work, and a devotion and loyalty to the other members of the group.

[2] Morale is a fragile thing that tends to fluctuate even among the best Marine units. It must be a constant concern for the leader, because it is the foundation element of discipline.

[3] Motivation answers the question "why" individual Marines fight. Motivation is based on psychological factors such as needs, desires, impulses, etc. that cause a person to act. For a Marine, commitment to and pride in the unit and Corps is generally the basis for combat motivation.

(10) HOW DO LEADERS MAINTAIN MORALE IN THEIR UNIT?

(a) Teach a belief in the mission. This involves not just development of confidence that the job must be done and can be done, but the deeper understanding that their efforts and sacrifice are necessary as well. Belief in the hallowed words, "Duty, Honor, Country" must be a deep inner conviction on the part of the leader, and must be reflected in his/her actions. Marines who must endure combat will look to their leader for reassurance that the cause is just and their duty to Corps and Country is clear.

(b) Instill confidence. Maintain a positive attitude and cultivate trust and confidence in your Marines. They must have confidence in their own abilities, in their leaders, their training, and their equipment. "Leadership from the front" can be particularly effective in combat. Marines will always respond when they see their leader willing to take the same risks, capable of demonstrating the proper standards, and showing how things are to be done. Nothing instills confidence quicker than seeing effective leadership by example.

(c) Consider job assignments carefully.

[1] Risks must be shared within a combat unit as much as possible. Alternate assignments on point or flank security, rotate the dangerous duties, and resist the temptation to always utilize the "best" man for such duty. If not, morale will drop when this "best" man becomes a casualty because of prolonged exposure to risks.

[2] Do not ask for volunteers for a particularly dangerous task. Marines must depend on one another as a team, not develop an excessive reliance upon one of its members. It is the leader who must make sure the team has the right people in the right jobs for obvious reasons.

[3] Avoid using any individual in a manner that may affect the morale of the unit; avoid assigning jobs to individuals who obviously will have difficulty accomplishing the tasks required. For instance, a machine gunner or radio operator must be physically able to carry and maneuver with a heavier load than the average Marine.

[4] Demonstrate concern and attentiveness to the welfare of your Marines. This means not only providing rest,

food, and water. It means checking to see that positions and weapons are properly located, equipment and weapons are maintained properly, and attending to the numerous other details that make a unit effective. It means a habit of training and critiquing so that "lessons learned" don't have to be relearned. It means talking to your Marines as if they are members of your family. It means looking out for your Marines as they instinctively do for you.

(11) WHAT ARE SOME OF THE SPECIFIC INDICATORS OF MORALE THAT THE LEADER MUST BE CONTINUALLY AWARE OF?

(a) Appearance. If an individual begins to look sloppy, it may be an indicator that something is affecting his/her behavior. Likewise, if conditions do not allow your Marines to wash, shave, or obtain clean uniforms for prolonged periods, it can cause morale to drop. Beware of the tendency of some Marines to take on a "salty" attitude and appearance. A tolerance for sloppy appearance standards in the field may lead to an equally sloppy attitude regarding attention to details and basic field discipline, and may result in additional combat casualties.

(b) Personal conduct. Be alert for behavior that is out of character. Moodiness, sullenness, quiet withdrawal, or any sudden unexplainable change in an individual's behavior is cause for concern.

(c) Standards of military courtesy. Units having pride and confidence in their leaders maintain high standards of military courtesy all the time. Changes may be indicative of lower morale and will erode unit discipline.

(d) Personal hygiene. If individuals allow this standard to drop it can quickly affect the morale (not to mention health) of the entire unit. Nobody wants to live in filth and regardless of how miserable the circumstances may actually be, we must do what we can to make conditions habitable. Always establish designated latrine areas, cat holes, etc., and see to it that they are used and properly maintained.

(e) Excessive quarreling. Cooperation and mutual trust and confidence in one another's ability can be adversely affected when Marines quarrel among themselves. Settle arguments quickly. Excessive quarreling is a sign that something is wrong that must be fixed. Find the source of irritation before it

affects unit efficiency. Direct energies toward the enemy not fellow Marines.

(f) Rumors. Lack of information is common in combat. Rumors can plant the seeds of fear that will grow way out of proportion. The leader must be a source of facts, and when events do not occur as planned, find out what happened and pass the word. Keep your Marines informed and cultivate their trust and confidence.

(g) Care of equipment and weapons. Failure to accomplish proper maintenance is an indicator that the individual doesn't care or is becoming excessively fatigued. On the other hand, if you fail to provide the means to keep your Marines gear properly maintained (lubrication, grease, etc.), the absence of the material to properly care for their equipment can erode morale.

(h) Response to shortages. Always be alert when your unit experiences shortages of anything, particularly food, water, boots, oil, ammunition, medical supplies, or even mail. When this occurs, how do your Marines react? Do they share what is available instinctively, or do some hoard what they have? The unit with high morale and strong unit cohesion will instinctively divide what is available and become an even stronger outfit because of it. The unit that fails to develop this quality will disintegrate quickly in combat.

(i) Motivation. When given an unpleasant task, or any job that must be done, how does the unit or individual respond? Do they respond enthusiastically and make it their best effort, or are they going to do just enough to get by? How closely do leaders have to supervise, and how often must jobs be done again because they weren't accomplished adequately the first time? Are your Marines willing to help one another without being told? We will deal with motivation in more detail shortly. The leader must recognize the extreme importance morale has to the combat effectiveness of the unit. Consider the following observations of great leaders from earlier periods of history:

"Whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot withstand them."

The Greek Warrior, Xenophon more than two thousand years ago.

"The human heart is the starting point in all matters pertaining to war."

Frederick the Great, King of
Prussia, 1120 A.D.

"Morale makes up three quarters of the game; the relative
balance of manpower makes up only the remaining quarter."

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of
France, 1804 A.D.

"We have already trained our men to the highest possible level
of skill with their weapons and in their use of minor tactics.
But in the end every important battle develops to a point where
there is no real control by senior commanders. Every soldier
feels himself to be alone. Discipline may have got him to the
place where he is, and discipline may hold him there for a time.
Cooperation with other men in the same situation can help him to
move forward. Self preservation will make him defend himself to
the death, if there is no other way. But what makes him go on,
alone, determined to break the will of the enemy opposite him, is
morale. Pride in himself as an independent thinking man, who
knows why he's there, and what he's doing. Absolute confidence
that the best has been done for him, and that his fate is now in
his own hands. The dominant feeling of the battlefield is
loneliness, gentlemen, and morale, only morale, individual morale
as a foundation under training and discipline, will bring
victory."

Major General Sir William Slim as
quoted by John Masters in
The Road Past Mandalay

(12) HOW DO YOU MAINTAIN MORALE IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT?

(a) The following responsibilities of the leader
should be instinctive; omission of any of these directly results
in lower morale. (These responsibilities are also important in
peacetime.)

[1] Be positive, optimistic, enthusiastic, and
realistic.

[2] Be able to recognize when a Marine is
experiencing personal problems. You are the one he/she should
turn to for help, advice, and good counsel. Always be willing to
listen. Know who gets mail, who doesn't, and what reaction it
causes. Be alert for bad news from home and be ready to offer
good counsel. Know who is married and who isn't. Know what your
Marines are thinking about. Care about them.

[3] Maintain health discipline. Check the physical condition of your Marines. Feet checks, changes in clothing, hygiene enforcement, and overall personal cleanliness must be rigorously maintained. The primitive conditions in a combat environment will adversely affect morale unless you do what can be done to improve their circumstances; conduct frequent inspections to insure that proper care is taken of cuts, blisters, minor wounds, rashes, or other conditions that can get worse without attention. Shaving daily, haircuts, and basic cleanliness results in Marines feeling better about themselves.

[4] Provide rest. Fatigue will erode morale and fighting ability. Weary people tend to forget things, behave irrationally, become inattentive, and do not think clearly. The leader and his/her Marines must have rest, and an opportunity to sleep. Rotate the watches, get rest regularly. If possible, position two or three Marines together so that security and rest can be obtained at the same time. Your unit's survival depends on it!

[5] Provide a break in the routine. If possible provide an opportunity for relaxation and recreation. On Con Thien in 1967, during a prolonged period under enemy artillery fire, one unit held a tobacco spitting contest judging accuracy and range. Everyone participated and some humorous situations resulted. Any type of break (and humor is especially beneficial) from the constant rigor of combat will provide an outlet for frustration, prevent boredom, stimulate competition, build teamwork, and is an opportunity for the leader to participate and show that he/she is also part of the team.

[6] Provide food. In combat the provision for food is always inconvenient and sometimes not in adequate supply. This does not reduce its importance as a factor in morale. Whenever a shortage exists, share what you have. Make the best use of your facilities to prepare food well at every opportunity. Take turns within the squad, fire team, or small unit to have one individual prepare a special meal for the team.

[7] Maintain standards. The combat environment is no place to allow discipline to become slack.

[8] Keep Marines informed. Include subordinates in the decision making process whenever possible. You never have all the answers.

[9] Tend to administration. Combat does not eliminate the various administrative events that impact upon the individual Marine's welfare. Allotments, pay, and other administrative matters while not an immediate concern to the Marine in combat, weigh heavily on his mind when they get awry. Make sure that your Marines are properly taken care of administratively, especially relative to pay. If administrative is fouled up, the individual who is affected suspects that other things are probably fouled up as well and confidence in the unit commences to erode.

[10] Tend to quarters. Combat usually entails primitive living conditions. Sleeping on the deck under a poncho "hooch" is a luxury. It is a primary concern of leaders to ensure that the positions occupied by their Marines are adequately constructed and offer suitable protection from enemy fire and observation, and the weather.

[11] Care for equipment and weapons. Continuous concern for proper maintenance is essential. Ensure that adequate means exist to properly care for weapons and equipment, and that proper action is being taken. Priority of work should always provide for the care of equipment/weapons before, the routine care of human needs.

[12] Know your Marines. Marines are by nature fiercely loyal, proud, and determined. It is not uncommon for Marines to refuse to admit that they are hurt or injured and to believe they can do more than is prudent at the time. Leaders must be especially watchful over the health and physical condition of their Marines to ensure that minor wounds receive proper care, and that adequate rest is provided.

[13] Make assignments carefully. Place qualified, capable individuals in key billets and give them latitude to operate. Remove those who don't produce. Properly integrate and assimilate green troops and replacements; spread them out among seasoned, experienced, solid leaders who have proven ability to train and look out for them.

Morale describes an individual's general state of mind. With effective leadership and attentive concern for maintaining high morale, motivation will also be high. However, motivation is much more than just an indicator of morale. It is a key element that must be understood by everyone in the unit. In combat, motivation has special significance to Marines. It describes

what being a Marine is really all about. Read the following to the group:

"In a foxhole in the center of the tenuous line he had done much to hold, Private First Class John Ahrens, an Able Company automatic rifleman, lay quietly, his eyes closed, breathing slowly. Ahrens was covered with blood. He was dying. Next to him lay a dead Japanese sergeant, and flung across his legs, a dead officer. Ahrens had been hit in the chest twice by bullets, and blood welled slowly from three deep puncture wounds inflicted by bayonets. Around this foxhole sprawled thirteen crumpled Japanese bodies. As Captain Lewis W. Walt gathered Ahrens into his arms to carry him to the Residency, the dying man, still clinging to his BAR, said, 'Captain, they tried to come over me last night, but I don't think they made it.'

'They didn't, Johnny,' Walt replied softly. 'They didn't.'
From U. S. Marine Corps in World War II, by S.E. Smith.

(13) WHY DO MARINES FIGHT LIKE PFC AHRENS? WHAT CAUSES MARINES TO HAVE THIS MEASURE OF TENACITY, THE ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT WHEN OTHERS WOULD GIVE UP?

(a) Allow some discussion; the following factors should be discussed in detail.

[1] Patriotism. Marines are oriented from the first day of boot camp to their identification with service to Corps and Country.

[2] Aggression. Training provides for development of an aggressive character in Marines.

[3] Punishment/fear. Fear of punishment for failure.

[4] Rewards. Recognition for performance.

[5] Tradition. Identity with the unit's history and standards.

[6] Social Identity. Identity with your fellow Marines. Not wanting to let your buddies down.

(14) CONSIDERING ALL OF THESE FACTORS, WHICH DO YOU THINK ARE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT IN MOTIVATING MARINES?

(a) Numerous historians, sociologists, and psychologists have studied Marine behavior under fire in an effort to find out why we fight as we do. In explaining what motivates Marines to persevere in battle, experts have come to the conclusion that several factors are significant.

[1] Tradition. Marine values and attitudes are stressed from the first day in the Marine Corps and are constantly reinforced until a Marine finally passes on to guard the heavenly gates. We are told over and over again: "a Marine never quits"; "a Marine never surrenders"; "a Marine never retreats"; "Marines never leave their dead and wounded." These values and impressions of proper Marine behavior become ingrained into the very being of every Marine, a key part of every Marine's values, and describe proper behavior when in the company of fellow Marines. Behaving in an aggressive manner and putting forth a maximum effort is a natural outgrowth of Marine identity and is expected from your fellow Marines. The degree to which we have internalized these traditional values and beliefs is a partial explanation for our combat performance. Consider the following:

"The average Marine, if such a condition exists, is definitely not the lad represented on the recruiting poster. More likely he is a small, pimple-faced young man who, because it has been so skillfully pounded into him at boot camp, believes he can lick the world."
The Last Parallel, Cpl Martin Russ, USMC.

"The men (Marines) were not necessarily better trained, nor were they any better equipped; often they were not so well supplied as other troops. But a Marine still considered himself a better soldier than anybody else, even though nine-tenths of them didn't want to be soldiers at all."
Last Chapter, Ernie Pyle.

"Men take a kind of hard pride in belonging to a famous outfit even when doing so exposes them to exceptional danger. This is an essential element in the psychology of shock troops."
Fear in Battle, John Dollard.

[2] Social identity. Social factors affecting the Marine's primary group (squad, fire team or section), are recognized by many military and nonmilitary writers as one of the most significant aspects of achieving combat motivation. Marines commonly express this in terms of not wanting to let their buddies down. This unit cohesiveness is perhaps the most

powerful motivational factor in combat. When traditional Marine Corps values stimulate and foster a closeness among the individuals in a unit, the result is a unit that is able to maintain tactical cohesion and achieve the desired combat performance. Consider the following:

"Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. There is the science of the organization of armies in a nut-shell."

Battle Studies, Col Ardant du Picq.

"I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed presence of a comrade."

Men Against Fire, S.L.A. Marshall.

[3] Patriotism. The idea of conscious identification with a cause is a factor in morale and generally functions as the reason men respond to the call to arms. Every Marine must be convinced of the rightness of his/her country's cause. This is usually a significant factor in the decision to join the Marine Corps. Patriotism is a spiritual foundation to morale. In combat it is an important leadership responsibility to sustain the strength of this foundation. As casualties occur and the fight becomes difficult, Marines will look to their leader for reassurance that the sacrifices borne are necessary.

[4] Aggression. We do not develop a "killer instinct" that can be turned on and off at will. Compassion for the enemy and noncombatants is a characteristic that is not uncommon among Marines on the battlefield. However, we do recognize that aggressive fighting style is our trademark and seek to keep our reputation secure from any doubt. We will fight as long and as hard as necessary to overcome the enemy. Likewise, brutal leadership is not characteristic of the Corps either. Marine leaders must understand that they sustain the confidence of their men by accomplishing the mission at the lowest possible cost in casualties. The leader must maintain effective discipline and control to ensure moral standards of conduct amidst the destruction of combat.

[5] Rewards/Punishment/Fear. When it comes to combat, there is no amount of pay that can adequately reward Marines for risking their lives to achieve a particular objective. Also, there are no medals that will provide adequate

incentive either. Not even survival can be considered a reward because it is clearly beyond anyone's control and unless we change the policy that has governed our Armed Forces for the past hundred years, any brig's punishment would be a safe haven compared to the environment on the battlefield. When Marines who have experienced combat are questioned on this factor they tend to respond that their greatest "fear" was being perceived as less than adequate in the eyes of their fellow Marines. Their only "reward" was the respect, praise, and recognition which came from camaraderie and acceptance within the unit. The purpose of our system of rewards in combat is intended to reflect Marines' recognition of one another as warriors. This recognition of heroic efforts, sacrifices in behalf of your fellow Marines, and maximum efforts are important leadership responsibilities.

(15) SO WHY DO MARINES FIGHT SO WELL?

(a) Commitment: more than anything else, men have fought and teams have won because of commitment. More often than not, it is a commitment to a leader and to a small brotherhood where the important things are mutual respect, confidence, shared hardships, shared dangers, shared victories, discipline and perseverance. A Marine advances under fire because "the sergeant said so," or "I can do it if they can," or "I can't let them down."

(b) Morale and motivation provide the foundation for discipline. More than being a simple mechanism for maintaining order, discipline is the essential condition within a unit that allows it to overcome the extreme fear and fatigue of combat.

(16) WHAT IS DISCIPLINE?

Willing obedience to orders will be the most common definition given by Marines. Quite simply, discipline is the situation where the individual has been taught to sacrifice his/her own interests for the common good, and will respond from a sense of duty which is more important than individual rights or wants. It also ensures prompt obedience to orders and guides an individual's or unit's actions in the absence of orders.

(17) HOW IS DISCIPLINE DEMONSTRATED?

(a) Obedience, initiative, self-reliance, and self-control.

[1] Obedience. When all respond to orders as a team, a sense of unity is created whereby everyone recognizes that their role is to contribute to something more important than any one individual. An unorganized crowd of individuals is useless in a crisis. The strength to overcome the extreme crisis of combat is greatly affected by the individuals' comprising the unit abilities to respond as a team. The unit is capable of dealing with the chaos of combat. The individual is generally only effective so long as his/her actions are a part of the unit effort.

[2] Initiative. Marine Corps leadership is based upon a concept of trust and confidence in each individual Marine's quality of self discipline. The modern battlefield has become an extremely deadly place. As the destructive power of weapons has increased, it has become increasingly more difficult for leaders to maintain positive control over every action. We rely on a high degree of initiative, individual courage, and the ability of the individual Marine to take proper action when the situation is in doubt. The responsibility of every Marine in such situations is clear. They must support their fellow Marines aggressively using their own initiative to join their force to others.

[3] Self-reliance. During long periods of monotony and apparent lack of enemy contact, or long hours of darkness when imagination runs wild and fear begins to creep up on him gradually, discipline will steady a Marine's nerves and allow him to deal with the frightening conditions of battle.

[4] Self-control. Discipline enables the Marine who sees a fellow Marine suddenly killed and immediately recognizes his/her own peril, to exercise self-control over his/her own behavior.

(18) ARE THERE DIFFERENT TYPES OF DISCIPLINE, IF SO, WHAT ARE THEY?

(a) There are essentially three types of discipline:

[1] Self-discipline.

[2] Unit discipline.

[3] Imposed discipline.

(19) WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THESE TYPES OF DISCIPLINE AND WHICH IS MOST IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN?

(a) Self-discipline is the most important quality to develop. It means that the individual has a sense of personal duty to the unit, to fellow Marines, and to the nation. This type of discipline will hold Marines steady against anything the enemy may throw at them, because he has a firm conviction that will not let him let their fellow Marines down. This is the quality of discipline demonstrated by PFC Ahrens.

(b) Unit discipline is the behavior that results from the expectations of your fellow Marines in the unit. A Marine knows that to belong, he/she must conform. This particular quality of discipline will steady the Marine so long as he/she is in the company of fellow Marines.

(c) Imposed discipline is behavior that is motivated primarily by the immediate supervision of leaders. It lacks the permanence of unit discipline and the special strength of self-discipline. Under extreme combat conditions, all leaders may be required to resort to this form of discipline. This was the only way Captain Barrow was able to force the necessary actions on the ridge in Korea.

(20) HOW IS DISCIPLINE DEVELOPED IN MARINES?

(a) Recruit Training. Recruit training is dedicated to preparing and conditioning young recruits mentally, physically, and emotionally to meet the experience of combat. It is designed to instill the skills, knowledge, discipline, and self-confidence to make a them worthy of recognition as Marines; to develop a sense of brotherhood, patriotism, loyalty, interdependence, and determination to be victorious; to imbue them with the instinct of obedience; but most of all it develops in them a sense of commitment. Through imposed discipline, recruits become familiar with Marine Corps norms and standards. Self discipline and obedience are stressed. Marine values are crystallized here.

[1] Unit Training. After recruit training the Marine's values and appreciation for Marine Corps norms and standards are further developed, expanded, and reinforced. Through developing a stronger bond with fellow Marines, perfecting skills, and experiencing high unit standards, a quality of resilient self-discipline should become evident as mutual trust and confidence grows.

[2] Leadership Training. Every Marine is trained to be ready for the responsibility of leadership. This development of a broad base of leadership within the unit establishes a capability for the individual to influence fellow Marines during particularly tough periods when self discipline is faltering and unit discipline begins to erode because of the rigors of combat at such times leadership is on trial. How well you train your Marines to lead before combat will be decisive.

(21) WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC ACTIONS THAT A LEADER CAN TAKE TO IMPROVE UNIT DISCIPLINE?

(a) Set the example with personal high performance standards and expect the same from your Marines. Give your maximum effort, expect theirs.

(b) Encourage peer discipline, i.e., a Marine becomes offended when a peer disgraces the unit (e.g, UA, drugs, etc.) and tells him/her so. When pride and loyalty permeate a unit to the degree that Marines won't tolerate a peer "screwing up" because it makes him and the unit look bad, many problems will vanish and the unit will be solid.

(c) Know your Marines, look out for their welfare.

(d) Be fair in assigning duties; ensure everyone shares risks, as well as menial tasks. Eliminate meaningless or unnecessary tasks.

(e) Praise in public, admonish in private.

(f) Reward good work. Recognition that a job has been "well done" by a leader is important to the individual.

(g) Be fair and impartial when correcting poor performance or taking action to effect punishment.

(h) Develop mutual trust and confidence by giving responsibility to subordinates and holding them accountable. Train as you expect your unit to be able to fight. Develop subordinates to take charge and have confidence in their ability to keep essential equipment functioning.

(i) Encourage and foster the development of self-discipline by providing guidance and assistance without over supervising.

(j) Be alert to conditions conducive to breaches of discipline and eliminate them where possible.

(k) Encourage initiative and innovation in your subordinates by allowing them to learn from mistakes during training and to develop the habit of applying "lessons learned" instinctively.

(22) HOW IMPORTANT IS SELF RESPECT TO ACHIEVING SELF DISCIPLINE?

The individual Marine must be determined to be tough, alert, courageous, and an important part of the unit. He/she must have this self-image and perceive that fellow Marines have this image of him/her. Development of self-image is crucial to developing and maintaining self-discipline. According to S.L.A. Marshall, the most important image to the individual in combat is the "reputation to be a man amongst men."

(23) WHAT IS THE LEADER'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING SELF-RESPECT IN HIS/HER MARINES?

The leader must cultivate the self-respect of his/her Marines. It is the leader's responsibility to build pride, confidence, and determination in each of his/her Marines.

(24) HOW DOES THE LEADER DEVELOP SELF-RESPECT IN HIS/HER MARINES?

(a) Respect them. To develop respect in someone requires letting them know that you respect them, especially if you're an important person in their eyes. So, first of all, be that important leader and secondly, respect them and encourage them.

(b) Maintain a religious and moral environment where the values learned will function as a firm base for proper behavior in the unit. Adherence to religious and moral principles will help to steady the individual under fire.

(c) Dress and cleanliness standards provide everyone an opportunity to demonstrate their pride and high standards. Generally, if one looks good they tend to feel good about themselves. These standards will pay off in the harsh environment of combat.

(d) Stress efficiency and reliability. A Marine who feels reliable will respect him/herself and take pride in his/her

accomplishment. Over-supervision may be perceived by the individual as evidence of distrust.

(e) Show personal interest in your Marines. A Marine's self-respect and pride is raised immensely just by knowing that his efforts are appreciated. A pat on the back or simple "well done" at the right moment works wonders.

(25) WHY IS PROFICIENCY A LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE?

Proficiency is defined as the technical, tactical, and physical ability of the individuals in the unit to accomplish the mission. How your Marines actually accomplish their jobs is a technical question, however, when Marines must accomplish their jobs under enemy fire, it becomes a matter of willpower. Technical training alone creates qualified technicians. Do Marines have "the right stuff" to do their jobs when it is critically necessary?

(26) WHAT CAN A LEADER DO TO DEVELOP THE SORT OF PROFICIENCY THAT IS "THE RIGHT STUFF" IN COMBAT?

(a) Be proficient and instill in your Marines the immense pride that you cannot "stump" them about anything relative to the performance of their assigned job.

(b) Thoroughly train your Marines to do their duties as well as they can be done under any conditions (e.g., in garrison, field, adverse weather, at night, etc.). There is no substitute for their best effort, and always work to improve that.

(c) Emphasize teamwork and the chain of command.

(d) Cross-train your Marines so that essential equipment/weapons will be able to remain in action.

(e) Train as you intend to fight. Attempt to accomplish as realistic training as possible. Make everyone aware that combat will require your unit to endure conditions and stresses that are unique to the combat environment and will exceed what exists in training. Train to be flexible, and to be able to apply "lessons learned" quickly and continuously.

(f) Provide subordinates with frequent opportunities to lead at the next higher level. Every Marine has to be ready to lead if the situation requires it.

(g) Set high, attainable performance standards and stick to them.

The previous leadership challenges have dealt with the attitude of the individual. Esprit de corps is something that describes the character of the group, not the individual. It more than anything else describes what it is to be a Marine. Esprit de corps implies devotion and loyalty to the Corps, as well as a deep regard for the history, traditions, and honor that the Corps and the unit have acquired.

(26) WHAT ARE SOME OF THE INDICATORS THAT A UNIT HAS ESPRIT DE CORPS?

(a) Some are:

[1] Expressions by the members of the unit showing pride and enthusiasm for their outfit.

[2] A good reputation.

[3] Strong competitive spirit with other units.

[4] Willingness of its members to participate in unit activities.

[5] Obvious pride in the history of the unit and observance of traditions.

(27) IS THERE SOMETHING SPECIAL ABOUT A UNIT HAVING ESPRIT DE CORPS THAT YOU CAN DETECT RIGHT AWAY?

(a) A unit with esprit de corps has a degree of zeal, snap, and pride that clearly indicates that it is functioning by a force of its own. A unit functioning by only the will of its commander will pale in comparison. The truly decisive difference will be realized when the unit enters combat. Read the following:

"A British military observer, while watching the Marine Brigade move against a Communist Division in a last ditch effort to save the Pusan perimeter, our last toehold in Korea, said:

'They are faced with impossible odds, and I have no valid reason to substantiate it, but I have a feeling they will halt the enemy. I realize my expression of hope is unsound, but these Marines have the swagger, confidence, and hardness that must have been in Stonewall Jackson's Army of the Shenandoah. They remind

me of the cold streams at Dunkerque. Upon this thin line of reasoning, I cling to hope of victory.'"

This Kind of War, T. R. Fehrenback

(b) The development and maintenance of this "esprit" is a responsibility of Marine Corps leadership.

(28) HOW DOES THE LEADER DEVELOP ESPRIT DE CORPS?

(a) Teach the history of the unit and maintain its traditions. Cultivate a deep and abiding love of Corps and country.

(b) Ensure that everyone understands the mission and activities of their unit, and takes pride in unit accomplishments.

(c) Develop the feeling that the unit must always succeed, and every individual member must contribute to its success.

(d) Reinforce success with an effective means of recognizing the efforts of individuals who distinguish themselves in behalf of the unit.

(e) Encourage competition with other units in events that provide for participation by everyone and foster an unquenchable thirst for victory. Winning is one objective of sports, but the only objective in combat.

(f) Everything any member does reflects upon the unit. Make sure everyone realizes this fact of life and tolerates no poor reflections. Strong peer pressure to keep the unit's honor and reputation clean is an indicator of esprit.

(29) SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES FACED IN COMBAT

(a) Success in combat is the payoff. The degree to which the individual Marines have high morale, discipline, proficiency, and esprit de corps largely determines how they will perform in combat. During operations in a combat environment the essential nature of these factors becomes clearly evident to everyone, particularly the leader.

(b) Success in combat depends upon leadership that can keep the unit cohesive, disciplined, and capable of destroying the enemy. The Marine leader today has the heavy responsibility of ensuring that our fighting quality as Marines

remains at least as strong and as ready for combat as our legacy has proven us to be in the past.

9. Discuss how to develop combat readiness

a. WHAT IS COMBAT READINESS?

(1) There is no organization in the world where effectiveness is more important than in the Marine Corps. Every individual Marine is essential to the performance of his unit, and all Marine units depend upon the effective performance of other units. With us, a loss in effectiveness can result in the loss of Marine lives. Every Marine must know how to and then do his job; this translates into unit effectiveness. But effectiveness is not necessarily combat readiness.

(2) Combat readiness is effectiveness plus the desire and ability to keep on fighting until the mission is accomplished. Simply, the ability to maintain efficient and effective performance while under enemy fire; to fight and win. The objective of Marine Corps training is combat readiness.

(3) HOW DO YOU ACHIEVE COMBAT READINESS?

(a) Building unit discipline, proficiency, morale, and esprit de corps.

(b) Training to enhance each Marine's:

[1] Knowledge of the job.

[2] Self-discipline.

[3] Self-confidence.

[4] Leadership.

Discipline, proficiency, morale, and esprit de corps are leadership indicators that were dealt with in some detail as leadership challenges. They are reflections of the willpower of the individuals in the unit and are crucial to combat readiness. We will now focus on the training concepts that contribute to a unit's ability to succeed in combat.

(4) WHAT CAN WE DO DURING PEACETIME TO PREPARE OUR MARINES TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES?

(a) In Appendix A, the author states, "The great majority of soldiers overcome fear, as they have done throughout their lives, by an effort of will and by support from others." Why is this? Where/how can we instill the "will?" How do we ensure individuals will receive the needed support? Some suggestions by follow:

- [1] Develop a close knit and cohesive group.
- [2] Avoid personnel turbulence.
- [3] Know your Marines and be known by them.
- [4] Promote and retain only the finest leaders.
- [5] Train your Marines as they will be employed and in as nearly accurate to combat environment as possible.
- [6] Ensure all are physically fit.
- [7] Train to ensure competent administration, logistics, and communication.

(b) In Chapter II of Battle Leadership, Captain Von Schell writes,

"At the commencement of war, soldiers of all grades are subject to a terrific nervous strain. Dangers are seen on every hand. Imagination runs riot. Therefore, teach your soldiers in peace what they may expect in war, for an event foreseen and prepared for will have little if any harmful effect."

(c) Other techniques to enhance combat readiness include:

- [1] Train on how to identify and cope with stress, fear, etc.
- [2] Provide realistic and stressful training to build proficiency and confidence in leaders, unit, equipment, tactics, weapons, and self.
- [3] Provide firm fair discipline but ensure that you emphasize and recognize superior performance.
- [4] Cross train to ensure depth in unit proficiency and leadership.

(d) Annex B, "Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders" also provides some good points to add.

[1] How do you set needed training priorities?

[2] What is a realistic training environment?

[3] How realistic must it be? Can it be?

[4] How much risk is necessary to create the needed simulated stress?

(e) When challenging and realistic training is not provided, morale, discipline, esprit, and proficiency are adversely affected.

(5) MARINES MUST TRAIN THE WAY THEY INTEND TO FIGHT. HOW DO YOU DEVELOP REALISM WITHOUT TAKING EXCESSIVE RISKS?

(a) Realistic Training. Combat training must be stressful and incorporate noise, smoke, danger, confusion, and fatigue if it is to be moderately effective. The conditions that are anticipated must be duplicated as much as possible. Exercise your ability to handle in training everything you expect to handle in combat. Carry heavy loads; go on forced marches; conduct low-level flight training; operate without supplies on occasion to simulate the necessity of sharing rations; water, and ammunition; practice care for casualties; and develop physical strength and endurance to the level where everyone has confidence in their ability to persevere. Use your imagination; it is the responsibility of the leader to prepare the minds of Marines for the shock of combat. Captain Von Schell said it best in Battle Leadership:

"In peace we should do everything possible to prepare the minds of our soldiers for the strain of battle. We must repeatedly warn them that war brings with it surprise and tremendously deep impressions. We must prepare them for the fact that each minute of battle brings with it a new assault on the nerves. As soldiers of the future we should strive to realize that we will be faced in war by many new and difficult impressions; dangers that are thus foreseen are already half overcome."

(b) Train in the basic fundamentals

[1] Emphasize camouflage; cover and concealment; helo operations; movement; preparation of battle positions; accuracy, control, and distribution of fire; use of supporting arms; land navigation; communicating with and without radios; noise and light discipline; and other basic skills. All are essential elements the combat leader must teach Marines so they can survive on the battlefield.

[2] Unit leaders must learn the skills and techniques themselves before they can teach them, and learn how to train to develop them in their Marines.

[3] Training should emphasize the attack. We don't win by defending. Defense is something that is only accomplished when we are preparing to continue the attack. Even when defending, aggressive patrol actions should take the fight to the enemy, and familiarize him with what he can expect if he elects to attack. Instinctively think of forward movement and instill a desire to close with and destroy the enemy. Concentrate on day and night offensive operations.

(c) Training should develop an aggressive spirit and confidence in the fighting ability of the individual and the unit. Emphasize close combat training. A Marine should be an expert in unarmed combat and be able to skillfully fight with the knife and bayonet. These skill areas require extensive training to master requisite speed and technique for effective use, but it is worth it and Marines thrive on it. Hand-to-hand combat training, bayonet training, unit events such as bear pits, push ball, or other physical team oriented efforts develop confidence and aggressive spirit.

(d) Cross training is essential. All Marines must not only be able to perform their individual jobs, they must know how to keep the unit operating at peak efficiency. This means knowing one another's job and being able to keep the essential equipment/weapons operating when combat power is crucial. Cross training is a key element for maintaining cohesion when taking casualties. All Marines must understand instinctively that their first responsibility in combat is to join their force to others; the unit must prevail. Only through effective control of unit firepower can combat success be attained. Cross training will also develop a depth of leadership ability that will allow for the continued effectiveness of the unit if any leader becomes a casualty. Train all your Marines to be ready and able to take charge and make decisions if their leader is hit!

(e) Train under adverse conditions. Combat will test your ability to endure hardship. Marines must be conditioned to withstand the effects of weather. Recall the experience of Captain Barrow in Korea. Extreme weather conditions offer a distinct advantage to the side best prepared to continue fighting amidst such hardships. Training in adverse weather will build confidence in your Marines' ability to care for weapons, equipment, and themselves. Remember, merely enduring is not enough; they must be able to use adverse conditions to their advantage to fight.

(f) Drill. Drill is the beginning of the process that turns an uncoordinated group of individuals into a tight military unit. Drill produces a habit of prompt obedience to orders and instills pride, a sense of unity, and discipline. The habit of responsiveness that is developed through drill will help carry the unit through the terrifying moments when the shock of enemy fire is first felt.

(6) WHAT SHOULD WE DO DURING COMBAT TO MEET THESE CHALLENGES?

(a) Ask the group to provide examples from their experiences. Some additional questions include:

[1] How did seniors aid them?

[2] How did seniors impede them?

[3] Consider the situation in places like Somalia; what types of challenges do leaders face?

[4] How can we assist our Marines in understanding and dealing with an often hostile press and population back home?

(b) Appendix A addresses the importance of:

[1] Keeping the troops and seniors informed to prevent rumors and uncertainty.

[2] Demonstrating personal and courageous leadership by example.

[3] Providing "purposeful actions" to keep troops busy and active as an "...antidote to the poison of fear.

(c) In Appendix C, Marshall wrote of the great importance and impact of a leader's personal courage and leadership on the battlefield. He stated:

"There is one radical difference between training and combat conditions... In combat something new is added. Even if they have previously looked on him as a father and believed absolutely that being with him was their best assurance of successful survival. Should he then develop a dugout habit, show himself as fearful and too careful of his own safety.... On the field there is no substitute for courage, no other bonding influence toward unity of action. Troops will excuse almost any stupidity; excessive timidity is simply unforgivable."

(d) There are other examples that address this in Chapter I of Von Schell's Battle Leadership.

(e) Some other actions a leader can take are:

[1] Ensure proper rest, food, etc. (when possible).

[2] Keep a close watch on subordinates for any telltale signs of excessive stress and ensure they do the same for their Marines.

[3] Ensure the maintenance of standards (of discipline, hygiene, maintenance, etc.)

[4] Ensure replacements are properly integrated, assimilated, and trained. Von Schell addresses this in Chapter IV of Battle Leadership.

(7) WHAT ARE SOME IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS WHEN INTEGRATING OR ASSIMILATING UNTRIED MARINES INTO YOUR ORGANIZATION?

(a) Considerations include:

[1] Explaining to them the unit's mission and what the unit has accomplished recently and any future plans.

[2] Personally talking with each Marine.

[3] Placing inexperienced Marines with an experienced individual.

[4] Stressing personal discipline.

[5] Time permitting, training under difficult conditions.

[6] Keeping troops informed.

[7] Time permitting, allow troops to slowly become acclimatized to: their unit, their leaders, the environment and the general situation. Exhausted and confused Marines are a liability.

(8) HOW CAN THE PROPER INTEGRATION OF GREEN TROOPS INFLUENCE MORALE AND MISSION PERFORMANCE?

(a) Von Schell states:

[1] They quickly gain confidence.

[2] Veterans regard themselves as instructors to their young comrades; they feel responsible for them. It contributes to unit cohesion, esprit and morale.

(Note: Appendix B, "Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders" is not only a guide for proper leadership in combat, it also serves as a guide for conducting proper training. Although many of those fundamental leadership principles and rules based on combat experience have been incorporated in this discussion guide, it would be well worth the time to give copies to your leaders and discuss each one of these truths of positive combat leadership. Appendix D, "Combat Leadership Problems" presents two scenarios for discussion).

10. SUMMARY

a. Combat readiness is the responsibility of every leader. The key to achieving combat readiness is in properly training your Marines. All members of the unit must know their jobs. They must understand the role and function of the unit and be able to keep the unit operating when it comes under fire. This requires effective leadership before, during, and after combat. Effective leadership includes high standards of discipline, proficiency, morale, and esprit de corps that will enable a unit to effectively deal with the shock of combat. Effective leadership provides training that accomplishes the following:

(1) Prepares individual Marine for the stress of combat (for the moment they hear an angry bullet crack by their head and

realize for the first time that somebody actually intends to kill them).

(2) Builds confidence in individual Marines, their leaders and the ability of the unit to succeed.

(3) Builds self-discipline.

(4) Develops unit cohesion and fighting power.

(5) Instills an aggressive, unconquerable spirit, and determination to succeed in combat.

(6) Individual Marines must be fit, reliable, tough, capable of effectively using weapons, and able to fight, survive, and win on a lethal, and confusing battlefield. It is the basic soldiering skills that will enable us to succeed, and we must not forget it.

(7) The formula for positive combat leadership which we have discussed applies to all leaders, at all times, regardless of rank, specialty or duty assignment. We are all potential combat leaders. Failure to follow these basic leadership techniques can cost the lives of those dependent upon our leadership, and spell the difference between defeat and victory.

(8) Success in combat depends upon effective leadership that can keep the unit cohesive, disciplined, and capable of destroying the enemy. Marine leaders today has the heavy responsibility to ensure their units are as strong and as ready for combat as our legacy has proven to be in the past.

b. The following is a description of the Marines who landed to fight in Korea:

"And these men walked with a certain confidence and swagger. They were only young men like those about them in Korea, but they were conscious of a standard to live up to, because they had good training, and it had been impressed upon them that they were United States Marines.

Except in holy wars, or in defense of their native soil, men fight well only because of pride and training pride in themselves and their service, enough training to absorb the real blows of war and to know what to do. Few men, of any breed, really prefer to kill or be killed. These Marines had pride in their service, which had been carefully instilled in them, and they had pride in themselves, because each man had made the grade

in a hard occupation. They would not lightly let their comrades down. And they had discipline, which in essence is the ability not to question orders but to carry them out as intelligently as possible.

Marine human material was not one bit better than that of the human society from which it came. But it had been hammered into form in a different forge, hardened with a different fire. The Marines were the closest thing to legions the nation had. They would follow their colors from the shores of home to the seacoast of Bohemia, and fight well either place."

This Kind of War, T. R. Fehrenback.

c. The books that record the Corps' history rarely outline the grand political strategy of theater tactics, but record the bloody details of Marines in combat. Marines who were wounded or killed trying to save a buddy, Marines who charged a position single handedly, Marines who despite the odds, terrain, or possible outcome, led, followed, and were successful. The responsibility for the preparation of future combat veterans is an awesome moral responsibility. Winning teams do not just happen; they are created by hard work and lots of leadership.

11. Appendices:

- Appendix A: Determination in Battle by MajGen T.S. Hart
- Appendix B: Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders for 3d Marine Division
- Appendix C: Combat Leadership by S.L.A. Marshall
- Appendix D: Americans in Combat excerpt from The Armed Forces Officer
- Appendix E: Legacy of Esprit and Leadership by MajGen John A. Lejeune
- Appendix F: Peleliu - Recollections of a PFC by E.B. Sledge

Determination In Battle

by Major General T. S. Hart

This article is based on a presentation made by General Hart before a Royal Armoured Corps Conference in late 1978. Although a part of it is directed toward the British Regimental System, General Hart has many things to say regarding morale and conduct in battle that are pertinent to soldiers of all ranks, whatever their Army. ARMOR is pleased to pass along his remarks to its readers worldwide. ED.

For a short time we are to put aside tactical doctrines, the requirement for a new main battle tank, restructuring, electronic warfare, and all the other familiar subjects which normally dominate Arms and Services Directors' Conferences.

As a change, I have been asked to talk about the soldier and his determination in battle. Because however good the equipment, however complete the staff work and planning, unless the soldier actually fights, defeat is inevitable. Events in Southeast Asia and the Middle East in the mid-seventies have certainly shown that the time-honored quotation, "*It is not the number of soldiers, but their will to win, which decides battles,*" is still very valid.

I first researched this presentation in 1974, but I have changed but little from my original script. This is not due to idleness but the realization that with the possible reduction in the warning time of Warsaw Pact aggression we all may be required to react as quickly as the 3rd Airborne Division was expected to react in the old days.

Anyway, the principles involved in determination in battle are the same for troops

based either in Tidworth or Fallingboestol, Hohne or Colchester.

Now all of us at various times in our careers have attended lectures on morale and leadership. In many cases the lecturer has been of the standing of Field Marshals Slim, Wavell, or Harding: commanders with quite unique experiences of leading soldiers in major battles. It would be tactically unsound for a Director of Medical Services (DMS) to take on such company. I intend, therefore, to look at the problem in a slightly different and more academic way - and yet frequently refer to history to bring my academic kite flying back to earth.

I will also quote from a variety of commanders throughout history who, although they knew nothing of the modern fields of behavioral psychology, knew instinctively what stimulated their soldiers to deeds of valour.

Fear and Courage

When discussing human behaviour, we are immediately on uncertain ground. There are many varying views, especially among experts. Therefore, when discussing courage, determination in battle, or morale - call it what you will - we have to accept some basic assumptions.

First, man is by nature an aggressive animal and unlike other animals, who merely seek to dominate, man is prepared to kill.

Next, although society is constantly changing, aggression is innate in man and has varied little, if at all, in recent centuries.

In our present culture, to display courage is still considered to be major, if not the major, virtue of the male- and deep down

nearly all men, if honest, would wish to succeed as a warrior, if given the chance. Field Marshal Slim summed it up well when he said:

“I do not believe that there is any man who would not rather be called brave than have any other virtue attributed to him.”

What then is the problem? Here we have an animal that is aggressive. It will kill and, in the main, still holds courage in battle to be a virtue. Unfortunately in human behaviour nothing is quite so simple.

Considering the problem in purely physical terms, when faced with danger the body responds by certain physiological changes. The number of blood cells increases, the time blood takes to clot is reduced, more sugar is distributed to the muscles and many other changes take place so that physically he is ready to launch into the attack. There is, however, a snag: fighting may lead to a valuable victory, but it may also involve serious damage to the victor. The enemy invariably provokes fear as well as aggression. Aggression drives man on: fear holds him back. Those physical changes I have already described, increase in number of blood cells, etc., not only prepare the body to fight -but also for flight. In other words all that blood sugar can either be burned in combat or by taking off at high speed in the opposite direction. Physically, the body doesn't care which: it is mentally that the final decision is made whether to stand and fight or cut and run. Moran, in his classic book *the Anatomy of Courage*, defines courage as follows:

“It is a moral quality, it is not a chance gift of nature like an aptitude for games. It is a cold choice between two alternatives, it is the fixed resolve not to quit, and act of renunciation which must be made not once but many times by the power of will. Courage is will power.”

I would like to spend a little time examining those factors which either stimulate courage or erode it- for it must be accepted that all men have some degree of courage. Many things support or sap the will of the soldier and their importance in many cases varies as society changes. However, some factors are basic and remain constant.

Let us take the bad news first.

The major stress that can erode and destroy a man's courage and lead to mental breakdown is fear.

The emotion of fear is, of course, a perfectly natural, and defensive, reaction to any circumstances which threaten to endanger the safety of the individual. No man relishes the thought of wounding, or death.

In battle, fear varies in direct proportion to the real or imagined danger from the enemy. The great majority of soldiers overcome fear, as they have done throughout their lives, by an effort of will and by support from others. Certain situations, however, stimulate or magnify fear and therefore increase the chance of mental breakdown. The order of priority being the a matter of personal choice. I would put the following factors on my list.

The Unexpected. Soldiers going into battle have received training and have been given certain information. They have, in the main, mentally adjusted to a certain course of events and most are prepared to meet what comes. If they are presented with a situation for which their training has been inadequate or which is completely unexpected, then the will that controls fear sags and crumbles. I am sure that this is the basis for the success of either tactical surprise in battle or the introduction of the unexpected onto the battlefield. Examples abound in history from Hannibal's elephants to the use of poison gas and *blitzkrieg*. Clausewitz summed it up when he said:

"It is of first importance that the soldier high or low should not have to encounter in war things which seen for the first time, set his in terror or perplexity."

The Unknown. What man has not seen, he always expects will be greater than it really is. The modern soldier faces a battery or the most fearful weapons. Unless he is well trained and fully conversant with what is to be expected, then he will be anxious-and apprehension is fear in its infancy.

In the words of Thomas Hardy: "More life may trickle out of a man through thoughts than through a gaping wound."

I would add that this fear of the unknown is the most marked when the soldier is isolated, or at night.

Fear of Failure. Nearly all men have doubts as to how they will behave in battle. In some, this fear that they will fail and let down their comrades is a very real form of stress. And yet, perversely, in many the fear of failing and letting down the group can stimulate men to great deeds of heroism. There is an old German proverb, which is apt.

"Some have been thought brave because they were afraid to run away."

It depends on the man's background and the degree of his attachment to this group.

The Noise and Sight of Battle. Battles can be, and with the Soviet present penchant for artillery we can certainly expect them to continue to be, very noisy affairs, The sheer battering of the soldier by noise can destroy his will. The sights to be seen on the battlefield can also be unnerving. Widespread destruction, in many cases, does not seem to affect the soldier as much as the loss of one of his immediate group.

Fear of Killing. Although we have at the onset accepted that man will kill: some, quite reasonably, because of their upbringing

and teaching, are averse to taking a human life. This can in some cases cause a real and deep mental conflict. But in most, the excitement of battle, support from his comrades and finally, kill or be killed, results in most men overcoming this fear.

Exhaustion-Mental and Physical. You are all aware of Moran's description of courage and his view that men have only a certain amount of courage in the bank. He goes on:

"The call on the bank of courage may only be the daily drain or it might be a sudden draught which threatens to close the account."

There is no doubt that troops, however well-led, can only take the stress of battle for so long-then they break. Any commander, at any level, who tries to overdraw the account is courting disaster.

So far we have tended to separate the mental and physical. This is, of course, and artificial division-the mental and physical constantly interact. Therefore, physical fatigue, hunger disease, thirst and, above all, the stress of adverse climatic conditions, can reduce the physical state of the soldier to such an extent that his will to fight is broken. Taking climate as an example, one only has to consider the effect of cold on most of Sir John Moore's troops in the Corrunna campaign- or even Napoleon's army in Russia. One writer described Napoleon's retreat:

"The cold was the abominable thing: the dreadful enemy against which man could not fight and which destroyed them. The cold first struck on the night of November 5-6 and with that blow the dissolution of the grand army began."

And yet, exactly 130 years later, Van Paulus's Sixth Army fought at Stalingrad, poorly equipped for the climate, until early February. During the same winter Von

Manstein's army fought one of the best cavalry and armoured delaying battles of all time in the Don and Donitz basins.

Really delving into the past - I doubt if there has been a more disease ridden army than the "British Army" that fought at Agincourt. Many could hardly stand and yet they totally defeated the heavy armoured box of their day. *Why?*

I think it is now time to leave those factors which sometimes cause armies and soldiers to give way to fear and despair. We will now look at what stimulates and maintains *courage* and enables the soldier to overcome adversity and his quite natural fear.

Again, there are a number of factors, some of which are constant and some which vary, as society varies. For example in Cromwell's New Model Army, a major force was religion. John Baynes in his excellent book, *Morale*, when examining the 2nd Scottish Rifles who fought so well at Neuve Chapelle, found that religion influenced only 50 percent of the officers and 10 percent of the soldiers. I am pretty certain it is a lower figure today, and yet psychologists will tell you that:

"those with deep religious convictions have a bulwark against loneliness, terror, fantasies conjured up by the unconscious and the unleashing of deep-seated conflicts."

Just what we need in the soldier in battle. But the same psychologists admit that such people form a minority in our conflict-ridden society. So, much as we might like to, we cannot count on religion to aid more than a few.

Let us consider patriotism. Moran describes his generation, as follows:

"We went into the enterprise, the high adventure of 1914, with hearts singing."

Baynes, talking of a Scottish unit-and therefore more dour and down-to-earth folk-found that patriotism was certainly an influence on the behaviour of the 2nd Scottish Rifles; but that it was not comparable in importance with other factors. Certainly in our present society patriotism is not a dominant force. What do we have left? I think we have the same basic factors that we have always had - the strength of the well integrated group and the individual soldier's identification with that group, leadership, discipline, and success.

The first choice-*the strength of the well integrated group*- may surprise you. But I believe it is the major force in the stimulation of courage and maintenance of good morale.

The Well Integrated Group and Group Identification.

The fundamental patterns of behaviour laid down by hunting apes millions of years ago still shine through all the affairs of modern man. We did not evolve to live in huge conglomerations of tens of thousands of individuals. Our basic behaviour is designed to operate in the hunting group or as part of a tribe limited to hundreds-not thousands- of members. Loyalty to, and dependence on, the hunting group-and subsequently the tribe- are expressed in military society as loyalty to the platoon, the company, and lastly, the regiment.

This form of loyalty and dependence goes way back to the very roots of man. Baynes, in his very deep analysis of the ingredients that make up the quite unquenchable courage of 2nd Scottish Rifles at Neuve Chapelle, puts *regimental loyalty*- in my view quite rightly- at the top of the list. I believe many in the army have forgotten the cohesive power of this loyalty-but we will consider that later.

Leadership. Everyone has their own definition of leadership. While researching this presentation, I studied dozens of definitions-but the one that really comes alive for me is that by Correlli Barnett:

"Leadership is a psychological force that has nothing to do with morals or good character or even intelligence: nothing to do with ideals or idealism. It is a matter of relative will powers, a basic connection between one animal and the rest of the herd. Leadership is a process by which a single aim and unified action are imparted to the herd. Not surprisingly it is most in evidence in time or circumstances of danger or challenge. Leadership is not imposed like authority. It is actually welcomed and wanted by the led."

That in my view, is what leadership is all about. But how do you select such leaders? In the primitive hunting group leaders were accepted only after the most ruthless selection process. Is our selection adequate? This, we will consider later.

Discipline. The question of discipline has been the subject of considerable debate in a modern army plagued by difficulties in recruiting from a society which has rejected many previously accepted forms of discipline. While agreeing with all that has been written about discipline from within and self-control, I still believe that discipline of the more traditional kind is extremely effective in battle. De Gaulle summed it up well:

"Although soldiers carry within themselves a thousand and one seeds of diversity, men in their hearts can no more do without being controlled that they can live without food or drink. Discipline is thus the basic constituent of all armies, but its form must be shaped by the conditions and moral climate of our times."

Success. Obviously success is a factor of great importance: the modern soldier no longer accepts his lot stoically. He expects things to go well.

I include under this heading not only success in battle-but success from the point of view of things happening as planned. In other words good administration.

Although important, I would not rank success in battle alongside my first three factors because history has countless examples of well-led troops who pressed on through defeat after defeat.

An Example From History

The chances, in the next conflict, of a "phony war" period in which units can shake down are extremely unlikely.

I have therefore examined modern history to find a battle - preferably a *worst case*- which is comparable to one that the Army may be asked to fight. Having found such a battle, I examined what were the factors that, from the *morale* point of view, made the battle a success or failure.

The battle I picked was *the defense of Calais in May 1940 by the 30th Brigade*. The brigade, when committed to Calais, comprised Queen Victoria's Rifles (TA); 2nd Battalion, 60th Rifles; 1st Battalion, The Rifles Brigade; and 3rd Royal Tank Regiment.

Their mission was to defend Calais and thereby assist the withdrawal of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).

The enemy units were the 1st Panzer Division, at the onset, followed by the 10th Panzer Division from Guderian's 19th Corps-supported by massed artillery and up to 100 *Stukas*.

Battalions were moved at literally a few hours notice from East Anglia and Southern England to Calais, and in a matter of hours went into action.

They left most of their transport and much of their ammunition in the United Kingdom. The staff work of their move was a shambles. As they arrived in Calais, base troops and wounded were being evacuated and

dead were laid out on the quay. They had no artillery support even though the Royal Navy did their best with destroyers. The town was full of refugees and fifth columnists and the cellars held thousands of French and Belgian soldiers who had enough.

The front they had to defend stretched for 6 miles. The weather was extremely hot and soon after battle was joined the water supply was virtually destroyed.

Both battalions had trained for mobile operations as part of the 1st Division, but then were committed with no retraining to street fighting.

The noise from massed artillery, tanks, and *Stukas* must have been unbearable.

To top it all, for 2 days the troops were led to expect that they would be evacuated by sea when the positions became untenable. Then they were asked to defend to the last. (I did say I looked for the worst case).

This rather doleful tale contains every one of my adverse factors. The *unexpected; the unknown; fear; exhaustion; noise of battle; and unpleasant sights*. All were there in abundance.

If you had commissioned a psychiatrist to put together a situation for the complete demoralization of troops, I doubt if he could have improved on this situation.

But far from being demoralized, they stood and fought for 4 days. And accounts from the 10th Panzer war diaries show that at times they fought markedly superior German forces to a standstill.

On the very last morning, the 26th of May, 1st Battalion, The Rifle Brigade was down to 14 officers and 290 men. One company was reduced from 150 to 30 or all ranks, The 60th was probably worse off.

And yet Heinz Guderian questioned the Commander, 10th Panzer, as to whether or not he should stop the attack and ask for more air strikes- such was the resistance.

When analyzing the accounts in *The Rifle Brigade 1935-1945*, by Hastings, and especially in Airey Neave's book on the battle, the following of our positive factors come out time and time again:

Most of the personnel-officers and men-of the Regular battalions had been together for years. Even the Reservists that joined the battalions were 7-year men, who slipped back into the family with ease.

Pride in the regiment was enormous.

Leadership, from Brigadier Nicholson down, was of a very high order-one company commander, wounded on three separate occasions, refused to leave his company.

Thanks to Brigadier Jimmy Glover I found one more source, Major General Tom Action, who was Adjutant to 1st Battalion, The Rifle Brigade, in Calais.

He confirmed the shambles and many of the facts in Neave's account-but he said two things which I consider to be of tremendous value.

Having listened to his account of how everything went wrong I asked him the direct question, "Why did they fight so well?"

After quite a pause he said,

"The Regiment had always fought well, and we were with our friends."

Just simply that.

When asked what, apart from the obvious upset the men, he said,

"The breakdown of the normal organization and break up of previously cohesive groups upset the men and had an adverse effect on morale."

I will end on this account with two quotations from Airey Neave:

"It may be fashionable today to sneer at regimental loyalty, but Calais could not have been held long without it."

"So strong were regimental feeling that some wounded had to be taken out of POW columns by the Germans for treatment- even when they had been on the march for days."

What Can Commanders Do In Peace?

I think from the factors I have given you, and the account of Calais, you will have worked out what I am going to suggest. I have plugged time and time again the strength of the well-trained, well-knit group. At the beginning of this lecture I said, "The great majority of soldiers overcome fear, as they have done throughout their lives, by an effort of will and by support from others." This support is provided by the group and their leaders. But the group is only effective if it has been together for some time. The cohesive bonds having formed, and identification with the group and tribe having fully developed.

In the case of leaders, trust takes time to develop unless the leader has that instant magnetism that is found only in one in a million men.

May I quote from *Regulations for the Rifle Corps*, prepared in 1800, by Sir John Moore who is considered by many the greatest trainer of soldiers the British Army has ever had.

"Having formed his company he (the captain) will then arrange comrades. Every corporal, private, and bugler will select a comrade of the rank differing from his own, i.e. front rank and rear rank, and is never to change him without the permission of his captain. Comrades are always to have the same berth in quarters and that they may be as little separated as possible in either barracks or the field, will join the same file on parade, and go on the same duties with arms."

Commanders must therefore resist turbulence in their units. Every effort must be made to keep companies, platoons, and sections together for lengthy periods so that the bonds so necessary in war can be forged in peace. It is horrifying, when one examines recent operations, to see how the ad hoc unit has become normal practice. In war such an organization is a potential mob. When we either hamper the buildup of company and regimental loyalty, or deliberately break it down, we throw away one of our few major assets.

I next turn to leadership.

Earlier, I mentioned how the hunting group threw up its leaders after a ruthless selection within the group.

We have a different system. Some of our leaders, often raised in a society with different values, pick the next crop of young leaders.

Further selection takes place at Sandhurst and then in the regiment where the new young leader is imposed on his group. (Remember leadership is welcomed by the group, not imposed).

In the pre-1914 Army and, to a slightly less extent the Pre-1939 Army, young officers spent years with the regiments and the weeding-out process was quite severe. The soldiers themselves, to some extent, played a part in selection. Officers spent many years in close contact with their men and the grapevine soon made clear the views of NCOs and men.

Nowadays young officers spend less time with their regiments and less time in close contact with their men.

Commanders must make every effort to halt and, if possible, reverse this trend.

While considering selection, you may ask why we cannot pick out those men who will break in battle and become psychiatric casualties. If possible, now is the time to

discover them and weed them out-not as that armoured box motors past.

Lord Moran in his book, mainly written as a result of his experiences as a Regimental Medical Officer in World War I, strongly advocated such a procedure. In World War II attempt were made to initiate selection procedures. Despite these efforts, in the campaign in North West Europe alone, the British Army had over 13,000 psychiatric casualties.

The United States, in World II had overall 1.5 million psychiatric casualties admitted to hospitals, with nearly 0.5 million being invalidated.

Obviously the system was not a roaring success.

The Modern view is that preservice selection is notoriously unreliable and it can be expected to eliminate only the more obviously unintelligent, unstable, or mentally disordered.

It is more practical to eliminate the vulnerable in the basis of their performance during service and men who do not have the necessary fibre to make soldiers must be gotten rid of by administrative means.

I realise that there are great pressures to keep up the numbers, but the retention of the grossly inadequate is akin to retaining a Trojan horse in a unit.

The importance of the *power of the group and leadership* have been stressed. But it would be unwise to depend on these two morale factors alone. In the battle we may have to fight, we must take into account every means of encouraging *determination in battle*.

Earlier we considered the adverse effect of the *unknown*. Our soldiers are being asked to act aggressively against a quite alarming enemy-namely a large concentration of Russian armour. Even Israeli troops on the Golan Heights- troops with battle experience, found the sight unnerving.

How many of our infantry soldiers have worked with tanks? How many are convinced

that their weapons will destroy enemy armour? How many of our infantry soldiers are aware how vulnerable the tank is to attack at very close range by determined troops -especially in close country?

Obviously I do not know the answers. All I can say is that if all our troops have this experience and knowledge, there is one less factor to cause them fear and despair.

If only a few of our troops are so trained- we may have ourselves a problem.

Soldiers should be given every opportunity to gain experience of what we expect of them on the battlefield.

To keep a soldier away from what war is really like until he finds out for himself is as reasonable as keeping a medical student away from disease.

Physical Fitness

In virtually every account of battle the exhausting effects of even short bursts of fighting is stressed. Only the really physically fit soldier will be able to combat such fatigue.

How long the overweight soldier, or the man who cannot meet standards of physical efficiency, will survive is a matter for conjecture. I am not convinced it will be for very long.

Remember the reply of the Delphian Oracle when asked what Sparta had most to fear? One word, *luxury*.

Success

I included administration in my initial consideration of success. Repeatedly in military history-it was certainly so at Calais-the well administered unit is seen to overcome outside confusion and pressure.

Soldiers gain tremendous encouragement from the knowledge that, whereas the whole thing might appear to be a shambles, their unit moved well and was fed,

etc. Obviously such administrative skill is built up in peacetime.

What Can Commanders Do In War?

Obviously the factors I have already mentioned in peace are equally applicable in war. There are, however, two subjects I would like to discuss: information and psychiatric casualties.

Information. We have already discussed how one aspect of the power of the unknown undermines the soldier's will. There is one other; namely lack of information. Lack of knowledge as to what is happening both to our own troops and the enemy can lead to rumor and uncertainty.

We will be putting troops into a foreign country in the midst of chaos. There will be refugees on the roads and possibly retreating troops from other formations. Rumor can hardly fail to spread like a plague in such a situation. The only antidote is *accurate-information*. While security places certain limitations on the amount of information that can be given, whenever possible the soldier must be kept in the picture.

Psychiatric Casualties

Despite all our efforts, when stress becomes too much, or the soldier has been under stress for too long, the will breaks and the soldier suffers psychiatric breakdown. This breakdown can present in many forms:

Panic states which results in headlong flight.

Acute depression where the patient sits mute and motionless.

Acute anxiety with extreme restlessness and agitation.

Exhaustion states where troops show abnormal fatigue.

Hysterical reactions, including hysterical blindness, paralysis, etc.

A word of caution. It is to be expected that in battle everybody will be keyed up. Men can well sweat, have tremors, and be short tempered without being on their way to a psychiatrist. However, commanders at all levels must watch for the first signs of defeat in a soldier and come to the man's rescue. Leaders, officers or NCOs, who have been with their men for some time and know them well will quickly recognize the first signs. It is at this stage that a joke, asking the man to carry out a simple act, the odd word, or even a hand on the shoulder, will give him the support he needs.

How many times have we read in descriptions of a battle that, just before the action started, in that terrible short period of inactivity when the will begins to ebb away, "The leader moved amongst his men." This sort of situation is the test of real leadership. If a man is causing concern to a leader, asking that man to accompany him as he moves about often gives their soldier the support he needs.

There is not doubt that inactivity at a time of tension breeds fear and that the best antidote to the poison of fear is purposeful actions.

Once action begins, obviously the most steadying act by the soldier is to fire his weapon. This may seem a blinding glimpse of the obvious, but Brigadier General (then Colonel) S.L.A. Marshall, United States Army, carried out a survey involving several hundreds of U.S. Army infantry companies in World War II. He found that only some 15 to 20 percent of rifle company personnel actually fired upon the enemy or exhibited appropriate aggressive activity during battle. This negative attitude by some members of the group will present the leader with his greatest challenge. He must realize it may happen and be prepared for it.

So far, the whole of this has been geared to the prevention of psychiatric battle casualties. What do we do when, despite all efforts, some of our men really start to break?

Men in early stages of psychiatric breakdown are highly suggestible and can still be retrieved, especially by a positive approach by a leader the man trusts and respects. I would suggest that there are three possible courses of action.

If it is still possible to communicate with the man, attempts should still be made to stir him into action by carrying message, helping a comrade, etc. This activity could be carried out at a company aid post or company headquarters level.

If the man is incapable of such action, rest, sleep, food, etc. actually in the company aid post can often work wonders.

Lastly, there is the psychiatric casualty who, either by his position in the company hierarchy, by his symptoms is causing unrest amongst the others, or by the very seriousness of his symptoms cannot be treated within the company and therefore has to be evacuated.

Even in the case of the last group I would suggest nearly all could, and should, be treated at the regimental level.

There is one final point I would like to make. A psychiatric casualty, in many cases, knows he has failed. Censure and mockery from a respected member of the group will do him more harm than good. He wants firm but understanding support. He needs firm direction and aid from a member of his group or the leader he respects. He does not need a shoulder to cry on or, in most cases, certainly not a psychiatrist.

Conclusion

As a parting shot I would like to make one last quotation to leave in your minds the vital part the well integrated group plays in defending the soldier against psychiatric breakdown in battle:

"We trained hard, but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams we would be reorganized. I was to learn

later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing. And a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization."

Petronious Arbiter, 210 BC

It seems that man doesn't change much—neither do the mistakes he makes. If you are to remember anything from this lecture, remember General Action's remark, "*The Regiment had always fought well, We were amongst our friends.*"

MAJOR GENERAL T.S. HART, MB, MFCM, DPH, DTM&H, Director of Medical Services United Kingdom Land Forces, was educated at Dulwich College and trained in medicine at Guy's Hospital. Commissioned into the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) in 1951, he was appointed Regimental Medical Officer, 1st Battalion, Royal Norfolk Regiment and served with the unit in Korea and Hong Kong. In 1953, he joined the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) where he served as Second in Command of the 14th Field Ambulance Company and later as Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Service, 2d Infantry Division. After attending Staff College Camberley in 1958, he held an appointment in the Ministry of Defence Army until 1961 when attended the Senior Officers' Course of the Royal Army Medical College, being awarded the Montifiore Prize and Medal in Military Surgery. Following the Senior Officers' Course he attended the London School of Tropical Medicine. Between 1963 and 1969 he commanded the British Military Hospital Kluang, Malaya; attended the Joint Services Staff College Latimer; served as Assistant Director of Medical Service (ADMS), Eastern Command; and commanded the Military Hospital Colchester. Following a tour in the Manning Branch of the RAMC, he attended the Royal College of Defence Studies and subsequently became ADMS, 3d Division. In 1975 he was promoted to Brigadier and served 2 years as Deputy Director of Medical Service Corps, BAOR. He joined Headquarters, United Kingdom Land Forces as a Major General in 1978 and became Director of Medical Services.

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APPENDIX B

"BATTLE DOCTRINE FOR FRONT LINE LEADERS"

10 November 1981

Originally published by the 3d Marine Division for its front line leaders, and subsequently distributed Corps-wide as an official training guide during World War II by LtGen A.A. Vandergrift, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, this pamphlet contains in pure form the formula for positive combat leadership. The essence of its fundamentals applies both on and off the field of battle to all leaders, at all times, regardless of rank, specialty, or duty assignment. I commend these truths to your careful study. Failure to follow them can cost your professional creditability in peacetime, and, in war, the lives of those dependent upon your leadership.

(Signed) D. M. TWOMEY
Major General, U. S. Marine Corps
Director, Education Center

FOREWORD

This forceful restatement of the fundamental principles of troop leadership, supplemented by rules based on combat experience in the Solomon Islands Area was prepared by the Third Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force. It is worthy of careful study by every Marine who is or may be charged with the leadership of other Marines in battle.

(Signed) A.A. VANDERGRIFT

INTRODUCTION

The senior commander of a force plans the battle in its broader sense and is responsible for ultimate success or failure. However, once a subordinate unit has been committed to action, he must, for the time being, limit his activities to providing the necessary support and insuring the coordination of all components. Regardless of how well conceived the Senior commander's plan may be, it can be nullified if his front line platoons are incapable of carrying out the mission assigned.

The conduct of the front line rests with company commanders, and their platoon and squad leaders. The front line leader must plan and execute his own battle. He must know his enemy, his own men, and must aggressively employ all of his weapons in coordinated fire and movement. He must personally lead his unit to success. The paramount importance of front line leadership cannot be overestimated.

1. The prime factor in a successful fighting unit is esprit de corps. This needs no explanation. It simply means that no Marine ever lets another Marine down. The expression, "A Squad of Marines," has for over a hundred years been synonymous with such other expressions as "coiled rattlesnake," "concentrated dynamite," "powder keg," etc. Its meaning has been well-earned.

2. Of almost equal importance to a fighting unit is discipline. This applies to all activities at all times. It must never be relaxed, particularly during times of hardship, discomfort, or danger. It spells the difference between a "mob" and a "unit." Discipline is obtained mainly through diligence of the judicious daily application of rewards and punishments. Justice, consistency, firmness, and respect are the roots of discipline. Men like to serve in a well-disciplined unit. Mob methods disgust them.

3. Be neat in your person; habitually wear your insignia of rank on all uniforms and have all your subordinates do the same. Insignia may be dulled or blended just before entering close combat--but not before.

4. Exercise and display absolute loyalty toward a superior, particularly when he is absent. This is not only morally correct, it is the only sure footing in any military organization. It also enhances your personal prestige among your subordinates.

5. Refrain from "blowing up" under stress or when irritated.

6. Always show enthusiasm- it is infectious.

7. Never allow yourself to be unduly rushed or stampeded. There is usually ample time for considered judgment, even during battle. Dignity and poise are invaluable assets to a leader.

8. In the field, practice the habit of making daily inspections (using the "sample" method) and insist on: (1) clean weapons, (2) presence of arms, ammunition, mess gear, helmets and other items of individual equipment, (3) care of the feet, (4) alertness while on watch. See that rewards and punishments are promptly awarded.

9. At the front, visit all of your men frequently - talk to them - be sure they know what you want them to do at all times, and where you can be found.

10. Do not get your unit lost - nothing destroys confidence quicker.

11. As a general rule do not call for volunteers to do a dangerous or distasteful job. Pick out the individuals yourself and assign them to the job clearly, and in the presence of others.

12. Give your orders positively and clearly at all times. Avoid vagueness.

13. Never allow cruelty, it undermines the natural courage and manliness of the perpetrator. Be respectful to the dead - even the enemy dead. Bury the dead quickly.

14. Be prompt and accurate in making reports. Send back information at least once each hour during action. The commanding officer can't help you unless he knows your situation.

15. If anything goes wrong, do not be too quick to blame our artillery, aviation, engineers, supply services, or any other organization. They can be depended upon always to do all they can with the information and means at hand. They, too, have a job which requires courage and determination, and they are doing their best to back you up.

16. Take active charge of all activities in the front which lie within your sphere of responsibility.

17. A front-line Marine demands little from his leader, namely: (1) a clear conception of what he is expected to do, (2) ammunition, (3) drinking water, (4) rations, (5) medical service, and eventually (6) cigarettes and mail. These items must be your continuous concern.

18. Always arrange for the comfort of your men before you do your own.

19. Maintain your leadership. Nothing is more humiliating to a nominal leader than to see his men naturally turning to a subordinate for direction in times of danger.

20. Arrange continuously for your men to get as much rest as the situation will allow. Avoid unnecessary harassments, such as "standing by." Unless your unit is on the move or unless you or the enemy are actually attacking, you can usually arrange for at least two-thirds of your men to sleep at night.

21. Do not tolerate any evidences of self-pity in your men. It makes any difficult situation worse.

22. Keep to yourself alone any concern you may have as to your general situation, and do not let it be reflected in your countenance or actions. Remember that all situations look critical at times.

23. Encourage common decency - do not tolerate vulgarity or filthy language in your presence.

24. Insist on carrying out all rules for field sanitation, even in the front lines.

25. Do not encourage rumors - they are usually disturbing - most of them are entirely without foundation. Find out for yourself and be the first to tell your men the truth.

26. Win a reputation for moving your outfit promptly. Depart and arrive on time.

27. Be "time and space" conscious. By practice, know the average time it takes: (1) to issue your orders, (2) to assemble your unit, (3) to move it a hundred yards over varied types of terrain, (4) to deploy it for battle. Always have your watch set at the correct time.

28. Keep your men informed as to the enemy situation and your plans. Devise and execute plans for taking prisoners.

29. Offensive tactics, briefly summarized, may be stated as follows: Hold the attention of your enemy with a minimum force, then quickly strike him suddenly and hard on his flank or rear with every weapon you have, then rush him when his fire slackens. Any plan that accomplishes this will usually win if it is driven home quickly. Be slow to change a plan - the reason for the change should be obvious.

30. Remember that support arms seldom destroy - they paralyze temporarily. Take quick advantage of their support before the enemy "comes to." Act suddenly.

31. In a surprise meeting of small forces, hit the enemy immediately while he is still startled; don't let him get set, be persistent, and "keep him rolling."

32. Be prepared always. Anticipate your action in case of an emergency. Ask yourself what you would do immediately in case the enemy should suddenly appear. If you have to hesitate in your answer, you are not sufficiently prepared. Keep thinking, and at all times be one jump ahead of the immediate situation.

33. Never permit men to remain inactive under machine gun fire. Give orders quickly.

34. Do not permit the slightest rearward movement of any individual while under heavy fire, except to get wounded out, or when openly directed by you. It is usually best to go forward, or dig in until the fire ceases.

35. Always endeavor to confront your enemy with superior volume of accurate fire. This may be accomplished at any given point by means of maneuver and coordination of the fire of all weapons. Use every weapon you have - they are all especially effective if used together.

36. A great and successful troop leader said that there comes a point in every close battle when each commander concludes that he is defeated. The leader who carries on, wins.

37. It has been recently observed that an enemy often slackens or ceases his fire right at the time he appears to be getting the upper hand. He then simply crouches in his hole. This means that he cannot sustain a fire fight. Stick to your plan and hit him harder.

38. Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.

39. Beware of daylight withdrawals. They may appear logical in a classroom but they are always dangerous in practice. In a tight spot hold on, at least until nightfall.

40. Nothing on this earth is so uplifting to a human being as victory in battle; nothing so degrading as defeat.

41. "Battles are won during the training period."

COMBAT LEADERSHIP

"There is no new thing under the sun." - Ecclesiastes

From his vast experience acquired during military service which spanned three wars, Brig Gen S. L. A. Marshall (Ret) has written and spoken extensively, passing on his keen personal observations. Particularly significant was a paper which he read, in 1957, at the Social Psychiatry. Following is a condensation of that paper.

Editor.

There is a modern tendency to believe that science may find a new and secret key to the strengthening of moral forces within military organization which may have eluded the most gifted captains in times past who found the right way through instinct.

I was at Pork Chop Hill in 1953 to determine how our troops had behaved. It was a tactical review of the meaning, method, and manner of leadership under the most exasperating of field conditions. The men were green; the young leaders hardly knew to character of their following; and many of the men, newly arrived replacements, were total

strangers. Certainly here was an inviting laboratory. Yet when the seven weeks' work was concluded, I had found nothing new under the sun.

More recently, I was in the Middle East with the Israeli Army, in Sinai, studying the "100-Hour War" of November 1956. Never before in human history have troops been pushed as hard and moved as concertedly and recklessly to a dramatic and decisive goal in war. My job was to get at the nature of that Army by examining in detail its movements, motives and moral forces under the stress of battle. But again I found nothing new under the sun.

Every rule of action, every precept and example set for and by leadership, toward the end that an immediate following would be stimulated and the Army as a whole would respond if inspired, must have been old at the time of Gideon.

At the high tide of danger, leaders invariably went first. They counseled their men to audacity by being themselves audacious. Amid dilemma, they resolved three courses by taking the line of greatest

daring, which they reckoned to be the line of main chance. Exercising tight control amid crisis, they still bubbled with good humor. Yet one other command attitude was even more conspicuous. While these young men - company, battalion, or brigade leaders - demanded an utmost performance from their troops and pushed them many times toward the fringe of exhaustion, they did not go beyond it. Right on the battlefield, with an attack pending, they would hold everything to order a rest or a sleep if they felt that the condition of the troops demanded it. Too often we tend to an opposite course, and we waste men and opportunity because of it.

I have heard many times, in explanation of the dynamism of Israel's Army that "Of course, these troops are highly motivated. They are pioneers. Their land is ever in danger and surrounded by enemies." No one would deny that these are factors which simplify Israel's basic training situation and enable Government to make a stern requirement of the individual.

But for my own part, I reject the idea that the extraordinary spirit of that Army in combat comes from self-identification of the individual with the goals of his nation when his life is in danger. That is not the nature of man under battle stress; his thoughts are as local as his view of the nearest ground cover, and unless he feels a solidarity with the people immediately around him and is carried forward by their momentum, neither thoughts about the ideals of his country nor reflections on his love for his wife will keep him from diving toward the nearest protection.

When fire sweeps the field, nothing keeps a man from running except a sense of honor, of blunt obligation to the people right around him, of fear of failure in their sight, which might eternally disgrace him. Generate high motivation and the spirit of dedication if you can, but don't over-evaluate them as the begin-and-end-all of combat efficiency. Even an utterly unselfish patriotism (if there be such a motivation) will not of itself make inspired leading or generate its prerequisite - that personal magnetism which produces group unity.

I recall the words of General Dayan (Israeli Army Chief of Staff): "A leader should be moral. He shouldn't drink heavily, play around with women, be careless in his

private affairs, neglect his work, fail to know his men intimately as individuals. And you may have a moral paragon who observes all the rules and is still not a leader. In fact, if he is that perfect, combat leading may be the one thing at which he will certainly fail" To that, amen!

There is not point in repeating the platitude "nothing succeeds like success." But there is every reason to state again and again the almost disregarded corollary that within military organization, faith in ultimate success is the broad highway to success itself. I have been fortunate. Four times in my military service I have had the experience of taking over a demoralized, rundown unit in wartime, with the charge that I would get it up and going again. Were that to happen to me a fifth time, I would want nothing better than that, at the earliest moment, those under me would get the idea, right or wrong: "This name is born under a lucky star. He may be cantankerous, demanding, hard to live with, and idiosyncratic. Maybe his sense of right and wrong wobbles a bit. But, if we stay with him, this unit is coming out of the woods, and I personally will have a firmer hold on the future." Yes, that is what I would like them to say.

In this business of rebuilding I have never known any better therapy than to talk again and again about the importance of group success as a foundation for the personal life while taking actions which indicated new direction.

In combat or out of it, once an organization gets the conviction that it is moving to higher ground as some distinction will come of it, then all marginal problems begin to contract. Discipline and standards of courtesy tighten of themselves, because pride has been, restored.

Malingering in the form of too many men on sick call, AWOLs, and failure to maintain proper inspection standards becomes minimal through a renewed confidence and an upgrading of interpersonal relationships at lower levels. When the group gets the feeling of new motion, it centrifugally influences anyone who tries to stand still. It can even make good soldiers out of potential bad actors. I remember a dying boy at the battle of Carentan. He had been an "eight ball" in the paratroop company. Just before death took him, he said, "tell me at last, Captain, that I wasn't completely a foul-up" So saying, he expressed the natural longing in all mankind.

Just as motion and sense of direction rehabilitates the unit, so they tonic the leader

by cutting pressure from higher command. What a wonderful thing is freedom of motion and how little you can get it with someone “riding your neck!” So I long learned that when your score sheet reads no VD, no courts-martial and no AWOLs, out of a mistaken impression up there in heaven that these things connote operational efficiency, you can win the right to be left along, sans inspection, sans interference; and what a blessed state it is!

There is one radical difference between training and combat conditions. In training, the commander may be arbitrary, demanding and a hard disciplinarian, working and sweating his troops more than any company along the line. But so long as his sense of fair play in his handling of his own men becomes evident to them, and provided they become aware that what he is doing is making them efficient than their competition, and better prepared for the rigor of combat, they will approve him if grudgingly, stay loyal to him, and even possibly come to believe in his lucky star.

In combat something new is added. Even if they have previously looked on him as a father and believed absolutely that being with him was their best assurance of successful survival, should he then develop a dugout habit, show

himself as fearful and too careful of his own safety, he will lose his hold on them no less absolutely. I witnessed these battlefield transformations in France in 1918. In the wars since then, all I have observed of our forces and others has served but to confirm that first powerful impression. In the field there is no substitute for courage, no other bonding influence toward unity of action. Troops will excuse almost any stupidity; excessive timidity is simply unforgivable.

Being a fundamentalist, I see man as a creature under daily challenge to prove to himself, by one means or another, the quality and character of his own manhood. And I am quite sure that in his working relations with all other men, as to whether he is to attain to firm ascendancy over them in a common activity, the hallmark of acknowledged superiority finally is the tested and proven masculine elements in his character. That implies the readiness to accept risk instead of putting ever uppermost the quest for security- and of this we hear too little in our time. It implies also a capacity for completing assigned or chosen work, without which no man may truly lead. Around two such fundamentals may be developed the aura, the manner, of leadership. If they be mission, there is no hope.

All of this is to be found in Ecclesiastes, along with the phrase: “There is no new thing under the sun.”

APPENDIX D

(Excerpt from the Armed Forces Officer)

Chapter 26

AMERICANS IN COMBAT

The command and control of men in combat can be mastered by the junior leaders of American forces short of actual experience under enemy fire.

It is altogether possible for a young officer in battle for the first time to be in total possession of his faculties and moving by instinct to do the right thing provided he has made the most of his training opportunities.

Exercise in the maneuvering of men is only an elementary introduction to this educational process. The basic requirement is a continuing study, first of the nature of men, second of the techniques that produce unified action, and last, of the history of past operations, which are covered by an abundant literature.

Provided always that this collateral study is sedulously carried forward by the individual officer, at least 90 percent of all that is given him during the training period becomes applicable to his personal action and his power to lead other men when under fire.

Each Service has its separate character. The fighting problem of each differs in some measure from those of all others. In the nature of things, the task of successfully leading men in battle is partly conditioned by the unique character and mission of each Service.

It would therefore be gratuitous and indeed impossible, to attempt to outline a doctrine that would be of general application, stipulating methods, techniques, and so forth, that would apply to all Americans in combat, no matter in what element they engaged.

There are, however, a few simple and fundamental propositions to which the Armed Forces subscribe in telling their officers what may be expected of the average man of the United States under the conditions of battle. Generally speaking, they have held true of Americans in times past from Lexington on April 19, 1775, to the withdrawal of the last brigade from Vietnam toward the end of 1972. The fighting establishment builds its discipline, training, code of conduct, and public policy around these ideas believing that what served yesterday will also be the one best way tomorrow, and for so long as our traditions and our system of freedoms survive. These propositions are:

I

When led with courage and intelligence, an American will fight as willingly and as efficiently as any fighter in world history.

II

His keenness and endurance in war will be in proportion to the zeal and inspiration of his leadership.

III

He is resourceful and imaginative, and the best results will always flow from encouraging him to use his brain along with his spirit.

IV

Under combat conditions, he will reserve his greatest loyalty for the officer who is most resourceful in the tactical employment of his forces and most careful to avoid unnecessary losses.

V

He is to a certain extent machine-bound because the nature of our civilization has made him so. In an emergency, he tends to look around for a motor car, a radio, or some other gadget that will facilitate his purpose, instead of thinking about using his muscle power toward the given end. In combat, this is a weakness which thwarts contact and limits communications. Therefore it needs to be anticipated and guarded against.

VI

War does not require that the American be brutalized or bullied in any measure whatever. His need is an alert mind and a toughened body. Hate and bloodlust are not the attributes of a sound training under the American system. To develop clearly a

line of duty is sufficient to point Americans toward the doing of it.

VII

Except on a Hollywood lot, there is no such thing as an American fighter "type." Our best men come in all colors, shapes and sizes. They appear from every section of the Nation.

VIII

Presupposing soundness in their officer leadership the majority of Americans in any group or unit can be depended upon to fight loyally and obediently and will give a good account of themselves.

IX

In battle, Americans do not tend to fluctuate between emotional extremes, in complete dejection one day and in exultation the next, according to changes in the situation. They continue, on the whole, on a fairly even keel, when the going is tough and when things are breaking their way. Even when heavily shocked by battle losses, they tend to bound back quickly. Though their griping is incessant, their natural outlook is on the optimistic side, and they react unfavorably to the officer who looks eternally on the dark side.

X

During battle, American officers are not expected either to drive their men or to be forever in the van, as if praying to be shot. So long as they are with their men, taking the same chances as their men, and showing a firm grasp of the situation and of the line of action that should be followed, the men will go forward.

XI

In any situation of extreme pressure or moral exhaustion,

where the men cannot otherwise be rallied and led forward, officers are expected to do the actual, physical act of leading, such as performing as first scout or point, even though this means taking over what normally ,would be an enlisted man's function.

XII

The normal, gregarious American is not at his best when playing a lone-handed or tactically isolated part in battle. He is not a kamikaze or a one-man torpedo. Consequently, the best tactical results obtain from those dispositions and methods that link the power of one man to that of another. Men who feel strange with their unit, having been carelessly received by it and indifferently handled, will rarely, if ever, fight strongly and courageously. But if treated with common decency and respect, they will perform like men.

XIII

Within our school of military thought, higher authority does not consider itself infallible. Either in combat or out, in any situation where a majority of militarily trained Americans become undutiful, that is sufficient reason for higher authority to resurvey its own judgments, disciplines, and line of action.

XIV

To lie to American forces to cover up a blunder in combat never, serves any valid purpose. They have a good sense of combat and an uncanny instinct for ferreting out the truth when anything goes wrong tactically. They will excuse mistakes, but they will not forgive being treated like children.

XV

When spit-and-polish are laid on so heavily that they become onerous, and the ranks cannot see any legitimate connection between the requirements and the development of an attitude that will serve a clear fighting purpose, it is to be questioned that the exactions serve any good object whatever.

XVI

On the other hand, because standards of discipline and courtesy are designed for the express purpose of furthering control under the extraordinary frictions and pressures of the battlefield, their maintenance under combat conditions is as necessary as during training. Smartness and respect are the marks of military alertness, no matter how trying the circumstances. But courtesy starts at the top in the dealing of any officer with his subordinates, and in his decent regard for their loyalty, intelligence, and manhood.

XVII

Though Americans enjoy a relatively bountiful, and even luxurious, standard of living in their home environment, they do not have to be pampered, spoon-fed, and surfeited with every comfort and convenience to keep them steadfast and devoted, once war comes. They are by nature rugged men, and in the field will respond most perfectly when called upon to play a rugged part. Soft handling will soften even the best men. But even the weak man will develop a new vigor and confidence in the face of necessary hardship, if moved by a leadership that is courageously making the best of a bad situation.

XVIII

Extravagance and wastefulness are somewhat rooted in the American character because of our mode of life. When our men enter military service, there is a strong holdover of their prodigal civilian habits. Even under fighting conditions, they tend to be wasteful of drinking water, food, munitions, and other vital supply. When such things are made too accessible, they tend to throw them away rather than conserve them in the general interest. This is a distinct weakness during combat, when conservation of all supply may be the touchstone of success. Regulation of supply and prevention of waste in any form is the prime obligation of every officer.

XIX

Under the conditions of battle, any extra work, exercise, maneuver, or marching that does not serve a clear and direct operational purpose is unjustifiable. The supreme object is to keep men as physically fresh and mentally alert as possible. Tired men take fright and are half-whipped before the battle opens. Worn-out officers cannot make clear decisions. The conservation of men's powers, not the exhaustion thereof, is the way of successful operation.

XX

When forces are committed to combat, it is vital that not one unnecessary pound be put on any man's back. Lightness of foot is the key to speed of movement and the increase of firepower. In judging these things, every officer's thought should be on the optimistic side. It is better to take the chance that men will manage to get by on a little less than to overload them, through an overcautious reckoning of every possible contingency, thereby destroying their power to do anything effectively.

XXI

Even thorough training and long practice in weapons handling will not always insure that a majority of men will use their weapons freely and consistently when engaging the enemy. In youth they are taught that the taking of human life is wrong. This feeling is deep-rooted in their emotions. Many of them cannot shake it off when the hour comes that their own lives are in danger. They fail to fire though they do not know exactly why. In war, firing at an enemy target can be made a habit. Once required to make the start, because he is given personal and intelligent direction, any man will find it easier to fire the second and third time, and soon thereafter his response will become automatic in any tactical situation. When engaging the enemy, the most decisive task of all junior field force leaders is to make certain that all men along the line are employing their weapons, even if this means spending some time with each man and directing his fire. Reconnaissance and inspection toward this end, particularly in the early stages of initial engagement, are far more important than the employment of weapons by junior leaders themselves, since this tends to distract their attention from what the men are doing.

XXII

Unity of action develops from fullness of information. In combat, all ranks have to know what is being done, and why it is being done, if confusion is to be kept to a minimum. This holds true in all types of operation, whatever the Service. However, a surfeit of information clouds the mind and may sometimes depress the spirit. We can take one example. A commander might be confronted by a complex situation, and his solution may comprise a continuing operation in three distinct phases. It would be advisable that all hands be told the complete detail of "phase A." But it might be equally sensible that only his subordinates who are closest to him be made fully informed about "phase B" and "phase C." Since all plans in combat are subject to modification as circumstances dictate, it is better not to muddle men by filling their minds with a seeming conflict in ideas. More important still, if the grand object seems too vast and formidable, even the first step toward it may appear doubly difficult. Fullness of information does not void the other principle that one thing at a time, carefully organized all down the line, is the surest way.

XXIII

There is no excuse for malingering or cowardice during battle. It is the task of leadership to stop it by whatever means would seem to be the surest cure, always making certain that in so doing it will not make a bad matter worse.

XXXV

The Armed Services recognize that there are occasional individuals whose nervous and spiritual makeup may be such that, though they erode rapidly and may suffer complete breakdown under combat conditions, they still may be wholly loyal and conscientious men, capable of doing high duty elsewhere. Men are not alike. In some, however willing the spirit, the flesh may still be weak. To punish, degrade, or in any way humiliate such men is not more cruel than ignorant. When the good faith of any individual has been repeatedly demonstrated in his earlier service, he deserves the benefit of the doubt from his superior, pending study of his case by medical authority. But if the man has been a bad actor consistently, his officer is warranted in proceeding on the assumption that his combat failure is just one

more grave moral dereliction. To fail to take proper action against such a man can only work unusual hardship on the majority trying to do their duty.

XXV

The United States abides by the laws of war. Its Armed Forces, in their dealing with all other peoples, are expected to comply with the laws of war in the spirit and to the letter. In waging war, we do not terrorize helpless non-combatants if it is within our power to avoid so doing. Wanton killing, torture, cruelty, or the working of unusual and unnecessary hardship on enemy prisoners or populations is not justified in any circumstance. Likewise, respect for the reign of law, as that term is understood in the United States, is expected to follow the flag wherever it goes. Pillaging, looting, and other excesses are as immoral when Americans are operating under military law as when they are living together under the civil code. Nonetheless, some men in the American forces will loot and destroy property unless they are restrained by fear of punishment. War looses violence and disorder; it inflames passions and makes it relatively easy for the individual to get away with unlawful actions. But it does not lessen the gravity of his offense or make it less necessary that constituted authority put him down. The main safeguard against lawlessness and hooliganism in any armed body is the integrity of its officers. When men know that their commander is absolutely opposed to such excesses and will take forceful action to repress any breach of discipline, they will conform. But when an officer winks at any depredation by his men, it is no different than if he had committed the act.

XXVI

On the field of sport, Americans always "talk it up" to keep nerves steady and to generate confidence. The need is even greater on the field of war, and the same treatment will have no less effect. When men are afraid, they go silent; silence of itself further intensifies their fear. The resumption of speech is the beginning of thoughtful, collected action, for two or more men cannot join strength and work intelligently together until they know one another's thoughts. Consequently, all training is an exercise in getting men to open up and become articulate even as it is a process in conditioning them physically to move strongly and together.

XXVII

Inspection is more important in the face of the enemy than during training because a fouled piece may mean a lost battle, an overlooked sick man may infect a fortress, and a mislaid message can cost a war. By virtue of his position, every junior leader is an inspector, and the obligation to make certain that his force at all times is inspection-proof is unremitting.

XXVIII

In battle crisis, a majority of Americans present will respond to any man who has the will and the brains to give them a clear, intelligent order. They will follow the lowest-ranking man present if he obviously knows what he is doing and is morally the master of the situation, but they will not obey a chuckle-head if he has nothing in his favor but his rank.

XXIX

Americans are uncommonly careless about security when in the combat field. They have always been so; it is part of their nature. Operations analysts reckoned, as to Vietnam, that this fault in itself accounted for approximately one-third of our casualties. This weakness being chronic, there is no safeguard against it except super vigilance on the part of officers, and the habit is easiest formed by giving foremost attention to the problem during training exercises.

XXX

For all officers, due reflection on these points relating to the character of our men in war is not more important than a continuing study of how they may be applied to all aspects of training, toward the end that we may further strengthen our own system. That armed force is nearest perfect which best holds itself, at all times and at all levels, in a state of readiness to move against and destroy any declared enemy of the United States.

APPENDIX E

A Legacy of esprit and leadership

"Combat leader, scholar, thinker, educator, innovator - all these describe the man who became the thirteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps and served as such for nine years during the 1920's" With these words General Lemuel C. Sheperd Jr., 20th Commandant describes MGen John A. Lejeune in the preface to the new edition of Reminiscences of a Marine, Lejeune's memoirs, republished this month by the Marine Corps Association.

Over the years John A. Lejeune has become almost a legend in the Marine Corps. "Besides the many 'firsts' of his distinguished thirty-nine year career," Gen Sheperd goes on to say, "Lejeune can perhaps best be described as the man who charted the course of the Corps in the 20th century." And indeed he did, when he directed a study of amphibious warfare at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico from which the Corps' modern amphibious doctrine evolved. But above all else Gen Lejeune's legacy come down strongest for his model of leadership. He set forth the "teacher-pupil" approach in the relationship between officer and enlisted which still provides the hallmark for Marine Corps leadership.

On 18 January 1921 he spoke to the Army General Staff College (forerunner of the Army War College), Washington, D.C. about esprit and leadership. He found the two inseparable. His message is timeless and proves that in leading men, leadership doesn't change much, only men do. On the 59th anniversary of Gen Lejeune's appointment as Commandant of the Marine Corps, we publish his talk on leadership as he gave it 58 years ago.

When General Smith wrote to me and asked me to come down to the General Staff College and make a talk on the subject of esprit and leadership, I was very loathe to accept. In the first place, I had been at the school here for 14 months and I felt like a fleet officer going back to the Naval Academy, getting up on the platform and talking to the staff and students of the school. In the second place, I have been very busy. I could see ahead that I would be busy with that kind of work which is very distracting; there are so many questions coming up all the time that it is very hard to concentrate on any one subject. In the third place, I did not think, and I do not know, that I have any very important message which would

be of great value to the persons who were going to hear it. However, I wrote out a talk. Ordinarily I talk without note, but I put them down because I might get a case of buck-fever.

Esprit de corps and morale are kindred subjects; in fact, some writers consider them as synonymous. This, however, is not the case, as esprit de corps is only one of the factors which goes to constitute morale.

Morale is three-fold -- physical, mental or professional and spiritual. The physical condition of troops has a great influence on their morale. Men whose bodies are untrained physically, who are soft from leading sedentary lives, are unable to stand the strain and stress of long marches and active campaigning. Their

morale is rapidly lowered, and they soon become demoralized.

The effect of physical training is exemplified in the case of Stonewall Jackson's division. In the fall campaign of '62, they made such long marches with so few stragglers that they were called the "Foot Cavalry." General Dick Taylor, who commanded one of the Brigades, writes very interestingly in his book entitled "Destruction and Reconstruction," telling how he trained his brigade to march. He said in '61 Jackson's division marched very poorly. It was composed largely of men who were brought up in the country and who were accustomed to ride on horse-back, or were city men who were accustomed to riding in carriages. Taylor took his brigade and practiced it in marching during the winter of '61 and '62, so in the spring of '63 his brigade marched so well that it was adopted by Jackson as an example for the whole division. The whole division was practiced in marching with the wonderful results that history tells us about. The morale of that division as we know was very high; perhaps the physical condition of the men had a great effect on it.

Similarly, Troops whose professional or Military training has been neglected, and who are unskilled in the profession of arms, finding themselves unable to cope on equal terms with a highly trained enemy force of equal numbers, have their morale lowered, and it becomes increasingly difficult to obtain results with such troops until and unless they shall have received the careful training and instruction which all troops should have before being thrown into battle.

There are many instances in history of the failure of untrained troops. They are particularly liable to panic. I think in our own history the most notable example is the Battle of Bull Run, where the Union Army became panic-stricken in the afternoon of the battle and broke and fled to Washington, General Grant tells us in his memoirs of a regiment in Illinois

which was badly officered. Reports came into the governor's office of the depredations of the troops. They seem to have committed atrocities all around southern Illinois, murders, robberies, drunkenness, everything of that kind. The Governor turned to General Grant, then Captain Grant, and said, "What are we going to do?" Grant said, "Give me command of the regiment and I can train them." He was appointed colonel and took command of this regiment, instructed the officers, trained the men, worked them about eight hours a day, and in a few months it was the best regiment of the Illinois troops.

Esprit de corps is the third factor in morale, affecting, as it does, the spirit of the troops. Like everything pertaining to the spirit, it is intangible, imponderable, and invisible, Esprit itself cannot be perceived by any of the five senses, but nevertheless, every leader of men knows that it does exist and that it is the most potent of the forces which it is necessary to utilize in order to achieve victory.

Napoleon has said that, of all the elements that go to make up battle efficiency, morale constitutes 75 per cent, or that morale is to the material as three to one. Marshal Foch, I have read, has increased the value of morale of the material to four to one.

When we consider the meaning of these statements, we are at first amazed to find that these great masters of the art of war have apparently gone on record as believing that the element of morale in any organization or army is three or four times greater than the combination of all the material factors, such as the weapons of the infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and, in the case of Marshal Foch, of the air service as well. It is beyond the power of the average man's comprehension to fully visualize this. The version of their statements is, of course, an exaggeration, in that unarmed troops, no matter how high their spirit, could not overcome troops fully armed and equipped with modern weapons, unless they were

absolutely lacking in morale, which is practically inconceivable, as even the most inferior troops have some spark of martial spirit, and are not altogether cowards.

What I think was intended to be conveyed by the statement of Napoleon was, that an army with high morale, and necessarily high spirit, could defeat an army of low morale, and necessarily low spirit, which was three times as strong in numbers. A study of history shows that this has happened over and over again. In fact, small forces have defeated armies much greater than three times their size. The Battles of the Greeks with the Asiatic armies alone are sufficient to establish the truth of this statement. For instance, Alexander's conquest of Asia; Xenophon's successful retreat with 10,000 men through the heart of Asia Minor although surrounded by hundreds of thousands of the enemy; the battles of Marathon, Thermoplae; and many others.

The Roman armies also overcame forces many times greater than they in numbers through their superiority in morale. A handful of Roman citizens ruled the world until the Roman Empire broke down through the loss of morale on the part of its people, when it then became an easy prey to hordes of barbarians who had continually pressed against its outer circumference for centuries.

Napoleon verified the truth of his belief by winning many battles with forces inferior in numbers to those of his opponents.

If it be accepted then as true that the esprit de corps of any body of troops is of such tremendous value, evidently it is a most important subject for a military officer to study. To be able to create and maintain this living thing which we call "esprit" in the hearts of his troops is to be a great leader. Whatever he be a platoon, a company, battalion, regimental, division, or army commander, the subject is worthy of his careful attention, and no officer should rest satisfied until he feels that he possesses that greatest of all assets - the ability

to play upon the emotions of his men in such a manner as to produce that most wonderful of all harmonies - the music of the human heart attuned to great deeds and great achievements.

To be practical, then, how can we produce and cultivate morale, and particularly that important element of morale - esprit - in our troops? the physical and mental, or professional phases of morale are well known to all of us. To acquire them it is simply a matter of applying practically and intelligently the rules laid down for physical training and military instruction. No proper excuse can be made for failure on the part of officers to bring their troops to the very finest physical condition and to so instruct them as to make them as skillful as the best in the profession of arms. These things are the manifest duty of every officer, including the subaltern, and any officer who fails in the performance of his duty in these respects is unworthy to hold a commission. They are the very "ABC" of his profession.

The third factor - the spirit - is a more or less unknown field to all of us and a field which it is very difficult for us to comprehend by the exercise of our mental faculties. Logic and reasoning play by a small part of it. Education assists but little. It is a matter of dealing with the emotions, the spirit, the souls of the troops. A man successful in this realm is a great leader, and qualities necessary to make him successful are known as the qualities of leadership. How, then, shall we inculcate and cultivate these qualities and become creators of esprit and therefore, successful leaders of men?

Perhaps we can learn more on this subject, as on all military subjects, by the study of history than by any other method. By consulting history, let us determine who were some of the great leaders and then ascertain, if possible, the methods used by them.

All of us are familiar with the great Hebrew leader called Moses. All of us know,

in a general way, that he reorganized his people and gave them a system of government, a body of laws, and a religion, but I do not believe that the average person quite comprehends the tremendous power of his leadership and the causes of his success.

Let us recall to our minds the old Bible story describing the history of the Jews in Egypt, their wanderings in the desert, and their entry into the Promised Land. These people, after several centuries devoted to carrying out the decree of Heaven to be fruitful and multiply, had become a numerous people, so numerous, in fact, as to make their masters, the Egyptians, fear that they might rise and overthrow them. In consequence, the ruler of the Egyptians enslaved them. He forced them to live in a crowded ghettos, deprived them from the use of weapons, compelled them to do treadmill work, make bricks without straw, and did everything else in his power to abuse them physically, mentally, morally, and spiritually. In spite of this, the ruler of the Egyptians still feared these people, and in order to prevent their rapid increase in numbers, he issued an edict that the first born male of each family must be slain at birth. The mother of Moses, in order to save his life, hid him in the bullrushes, and he was found and adopted by the daughter of Pharaoh. He was given the high degree of physical and mental training reserved for the ruling classes of Egypt.

Moses, upon attaining manhood, brooded over the condition of his people, and finally left the court of Egypt and went out into the desert, where he spent several years preparing himself for the mission which he had personally assumed - that of freeing his people and leading them into Palestine. During this time, he had opportunity to study the lore of the desert, to train himself in the profession of arms, and to sanctify his spirit to the unselfish service of his people and of his God.

This great leader, upon his return to Egypt, finally after many vicissitudes, secured

the permission of Pharaoh to remove the Hebrews and their belongings from Egypt, and actually succeeded in doing so. We know, at the present time, that the march from Egypt to Palestine is one of only a few weeks, although the Bible tells us that the Israelites were lost in the wilderness and wandered about, apparently in an aimless manner, for 40 years.

It is inconceivable that Moses could have allowed this to be done without purpose. He had lived in the desert for several years; he knew where guides could be found; and he knew the routes across the desert himself. A careful study of the Biblical account shows clearly that the wanderings of the Israelites in the desert were carefully planned by Moses himself, and that he took advantage of this opportunity and of the time to build up the morale of his people. These poor and feeble ghetto dwellers either died from exposure or became hardy by their continued wanderings, their open-air-life, and by the very difficulties which they had to surmount. They were compelled to learn the use of weapons and the lore of the desert in order to live. Moses taught them how to get food by the chase, how to find water springs, and how to utilize the fruits of the ground which they found from time to time. All of these things were so marvelous to them that they were called miracles.

Moses combined with this perfection of the physical instruction and training, the cultivation of the spirit of his people, He did everything in his power to cause them to lead virtuous and clean lives; he gave them the Ten Commandments, under circumstances which powerfully impressed the imagination of the ignorant Israelites, and these Commandments have come down to us unchanged and still constitute guides in the lives of all civilized people. He drew up and enforced a body of wise and salutary laws. He organized them by tribes into 12 fighting units. He insisted upon their adoption of the worship of the only true God.

Finally, after they had lived for 40 years in the wilderness, during which time every man, woman, and child who had left Egypt - with the exception of Moses, the civil ruler, and Joshua, the military leader - had died, Moses was able to look upon his people and see, in place of the weak and feeble race he had led from Egypt, a warlike host of 600,000, every member of which had been born, raised and developed in the desert, who were injured to hardship, were vigorous physically and alert mentally, trained in the use of warlike weapons, organized into a fighting force, filled with a religious enthusiasm which amounted to controlled fanaticism, and determined to reconquer the land which they had been constantly taught had been promised their forefather Abraham by God himself. Moses and Joshua therefore concluded that the time to enter Palestine had come. Moses himself, having completed his work, turned over the control of this warlike host to Joshua, and climbing to the top of a mountain, saw the Promised Land in the distance and was gathered to his Fathers.

Joshua led the troops into the Promised Land, easily overran the country, conquered and destroyed the tribes occupying it, and his people took it for their own.

This constitutes, I believe, the greatest example in history of the upbuilding of the morale of a whole people, and the changing of a race of slaves into a nation of mighty warriors.

There are other similar examples in history, although not quite so striking. Hannibal after the First Punic War prepared himself and the Carthaginians, a commercial trades-people, for the great war with Rome which he saw could not be avoided. The history of the early years of the Second Punic War tells us of his marvelous success. Cromwell led a religious rebellion against the king, carrying the Puritans to victory. George Washington for eight years led the revolutionary armies of our own country and

kept up the spirit of his faltering compatriots. Napoleon seized the opportunity of a regenerated France, whose people were fired with an enthusiasm for liberty and freedom, to lead her armies into the path of military glory and conquest. Finally, in the World War [I] we have the example of our own country - a peaceful nation - suddenly becoming filled with military ardor and the fighting spirit.

In nearly all of these great historical examples, we find a great leader who, in his own character, was the incarnation of the aspirations of his people and who, in his turn, built up their morale and esprit and led them to their goal.

Human nature is much the same as it has always been, although it has evolved with its environment, and the first essential of a successful military leader is to be able to understand and comprehend the emotions and the spirit which lives in the hearts and souls of the men he commands.

The study of leadership involves, therefore, first of all a study of human nature, One must put himself in the place of those whom he would lead; he must have a full understanding of their thoughts, their attitude, their emotions, their aspirations, and their ideals; and he must embody in his own character the virtues which he would instill into the hearts of his followers. True esprit de corps is founded on the great military virtues such as unselfishness, self control, energy honor and courage.

In time of peace, the cultivation of esprit is much more difficult than in time of war. The men have no great mission before them and it is hard to convince them that it is necessary to train arduously and to prepare themselves for an eventuality which does not appear to be imminent. Careful instruction in the history and traditions of their organization is of the utmost importance.

The United States Marine Corps has always been noted for its esprit de corps. This has been largely due to the fact that it has always been in competition with some other arm of the service. It habitually serves side by side with the Navy, and every officer who is worth his salt feels impelled to have his detachment, company, or other organization, win out in every competition, whether it be baseball, football, or other athletic activities, target practice, drills, discipline, appearance, conduct, military etiquette, or any of the other many things which go to make for efficiency. This competitive spirit is constantly drilled into the men, and as a result, every good Marine is ever on the *qui vive* to find some way to “put it over” the Navy. The same spirit exists when the Marines are detached for service with the Army, and an appeal to it always receives a response. The esprit of the Marines is that of the Corps, and while there is always a regimental and company esprit, the esprit of the Corps predominates.

In peace times too, creature comforts have a great effect in keeping up the morale of the men. The officers must see to it that the men are properly housed, clothed, and fed and that their time is taken up in useful and interesting instruction and entertainment. Idleness is the curse of the military life, but any treadmill instruction is a poor substitute. Officers must use ingenuity and initiative and must have their own minds trained and developed so that they can properly train their men. Discipline, in its true sense, should never be neglected. The men should be made to realize its great importance, but in enforcing it, officers should never be harsh or arrogant in their dealings with their men, but always kind, humane, and just.

In time of war, the leader must keep in touch with the current of thought of his men. He must find out what their grievances are, if any, and not only endeavor to correct the faulty conditions, but also to eradicate any feeling of

discontent from their minds. He should mingle freely with his men and let them understand that he takes a personal interest in the welfare of every one of them. It is not necessary for him to isolate himself in order to retrain their respect. On the contrary, he should go among them frequently so that every man in his organization may know him and feel that he knows them. This should be especially the case before battle.

He should watch carefully the training and instruction of the troops, and let them see that he is determined that they shall be fully prepared for battle. And if there be no liability of the information reaching the enemy, he should take his entire organization into his confidence and inform them of the great events that are taking place in other theaters of operations, the part being played by other units, and by their allies, if any; and give them full information of the eve of battle as to the plan of operations and the part to be played by each unit of the organization. Of course, that depends entirely whether or not the information can be kept from the enemy, if you are in reserve position, for instance.

It is especially advisable, whenever it can be done, for the commander to assemble his troops by battalions and address them, telling them of the great traditions and history of their organization and appealing to their patriotism and their esprit de corps. No stone should be left unturned to fill their hearts and minds with a determination to conquer, no matter what difficulties are to be overcome, and what losses they may be called on to suffer. The commander himself should be the symbol of the fighting spirit which he endeavors to foster and should show in himself a good example of patriotism, honor, and courage.

The first words of the Article of Government of the Navy, which correspond to the Articles of War, require that the commander of every vessel should show in himself an example of virtue, honor, patriotism,

and subordination. That is the preamble for the Article of Government of the Navy.

In the larger units, it is frequently impossible for the commander to address all of the men or to come in personal contact with them. In this case, battle orders should be issued. These orders should be based on a careful study of the problems involved and an intimate knowledge of the thoughts of his men. Following the battle, it is well, too, to issue an order recounting the exploits of the troops and telling them of the effects of their efforts. At this time the men are exhausted in mind and body, and even though they may have been victorious, they are depressed in spirit on account of the many losses they have suffered; their comrades have been killed and wounded, they have witnessed many terrible scenes, and every effort should be made to cheer and raise their spirits. Praise and commendation should be given freely; decorations should be promptly awarded and delivered immediately after withdrawal from the front lines. Addresses to organizations which have distinguished themselves should be made. Replacements should be furnished promptly, if practicable, and the thoughts of the men immediately turned to building up their shattered organizations and preparing again to strike the enemy. Skulkers and cowards should be promptly and publicly punished so that all may see the great gulf which separates them from the gallant men who have served faithfully and courageously.

One is just as important as the other. The way it appealed to me overseas is that there were three classes of men. The first class, [were] the gallant, courageous fellows who did not require any urging or any leadership practically, but who from a sense of duty, loyalty, and patriotism would stay up in the front lines and fight until all hell froze over. And the third class, [were] the skulkers, the white-livered fellows whom you could not expect anything of at all. Then there was a great middle class who could be swayed either

way, and that was the class you had to deal with. If the services of the men who fought bravely were not promptly and properly recognized on the one hand, and if the skulkers and cowards were not punished on the other, the sentiment might grow that it was just as well to skulk. You got nothing for doing your duty and you got nothing for not doing your duty. The two go hand in hand, and punishments should be prompt and merciless to a real coward. On the other hand, praise, commendation, and rewards should be freely given and promptly given. The French, I think, understood the psychology of their troops and decorated them immediately after they came out of the fight.

Finally, the most vital thing is to make the men feel that they are invincible, that no power can defeat them, and that the success of their country's cause depends on the victory of their organization.

I mentioned in reading this about informing the men beforehand what they were going to do. That policy was exemplified before the Second Division went into the battle of the Meuse-Argonne. We moved up in the reserve of the Fifth Corps. We had the general officers and the chief of staff, who was Colonel Ray, at several conferences at Fifth Corps headquarters, in which General Summerall explained in the greatest detail just what each division of the corps and the whole army was to do on November 1st. I took this back to division headquarters and had the senior officers of the division together, and Colonel Ray and myself explained everything to them. We were then in reserve with no opportunity for information to seep through the lines. It was directed that every officer and every man in the division be informed of the part we were going to play and what the object of the battle was, and what would be accomplished if victory was achieved. A map was drawn and given to every platoon, and each platoon leader had his men up and instructed every one down

to and including the privates of just what his platoon was going to do in the battle. There was plenty of time and opportunity to have it all worked out in advance and the consequence was that the whole division felt absolutely certain what it was going through on that day and it did go through.

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Peleliu-Recollections Of A Pfc

E. B. Sledge, Ph.D., is the author of the popular book, "With The Old Breed At Peleliu And Okinawa," published by Presidio Press. The book is available to our readers through the Marine Corps Association Bookservice at \$14.35 for association members and \$15.95 for nonmembers, plus \$1.00 for shipping and handling.

Sledge was a Marine Pfc and barely in his twenties when he landed with the First Marine Division on the island of Peleliu in September 1944. Following is his stark, ground-level account of "one of the most fierce, savage and bloody battles of WW II." - Ed.

The battle for Peleliu was a long, long time ago, and it is not pleasant to set forth the following recollections of my days there as a Marine Pfc. There is neither nostalgia nor wistful sentimentality in recounting the suffering, brutality and horror that was the reality I experienced in one of the most fierce, savage and bloody battles of WW II.

Thirty-nine years have not dimmed the memory. However, if my comments enable the reader to visualize more clearly the true nature of the awesome obstacles which confronted my comrades, and how they overcame them, then I am amply rewarded.

My experiences were typical of those of most Marines in a rifle company. Many fine historical accounts of campaigns - the "big picture" - clearly explain what happened in battle. This is as it should be. However, one should keep in mind the very important fact that the infantryman in combat was totally immersed in the abyss of hell, fighting the enemy in a desperate struggle for survival.

For us, combat was a series of changing events characterized by confusion, awesome violence, gripping fear, physical stress and fatigue, fierce hatred of the enemy, and overwhelming grief over the loss of friends. We endured vile personal filth in a repulsive environment, saturated with the stench of death and decay. The vital element in our lives was the faith and trust we had in each other. Nothing else mattered.

I have written elsewhere a detailed account of many of my experiences on Peleliu. Here, I am simply setting forth certain events taken from the total experience, and the reader should not look for continuity in the sequence of episodes. Time had no meaning - we lived only in the present moments of each event, for survival seemed less and less likely amid the violence and death of the present.

Like any other WW II enlisted Marine in a rifle, or line, company, the company was my world and my home - the 235 men of K Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, First Marine Division, were my family.

In combat I saw little, knew little, and understood still less about anything that occurred outside K-3-5. We had our hands full fighting and trying to survive moment to moment. I was assistant gunner on #2 gun in the company's 60-mm. mortar section. Merriel A. ("Snafu") Shelton, of Louisiana, and a veteran of the Cape Cloucester Campaign, was gunner - and there wasn't a finer one.

Our veteran company commander, Capt Andrew A. ("Ack Ack") Haldane, was widely acclaimed as one of the very best in the Marine Corps. He was a large man and possessed every personal and professional attribute of ability, leadership, courage, compassion and dignity one could possibly find in the best of officers.

Second in command was the veteran Executive Officer, 1stLt Thomas A. ("Stumpy") Stanley. Short, muscular, equally as capable as Ack Ack, Stumpy was always on the move. If Ack Ack was the rudder that guided K-3-5, Stumpy was the propeller that kept it moving - never too fast,

never too slow, but just the right pace for the situation at hand.

In my most vivid picture of Ack Ack, he is studying a map, his prominent jaw covered with a stubble of black beard, his brow beneath the rim of his helmet creased and wrinkled in concentration, his radio man and a couple of runners beside him, awaiting orders.

Stumpy seemed always on the move. His muscular legs driving like pistons across Peleliu's rough terrain as he coordinated positions, supervised removal of the wounded, or checked the company's flanks. When we had to withdraw from some untenable position, Stumpy always seemed to be the last man out - walking backwards, or running and turning as he fired bursts from his Thompson .45 Cal. submachine gun to cover our withdrawal. He always went where there was a problem and squared things away. It was a miracle that he never got hit. He was constantly exposed to heavy fire even when the rest of us were ordered to take cover.

Early afternoon on D-Day found three companies of 3/5 - I, K and L - separated and out of contact in the thick scrub growth somewhere south of the airfield. The battalion C.P. had been knocked out by enemy shelling and most of us in K Company were pinned down by small arms and shell fire. Visibility was poor through the scrub, smoke and dust. Ammunition was low, water was short, and the heat was unbearable. I feared we would

all be lost, but the veterans, though obviously afraid, remained calm and confident.

Sgt Henry A. "Hank" Boyes contacted a tank, climbed onto the turret and directed the gunner's fire. He spotted and directed the knockout of four strongly held Japanese artillery positions. Hank clung to the turret of that tank amidst a storm of enemy fire of every kind and caliber. The enemy was all around us, so the tanker rotated his turret and fired his .30 caliber machine guns and 75mm. cannon in a complete 360-degree circle.

A Japanese 75-mm. field gun was knocked out about 30 yards from my squad around a bend in a trail. We could hear the terrifying, thundering report of the enemy gunfiring, but couldn't see it. Hank emerged unscratched, and the opposition was almost wiped out in our area. Why he wasn't shot to pieces I'll never understand. We were able to fall back and later tie in with the Division line at the edge of the airfield after dark.

Hank Boyes was later awarded the Silver Star Medal on Stumpy Stanley's recommendation. Hank single-handedly saved K-3-5 that day. Stumpy said years later that it was the only medal he ever recommended in K-3-5 throughout Peleliu and Okinawa. It is his conviction that every man in the company at one time or another did something deserving of a decoration, but Hank's heroism that day saved us all. On this all the survivors heartily agree.

On the morning of September 16, 1944, as we took up positions

to make the costly attack across the open airfield under heavy fire, I passed a Marine machine gun position in a company of 2/5 that had killed about 15 Japanese during a pre-dawn counterattack. The dead were strung out in front of the gun and all had one or more disc-shaped mines tied to their bodies. The Japanese closest to the gun position had an unexploded grenade in his right hand, plus a mine tied on his pack above his shoulders and one on each hip.

"With all our flares and star shell, I managed to see this bunch and rack 'em up before they rushed us in the dark and set off those mines," the gunner told me. "I guess that first one was going to set off his mines with the grenade," I replied. "You said that right," remarked the gunner, "and it would have played hell with this part of the line if he had."

"Let's go, Sledgehammer," someone yelled.

I passed a small crater with a man in Marine battle dress sitting in it with a small portable typewriter on his knees. We halted nearby and I watched in admiration as the correspondent typed furiously away with the shells whistling over and bursting with increasing frequency in our area.

We were filled with dread as we lay on the scorching hot coral and looked north across the open toward Bloody Nose Ridge. Snafu and I were in the area where the upright and the horizontal runways intersected to form a figure 4. The horizontal runway ran roughly northeast.

As we moved forward, I clenched my teeth, prayed and squeezed my carbine stock.

Enemy artillery shells came in screaming or whistling. The smaller the caliber, the higher the pitch. Our 75's went switching over on their deadly mission, joined by big naval shells which rumbled along like locomotives in the distance. Enemy mortar shells, mostly the big 81-mm. and 90-mm., emitted an almost inaudible, soft whisper - whissh-shh-shh, whissh-shh-shh - as they approached. So soft was the sound of their approach that the shell was almost upon us without warning.

The Sound of the explosion seemed to be in two parts and began with a grinding and crunching noise like some demon clawing its way to freedom from inside the shell, followed by a loud, dull BANG. Steel fragments rushed out and tore through the air with a whirring, ripping sound that caused even the most stout-hearted to cringe. That terrible murmuring voice of an incoming mortar shell, so intimate and insidious, seemed, like the ghostly summons of some ghoulish witch, to enter into oblivion on the wings of violent explosion. Each shell seemed alive to and to be whispering, "Maybe next time."

We got across unhurt except for a bruise Snafu received on his side from a spent fragment. Many other weren't so lucky. To be shelled in the open as we ran was a terrifying experience - one of my most horrid and vivid memories.

One day we were read an "inspiring message" from the

Division Commanding General to the effect that we didn't need Army help to finish Peleliu. This was met with curses and profound expressions of hope from the troops that unprintable things should be in the general's future. We had given our all, lost a majority of our buddies, endured the horrors of hell, and in no mood for messages of cheer from way back at the Division C.P.

On September 28, after two weeks of 24-hour-a-day combat, the weary men of depleted 3-5 boarded amtracs and attacked Ngesebus Island to capture the fighter strip. Despite our fears, the landing was easy, thanks to the magnificent support of Corsairs and naval gunfire. A ridge honeycombed with caves gave K-3-5 a lot of trouble, however. Official reports said opposition was "meager," "light," or "slight." Possibly so in Division C.P. On the line it was a bloody fierce fight. There was ample evidence of the enemy's willingness to die fighting.

Pfc Bill Leyden, of New York, saw four enemy soldiers run down into a cave, so he tossed a grenade in after them. It exploded and an enemy soldier immediately jumped out, threw a grenade, and yelled in perfect English, "Here I am Marine! Kill me! Kill me!" Leyden fired from the hip-all eight rounds from his M1, killing the soldier instantly. The grenade exploded in the air, shrapnel struck Leyden in the left eye and the concussion knocked him out. He came to in a

moment, just in time to reload his rifle and shoot an enemy soldier crawling along in front of him.

Leyden was carried on a stretcher to an amtrac for evacuation. Dazed and in pain, he looked up as a Marine asked, "How is it up there, son?"

In that fury all front-line Marines reserved for anyone not on the line, Leyden retorted, "Get off your ass and go inland about 200 yards and you can find out."

Astonished, the man replied, "Don't worry, son. You'll be all right," as he moved away.

Another casualty on the amtrac informed Leyden he had just addressed LtCol Lew Walt, the Executive Officer of the 5th Marines.

(Leyden recovered and returned to K-3-5 after Peleliu. On his 19th birthday, on Okinawa, he was blown into the air and seriously wounded by the terrific blast and concussion of an artillery shell landing in his foxhole. Years later, at a Marine Corps reunion, Lew Walt reminded Leyden of the incident at Ngesebus. The Intrepid Walt had been so astounded at the insubordination of the young casualty that he had backed off the amtrac ramp and nearly broken his ankle.)

We were exhausted after the day-and-a-half fight on Ngesebus. over 470 Japanese troops were killed. K-3-5 alone lost eight killed and 24 wounded-hardly meager opposition, We had already fought for two terrible weeks on Peleliu, but rest and relief were not yet to be our reward.

On October 1, 1944, K-3-5 was attached to the 7th Marines. We made hopeless attacks on the Five Sisters ridges, K-3-5 losing eight killed and 22 wounded. For 15 more grueling days and nights we fought in the valleys and on the ridges of the Umbrogol Pocket, blasted and burned as barren as the surface of the moon. Our intense hatred of the enemy grew as they shot our helpless wounded and the dedicated corpsmen who were struggling to give what aid and comfort they could on the battlefield.

No amount of shelling, bombing, napalm, or satchel charges seemed to do much damage to the coral rock which protected the enemy in his caves. Every night they raided and tried to infiltrate our lines. We were so weary I often had to hold the eyelid of one eye open to stay awake while Snafu tried to sleep. One man had to be awake all night in each foxhole-or "position." - because it was impossible dig into the rock. We frequently fired illumination shells and/or H.E. all night. The muzzle flash of the mortar was attractive to infiltrators.

War as we knew it was savage and brutal. compassion was never extended to the enemy and was not expected in return. But to our own- both wounded and dead - a mother tending her babe could not be more gentle.

After exactly one month on the line we were relieved by Army troops who fought five more weeks to knock out the last enemy position.

We lost about 64% casualties in K-3-5. Statistics to historians, but fine, trustworthy buddies and leaders to the grief stricken survivors. The old salts said Peleliu was the fiercest combat they had ever seen.

How were we able to win such a fierce fight? I'll leave the "big picture" to the historians. But, it should be remembered, in the Pacific, for every infantryman on the line, 18 men were required in support (*The Sharp End* by John Ellis). Therefore, on man out of 19 knew war at its worst. The infantryman was called on to put his life on the line time after time beyond hope of survival, and to the point of near-collapse.

I believe, from personal experience in two campaigns and over 30 years of studying the Pacific War, that Marines were the fines troops in WW II. Their record bears out my conclusion. A combination of ingredients went into the production of such crack troops: strict discipline; thorough, though training beginning with boot camp, and emphasis on hand-to hand combat (which built confidence) and on weapons skill and physical fitness; superb leadership from corporals on up; *esprit de corps*- in the USMC, and in each unit itself; confidence, faith and trust in each other; the will to win and not to quit. Much of this can be summed up as pride and morale. It was not a smug cockiness, but genuine self confidence at both the individual and unit levels. It was simply unthinkable to let another Marine down.

Frankly, I didn't like much of my training- I thought it was going to kill me, and sometimes it

just seemed pointless. In retrospect, I realize it all had a purpose and it was all essential- it made me a Marine. Every Marine is first an infantryman and a specialist secondarily.

On the line in the ridges of Peleliu I saw men from Division Headquarters, Amtracs, Artillery, Engineers, Weapons Company, etc. - Marines one and all - and that's why we won.

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